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In tr o d u c tio n
S o m e  T h o u g h t s  o n  C o m m u n ic a t io n  a n d  J u s t ic e
In this thesis I explore the idea o f  communicative injustice. That is, I consider the 
thought that some o f  our communicative practices are so vital to our flourishing existence as 
human persons that w e suffer an injustice in certain circumstances when these practices fail. For 
instance, sometimes the ability to successfully communicate consent or refusal means the 
difference between maintaining authority over our bodies and becom ing victims o f  rape and 
assault. Sometimes the ability to communicate successfully about an experience like sexual 
harassment means the difference between vulnerability to confusion, self-doubt, and further 
injustice and the ability to understand and combat that injustice from a situation o f  relative 
epistemic security. I argue that there are conditions under which w e should be able to 
communicate certain things, and that sometimes an inability to communicate constitutes an 
injustice. That is, under my account, a person may becom e a victim o f  injustice when certain 
kinds o f  communication become impossible for her.
I begin in Chapter One with an introduction to an important debate about justice and 
communication: Catherine MacKinnon and Rae Langton’s work on silencing. I investigate some 
o f  Catherine MacKinnon’s claims about pornography and its relationship with speech. I then 
introduce some basic parts o f  Austinian speech act theory. With these background materials in 
place, I go on to outline Rae Langton’s silencing claim, and I offer som e reasons why this claim  
might be reasonable and useful. Langton’s work on silencing is particularly interesting for my 
purposes in this thesis because the woman in Langton’s paradigmatic refusal example finds 
herself unable to communicate in a way that seem s unjust and not simply unfortunate.
In Chapter Two I look at several critiques o f  Langton’s silencing claim. I outline 
arguments based in speech act theory made by Jacobson and Bird. I also look at critiques based 
in notions o f  authority and responsibility, including N ellie Weiland’s arguments about convention 
and linguist Deborah Cameron’s work on gendered communication and gendered communication 
failure. Finally, I consider Ishani Maitra’s Gricean alternative formulation. With each critique I
1
consider the advantages and disadvantages o f  Langton’s silencing framework. I use this chapter 
to discover the contours o f  some current debates about communication and justice.
In Chapter Three I delve more deeply into the ideas behind Langton’s silencing claim  
and begin to develop a broader understanding o f  communicative injustice. I ask how the man in 
the paradigmatic refusal example could have taken the woman to be consenting to sex in the face 
o f  all the evidence that she was not. I consider Lewis-style convention as one possible 
explanation. I also look at Miranda Fricker’s idea o f  a hermeneutical resource as a model for 
another kind o f  explanation. In this chapter I develop the idea that our communicative resources 
may be affected by prejudice and social inequality. With Fricker, I argue that marginalized 
groups may struggle with interpretive resources that are inadequate, or at least less adequate than 
those o f  more socially powerful groups.
In Chapter Four I examine Miranda Fricker’s work on hermeneutical injustice in more 
detail. I argue that Fricker’s insistence that there is a particular kind o f  asymmetry between the 
victim o f  this injustice and her surrounding social colleagues is problematic. I offer several 
different lines o f  argument that all combine to provide a critique o f  this asymmetry claim. In 
particular, I consider the significance o f  background social conditions for Fricker’s argument, 
and suggest that an epistemic injustice should not rely on other forms o f  disadvantage to achieve 
its status as an injustice.
In Chapter Five I finally begin to give an account o f  what I call ‘resource-based 
communicative injustice’, or ‘RCI’. I set out each part o f  my working definition: the resource 
deficit, the communicative attempt, and the vital need condition. I then put all three parts 
together in the form o f  a working definition. I also work through two potential counterexamples 
that give me an opportunity to explain communicative injustice in more detail.
Finally, in Chapter Six I revisit each o f  the main examples that I consider in this thesis 
and add one final contemporary illustration o f  politically significant communication failure. I 
work through each case as a potential instance o f  resource-based communicative injustice. I use 
this review o f  RCI to further illustrate the strengths and advantages o f  the resource-based 
communicative injustice framework.
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My goal here is to provide a working definition o f  resource-based communicative 
injustice. It is my hope that this definition and its accompanying conceptual framework can help 
us to gain a better understanding o f  some important kinds o f  communication failure. These 
failures include Langton’s silencing examples and Fricker’s sexual harassment case, but they also 
include other cases involving words and concepts like ‘rape’, ‘sexism ’, and ‘fem inism ’. The RCI 
framework also has a certain practical appeal. It captures communication failure from a broad 
and inclusive perspective instead o f  focusing only on those who are most obviously harmed by 
such failure. The practical advantage o f  this broad focus lies in its inclusiveness: those people 
who can understand them selves as part o f  a community-wide failure (as opposed to an individual 
error or instance o f  bad behavior) are less likely to feel alienated and hostile to considerations o f  
social justice and movements toward change.
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C hapter  O ne
S i l e n c i n g
In this chapter I look at the origins o f  ‘silencing ’. I begin by investigating some o f  
Catherine MacKinnon’s claims about pornography and its relationship with 
speech. I  then introduce some basic parts o f  Austinian speech act theory. With 
these background materials in place, I  go on to outline Rae Langton’s silencing 
claim, and I offer some reasons why this claim might be reasonable and useful.
1.1 Ma c Kin n o n  a n d  Po r n o g r aph y
Catherine MacKinnon has been involved in the legal and political debate about 
pornography and free speech for more than three decades. She, in company with Andrea 
Dworkin, is one o f  the principle authors o f  anti-pornography legislation that was passed in 
Indianapolis and then struck down in 1984.' Various versions o f  this legislation were proposed 
in American cities throughout the 1980s, with varying degrees o f  success. The United States 
Supreme Court has upheld all lower court rulings that the Dworkin-MacKinnon Anti- 
pornography Civil Rights Ordinance violates the right to freedom o f  speech protected by the 
First Amendment, and the legislation has never been successfully implemented. In spite o f  this 
ruling, MacKinnon continues to argue that pornography is harmful to women, and she bases an 
important part o f  her argument on the relationship between pornography and speech. 
Incidentally, MacKinnon’s definition o f  pornography is often used as a point o f  reference in the 
philosophical literature on this subject.1 2
MacKinnon’s exact position on the putative wrong done to women by pornography is 
complicated and often misunderstood. This misunderstanding has led to a great deal o f  criticism, 
both philosophical and legal, and it is this misguided criticism that has inspired some
1 See American Booksellers, Inc. v. Hudnut, 598 F Supp. 1327 (S. D. Ind. 1984). The ordinance made it actionable 
to traffic in pornography, but did not prohibit pornography itself.
2 See Vadas (2005), Langton (1993), Eaton (2007) to name just a few.
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philosophers to clarify and defend MacKinnon.3 I w ill outline two o f  MacKinnon’s claims about 
pornography here. Before I do however, let me be clear that MacKinnon is not making an 
argument against pornography that is based on any kind o f  prohibition o f  obscenity. She is not 
claiming that pornography ought to be illegal because it is shocking to public morals. Rather, 
she makes her argument based on the ways that pornography can be seen to circumscribe, limit, 
or deny wom en’s rights. This distinction is important because it helps us to see MacKinnon’s 
goal more clearly. She does not want to stop pornography because is depicts things that might be 
considered lewd or shocking and thereby harmful to the public good. Instead, she wants to stop 
pornography because it limits w om en’s rights, such as the right to bodily integrity or the right to 
equality under the law. MacKinnon aims to protect women, not public morals. An awareness o f  
this goal might help readers to understand why she makes her particular kind o f  argument against 
pornography.
The rights and freedoms that MacKinnon is interested in defending are integrally related to 
speech, but they are not limited only to speech. She notes that the boundaries between speech 
and action can be difficult to draw. Pornography can count as both speech and action at the same 
time, MacKinnon argues, and this double label need not confuse or deter us.
...[E xpression  is not just talk. Pornography not only teaches the reality o f  
male dominance. It is one way its reality is imposed as well as experienced. It 
is a way o f  seeing and using women. Male power makes authoritative a way o f  
seeing and treating women, so that when a man looks at a pornographic picture 
- pornographic meaning that the woman is defined as to be acted upon, a sexual 
object, a sexual thing - the viewing is an act, an act o f  male supremacy.4
In other words, pornography is not just, say, the filmmaker’s expression o f  a particular point o f  
view  or the provision o f  an entertainment. It is also the authorization o f  a particular b elief about 
women, namely that a woman is “to be acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual thing”. When 
someone view s pornography, MacKinnon claims, this viewing is the act o f  authorization. It is 
therefore an act o f  “male supremacy”.
3 Rae Langton provides an excellent summary of some of these criticisms in Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, pp. 
294-7.
4 Mackinnon (1987), p. 130.
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This is an interesting and distinctive part o f  MacKinnon’s view. Other advocates o f  anti- 
pornography legislation have argued, with varying degrees o f  success, that pornography 
contributes to many injustices suffered by women, including sexual assault, domestic violence, 
and workplace inequalities like lower rates o f  pay.5 MacKinnon, however, is not simply saying 
that pornography causes or may cause these effects on wom en’s lives, or may contribute to male 
supremacy. Over and above these things, she is stating that pornography is male supremacy. To 
be precise, though pornography is classed as speech, it is also an act o f  male supremacy. A s 
MacKinnon and Dworkin say in their definition o f  pornography in the Anti-pornography Civil 
Rights Ordinance, “We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination o f  
women in pictures or words.”6 This definition is the first o f  two claims by MacKinnon that I w ill 
examine in this thesis. This claim has proved itself to be challenging, and has led to the charge 
that MacKinnon must be speaking metaphorically, thereby exaggerating her claim and distorting 
the issue. However, an examination o f  a second claim suggests that she intends neither to 
exaggerate nor to employ metaphor.
Consider the following quotation from “Linda’s Life and Andrea’s Work”:
An additional assumption underlying the First Amendment is that free speech is 
necessary to discern truth, that the partiality produced by suppression distorts 
truth. ...[In opposition to this assumption, consider that] pornography hides 
and distorts truth while at the same time enforcing itself, imprinting itself on 
the world, making itself real. That’s another way in which pornography is a 
kind o f  act.7
Here, MacKinnon builds upon her claim that pornography is an act o f  male supremacy by further 
elaborating the actions that constitute making and viewing pornography. In making a 
pornographic film or image, you commit the act o f  hiding and distorting the truth (presumably 
the truth at issue here is about wom en’s sexuality and the harms o f  sexual objectification and 
abuse). By allowing (mostly male) pomographers to make pornographic films (and indulging in
5 Judge Easterbrook stated that pornography does these things in American Booksellers, Inc. v. Hudnut, 771 F. 2d 
329 (7th Cir. 1985). He, however, concluded that these things only served to demonstrate the power of pornography 
as speech. See Langton’s commentary on this in Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, p. 25-27.
6 See MacKinnon (1987) p. 130.
7 Ibid.
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this assumption about free speech), we allow  men to hide and distort the truth about wom en’s 
sexuality. In addition, MacKinnon says, “the free speech o f  men silences the free speech o f  
women. It is the same goal, just other p e o p l e This is the second claim  by MacKinnon that I 
will examine here. This second claim marks the beginning o f  the debate over what has com e to 
be known as ‘silencing’.
Taken together, these two claims make up what I w ill call the MacKinnon Claim. This 
claim can be stated as follows:
T he M acK innon Claim: Pornography subordinates and silences women.
This claim is bold and aggressive in its criticism o f  pornography, not least because it addresses 
itself directly to pornography, not just to the people who make and consume pornographic films 
and images. MacKinnon is not directly attacking pomographers or porn users by saying, for 
example, that they are abusing women. Instead, she targets pornography itself. It is 
pornography, not pomographers, that distorts the truth about wom en’s sexuality.8 9 This m ove is 
the one most criticized or characterized as confusion by MacKinnon’s critics. H ow  could  
pictures or films distort truth or reify anything? They are inanimate objects, not intentional 
agents. Could MacKinnon have been simply using colorful rhetoric? In this chapter I w ill 
explore the idea that there is reason to believe the characterization o f  pornography in the above 
passages is not mere hyperbole or metaphor. I begin by exploring some philosophical precedents 
to the idea that we can commit acts with our words. In the next section I w ill introduce som e o f  
the work done by J.L. Austin on speech acts in the hope that it may provide further support for 
the MacKinnon Claim and the kind o f  m ove that MacKinnon is trying to make here.
1.2 T h e Au stin ian  Backg r o u n d
A s I stated in the previous section, MacKinnon’s claims about the power wielded by 
pornography are not without precedent. Philosophers working on speech act theory have also
8 MacKinnon (1987), p. 156.
9 For a discussion of whether people or objects perform speech acts see Jennifer Saul, ‘Pornography, Speech Acts, 
and Context’ Proceedings o f  the Aristotelian Society 106:2, 61-80.
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noted the many ways that speech can count as action, beginning with the work of J.L. Austin. 
Austin based his critique of what was then contemporary philosophy of language on what he 
described as the widespread philosophical prejudice that sentences or utterances always describe 
something and so are always truth-evaluable. There are, as Austin pointed out, several types of 
sentences that are neither true nor false, and these sentences were largely ignored by the 
philosophical establishment of Austin’s day. Examples of these neglected sentences include 
nonsensical sentences, interrogatives, sentences expressing ethical claims, and what Austin 
called ‘performatives’.10
Austin contrasts this latter example, the performative, with what he calls the constative 
utterance, or an utterance that is used to ascertain, verily, establish, or prove something, and so 
can itself be described as either true or false. He gives two conditions for performative 
utterances, namely that
1. “they do not ‘describe’ or ‘report’ or constate anything at all, are not ‘true or 
false’; and
2. the uttering of the sentence is, or is a part of, the doing of an action, which 
again would not normally be described as, or as ‘just’, saying something.”11
This set of conditions is followed by a list of examples that help to make his point. I have 
adapted and expanded some of Austin’s original examples for my own purposes here:
• The sentence uttered “in the course of the marriage ceremony”, as in ‘I,
Beth, take you, Cindy, to be my lawfully wedded wife’.12
• The sentence uttered when christening a boat, as in ‘I name this ship the 
Queen Elizabeth ’.
• The sentence uttered in a legal will or testament, as in ‘I bequeath all of my 
wealth to the Hershey’s Chocolate Company’.
10 It is a matter of contention as to whether or not some of these examples really fail to be truth-evaluable. I am not 
going to enter that debate here.
11 Austin (1962), p. 5.
12 This particular example has resulted in some discussion because there are some places where the utterance of 
those words would not count as a performative utterance, or at least would not, in Austin’s words, be a felicitous 
performative, due to legal restrictions.
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• The sentence uttered when making a bet, as in ‘I bet that I will finish my 
thesis before the end of the war in Iraq’.13
Of course, not every sentence can count as one of the speech acts described above. A 
speaker must first utter the relevant words, certainly, but something more than the correct 
utterance is required in order that I successfully bequeath my wealth to the Hershey’s Chocolate 
Company. As Austin says, “[bjesides the uttering of the words of the so-called performative, a 
good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to 
have happily brought off our action.”14 Austin describes such happy and successful speech acts 
as felicitous, and he states that they must meet the following set of necessary conditions:
1. A conventional procedure must exist that has a conventional effect. The 
procedure must include the uttering of certain words by certain persons in 
certain circumstances, and the persons and circumstances involved in the 
procedure must be appropriately conventional.
2. The procedure must be carried out correctly and completely by all 
participants.
3. If the procedure is designed for people with certain thoughts or feelings, then 
the participants must truly have those thoughts or feelings, and subsequently
* act as if they did as well.15
Any unhappy utterance that does not meet all of these conditions is infelicitous, and infelicities 
come in many forms. For example, if Beth were to stand in Utah or some other place where gay 
marriage is illegal and say the words of the marriage ceremony to Cindy, she would not succeed 
in marrying her. Her speech act would be infelicitous because the circumstances of her utterance 
were not in accord with the conventions of marriage in the state of Utah. Also, I can attempt to 
bequeath my wealth to as many chocolate companies as I like, but until I do so in a legal
13 Austin also lists the interesting example of what he calls “the American law of evidence”, in which “a report of 
what someone else said is admitted as evidence if what he said is an utterance o f our performative kind: because this 
is regarded as a report not so much of something he said, as which it would be hear-say and not admissible as 
evidence, but rather as something he did, an action of his”. I assume that this kind o f example has become highly 
pertinent in recent legal cases in the UK in which people have been convicted of terrorism on the basis that their 
speech incited terror or religious hatred. However, the First Amendment has historically insured the right of U.S. 
citizens to speak freely, even to advocate violence against the state. The kind of case that Austin has in mind (at 
least in the U.S.A.) will require some special argumentation to the effect that the speech in question was, say, more 
than mere advocacy and had crossed into the realm of an order or command. In this way, the speech is clearly part 
of the action that goes on to be, say, murder. See Austin (1962), p. 13.
14 Austin (1962), p. 14.
15 Summarized here from Austin’s own conditions. See Austin (1962), p. 14-15.
9
document and in the presence of witnesses, the chocolate companies are unlikely to inherit any 
of my wealth. To complicate matters, as we shall see in Chapter Two, there will always be 
borderline cases, cases that do not quite meet the felicity conditions, or cases that meet them but 
are still not clearly successful or felicitous.
It should now be clear that many kinds of utterances are performative, and that Austin has 
given us a good guide for identifying what does and does not count as a successful performative. 
However, making a clear distinction between performatives and constatives still proves to be 
difficult, in part because there is some disagreement as to whether performatives actually fail to 
be truth-evaluable and in part because Austin came to the conclusion that to state something is to 
perform a kind of act, thus making all constatives into performatives anyway.16 In light of this 
difficulty, Austin decided to move forward from the performative-constative dichotomy and into 
a new system of nomenclature. As Austin says, we ought to
...consider from the ground up how many senses there are in which to say 
something is to do something, or in saying something we do something, and even 
by saying something we do something. And we began by distinguishing a whole 
group of senses of ‘doing something’ which are all included together when we say, 
what is obvious, that to say something is in the full normal sense to do 
something.17
But these distinctions are still tricky, so Austin attempts to clarify things by distinguishing three 
new ways that speech can be action,
1. To perform a locutionary act is to utter a sentence that has a particular 
meaning. For example, by saying “Shoot her,” you mean for me to pick up a 
gun and shoot the woman next to me.
2. The perlocutionary act is the effect of the words uttered. For example, by 
saying “Shoot her,” you shocked me. You also persuaded me to shoot the 
woman next to me.
16 In the end, Austin is unclear about whether or not he wishes to uphold the distinction. He goes some way towards 
softening his claim that to state something is to do something in his discussion of illocutionary force, (see his (1962) 
pp. 133-147), and he does note that some utterances (‘Sarah won the race.’) are truth-evaluable. Unfortunately, 
further investigation o f this distinction is beyond the scope of this thesis.
17 Austin (1962), p. 94.
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3. The illocutionary act is the act constituted by the utterance itself. It is what 
the utterance does. In saying “Shoot her,” you urged me to shoot a woman.
Urging, warning, promising, and marrying are illocutionary acts.18
and each of these acts falls into the class of actions called ‘speech acts’.
Even with this new classificatory system in place, Austin notes, we may still have
difficulty distinguishing between illocutions and locutions, and between illocutions and
perlocutions. In order to help us with this task, he introduces the notion of uptake, a notion that
will become important in Section 1.4. Regarding the relationship between illocution and
per locution, Austin writes:
[ujnless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
happily, successfully performed. This not to say that the illocutionary act is the 
achieving of a certain effect. I cannot be said to have warned an audience 
unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense. An effect 
must be achieved on the audience if the illocutionary act is to be carried out.
How should we best put it here? And how can we limit it? Generally the effect 
amounts to bringing about the understanding of the meaning and of the force of 
the locution. So the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing 
of uptake.19
In other words, we can make a fast-and-loose distinction as follows: illocutionary acts are bound 
up with effects, but are not limited to producing them, as are perlocutionary acts. A successful 
illocution requires of its audience that they grasp the content and force of the utterance, but this 
is not the same thing as being limited to producing an effect. Unfortunately, this way of making 
the illocution-perlocution distinction has proved to be inconclusive and has led to some 
confusion as to whether particular speech acts are illocutionary or perlocutionary.20 This issue 
will become relevant during some discussion of these issues in Chapter Two.
Returning briefly to our discussion in Section 1.1, the MacKinnon Claim is therefore not 
controversial because she is claiming that speech can be action. As we have now established, 
such a claim is neither radical nor without substantial philosophical precedent. Common sense
18 Austin (1962), pp. 101-103.
19 Austin (1962), p. 116.
20 See Alexander Bird’s discussion of the relationship between illocutionary and perlocutionary speech acts for a 
particularly relevant critique. Bird (2002). ‘Illocutionary Silencing’. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83:1, 1-15.
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tells us that we perform speech acts all of the time, and some of MacKinnon’s critics are very 
happy to agree that pornography might have perlocutionary effects such as arousal and 
entertainment.21 Instead, the MacKinnon Claim is controversial because of what MacKinnon 
claims that pornography does. Recall that the MacKinnon Claim states that pornography 
subordinates and silences women. What I take MacKinnon to be saying here is that 
subordinating and silencing are the acts constituted by utterances of pornography. These acts are 
not the effects of pornography. They are what pornography does. This claim is controversial, 
then, because critics have doubted that speech (like pornography) can do things like subordinate 
and silence.
In the next section I will set out a way of understanding this claim, based on the work of 
Rae Langton. Langton’s work has been foundational to the debate about silencing, and she takes 
MacKinnon’s work as her starting point.
1.3 Lan g to n ’s  Innovation
Rae Langton notes that the ability to perform speech acts can be extremely important.
The ability to perform speech acts of certain kinds can be a mark of political 
power. To put the point crudely: powerful people can generally do more, say 
more, and have their speech count for more than can the powerless. If you are 
powerful, there are more things you can do with your words.22
One very important thing that powerful people can do with their words is to silence the speech of 
the powerless, and it is in noting this that Langton brings Austin and MacKinnon together. Her 
innovative use of Austinian speech act theory to elucidate MacKinnon’s controversial claim 
about pornography brings feminism and more traditional philosophy together in a way that is 
both interesting and useful.
211 have already noted Judge Easterbrook’s thoughts on the effects of pornography. Rae Langton gathers evidence 
that pornography has more harmful effects in footnote 33 on page 39 of Sexual Solipsism. There is also evidence 
supporting the claims that pornography has beneficial effects and that it does not have the negative effects found in 
other studies. For a good summary o f this and o f some concerns with empirical evidence regarding the effects of 
pornography, see Saul (2003).
22 Langton (1993), p. 298-99.
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Langton initiated the philosophical debate about silencing with her influential paper 
entitled Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, in which she defends two claims about pornography 
made by Catherine MacKinnon. I presented one united version of these claims as the 
MacKinnon Claim in Section 1.1. Various forms of this claim were rejected by some of 
MacKinnon’s critics on the grounds that it is incoherent, and Langton responds to these critics in 
her paper. Recall MacKinnon’s Claims from Section 1.1:
1. We define pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women in 
pictures or words.
2. The free speech of men silences the free speech of women.
Langton summarizes these claims as follows:
1. Pornography is the subordination of women
2. Pornography silences women
I will focus here primarily on her defense of the second claim, which I will call the Langton 
Silencing Claim (LSC):
LSC: Pornography silences women.
The word ‘silencing’ does not immediately call to mind the kind of phenomena that 
Langton and MacKinnon highlight. When I talk of silencing somebody, I might traditionally 
have meant preventing that person from speaking. When we speak of silencing women, we 
usually mean stopping them from giving voice to their (negative, unjust) experiences. Langton 
notes this traditional usage, but she draws our attention to a way in which the usage can be 
stretched.
This bears on the question about silence. If you are powerful, you sometimes 
have the ability to silence the speech of the powerless. One way might be to 
stop the powerless from speaking at all. Gag them, threaten them, condemn 
them to solitary confinement. But there is another, less dramatic but equally 
effective way. Let them speak. Let them say whatever they like to whomever 
they like, but stop that speech from counting as an action. More precisely, stop 
it from counting as the action it was intended to be. That is the kind of 
silencing I will consider, and it is a kind of silencing about which Austin has 
something to say, without commenting on its political significance... If it can be
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shown that pornography contributes to this kind of silencing, then we will have 
a new way of understanding [MacKinnon’s] claim.23
In other words, Langton is interested in whether we can understand MacKinnon to be saying that 
pornography prevents women’s speech from counting as action.
In pursuit of this new understanding, Langton uses the Austinian speech act framework to 
construct her argument that pornography silences women. She begins with the assertion that 
pornography silences by preventing some women’s utterances of the word ‘no’ and other similar 
expressions of refusal from counting as actual refusals. “Some speech acts are unspeakable for 
women in some contexts: although the appropriate words can be uttered, those utterances fail to 
count as the actions they were intended to be.”24 One example that Langton has in mind goes 
something like this:
A man views pornography that depicts women as coy and sexually insatiable.
Women in these films say ‘no’ to sexual advances when they mean ‘yes’. In 
other words, they do not mean to refuse sex when they say ‘no’; they mean to 
tease and titillate men. The implication is that this kind of refusal, refusal from 
a woman in a sexual context, does not count as a “real” refusal. Instead, it 
counts as foreplay. This pornography-viewing man subsequently finds himself 
in a sexual context with a woman. The woman says ‘no’ to his sexual 
advances, but he does not take her utterance to count as a refusal, and he rapes 
her.
Langton argues that pornography is responsible for this woman’s illocutionary silencing. In 
other words, pornography makes it impossible for this woman to commit the act of refusing sex.
Recall Austin’s definition of an illocutionary act: the illocutionary act is the act constituted 
by the utterance itself. It is what the utterance does. The woman in this example utters the word 
‘no’, intending her utterance as a refusal of sexual consent to the man. If her refusal had been 
successful, the utterance of ‘no’ would have been an illocutionary act of refusal. However, the 
woman’s refusal was not successful. Instead, her utterance of ‘no’ counted as a kind of foreplay 
and sexual consent. Because of this, the woman did not perform the illocutionary act of refusal. 
It is a matter of some controversy as to whether she instead performed an act of consent, but this
23 Langton (1993), p. 299.
24 Ibid.
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additional claim is not strictly relevant to Langton’s argument.25 Langton argues that the woman 
is rendered unable to perform the illocutionary act of refusal. She concludes that pornography 
viewed by the man is responsible for the devastating communication failure in this example, and 
therefore that pornography silences women.
Langton also uses another example to illustrate her point about illocutionary silencing.
Linda Marchiano is a woman who has appeared in pornographic films. She wrote 
about her experiences during the filming of one particular piece, describing how 
she was beaten, tortured, drugged, coerced, and raped. Marchiano wrote about 
these experiences in explicit detail in order to protest against the treatment that she 
and other people endure in the making of pornographic films. She intended her 
account to shock and horrify her readers. Instead, Marchiano’s book is sold in 
pornography catalogues alongside material of pornographic content; it is sold as 
pornography.26
Langton argues that Marchiano’s illocutionary act of protest was silenced by the pom industry, 
just like the woman in the previous example. Neither one was able to perform the speech act that 
she intended to perform.
The women in Langton’s examples have been illocutionarily disabled. This means that 
their ability to perform a certain act, namely the act of refusing sex or the act of protest, has been 
damaged or taken away. Langton argues that their ability is taken away by pornographers: “The 
space for potential speech acts can be built by speakers, as can the limits on that space, the 
constraints responsible for the silence of illocutionary disablement.”27 In this case, the 
pomographers limit the space for potential speech acts. By (even inadvertently) inculcating 
certain beliefs in the minds of their audience, they prescribe the limits of women’s speech and 
leave no space for the speech acts of refusal and protest. It is important to note that these 
examples are different from the case in which the man ignores the woman’s refusal and rapes 
her. This kind of a case is an example of perlocutionary frustration; the woman was able to utter 
‘no’ and the man understood her utterance as a refusal, but her refusal failed to have the effect 
that the woman intended it to have. Illocutionary disablement or silencing is different from
25 See Jacobsen (1995) and Bird (2003).
26 See Linda Lovelace and Mike McGrady (1980), Ordeal.
27 Langton (1993) p. 320.
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perlocutionary frustration (though both may be caused by pornography, according to Langton). 
In cases of perlocutionary frustration, the woman still manages to express her refusal of sex even 
if the man ignores that refusal, but in instances of illocutionary silencing, the woman is not even 
able to refuse when she says ‘no’.
In the next section I will offer some reasons why the LSC might be reasonable and useful. 
I will do so by addressing some questions about Langton’s examples and how she uses parts of 
Austin’s work to make her case against pornography.
1.4 W hy S ilencing?
Though Langton and MacKinnon have both attracted criticism for their arguments, 
Langton set out to demonstrate that MacKinnon’s claim was not confused, misguided, or 
impossible to defend. I think she has succeeded in this goal. The LSC provides a credible 
philosophical defense for some of MacKinnon’s claims about pornography. Langton’s 
innovative use of Austin provides both framework and precedent for her argument. By using 
Austin to defend MacKinnon, she not only makes an interesting argument, but also brings a 
challenging feminist claim into the mainstream of analytic philosophy.
The LSC is also useful in several other ways. First, let us consider the matter of uptake. 
Uptake, as we noted in Section 1.2, can be loosely defined as the audience’s understanding of an 
illocutionary act. For example, if I say ‘hello’ to you, you might respond by saying ‘hello’ back, 
thus indicating your uptake of my greeting. In Langton’s examples of refusal and protest, uptake 
of the women’s illocutionary acts is not secured by their audiences. The man does not take the 
woman to be refusing sexual consent, and the browsers of the catalog of pornographic materials 
do not take Linda Marchiano to be protesting against her treatment by the pornography industry.
Uptake becomes a useful concept when we consider the nature of the communication 
failure taking place. You might object to the LSC by asking, “Doesn’t each woman just fail to 
get her point across? How is pornography involved in these speech acts?”. A defender of 
Langton might respond to these questions in two different ways. First, regarding uptake, she 
might point out that the women in Langton’s examples did not do anything wrong. Each did 
everything that was in her power: the woman in the sexual context said ‘no’, which is the 
conventional way of communicating refusal across most conversational contexts. In publishing
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her book, Marchiano recounted her experiences in language of protest and horror. There is a real 
sense in which these women cannot be said to have failed. Instead, there was something, as 
Langton might argue, that prevented audiences from securing uptake in these cases. The point 
here is that sometimes successful communication is not simply a matter of uttering the right 
words. Sometimes conventions, rules, and politically significant facts constrain a conversational 
context so that successful communication is impossible. Any communication failure is then due 
to such conventions, etc., and not to the individual speaker.
Another response to the above questions might be to make clear the connection between 
pornography and communication failure. Let us look at an example cited by Langton from 
Donald Davidson.
Imagine this: the actor is acting a scene in which there is supposed to be a 
fire.. . .  It is his role to imitate as persuasively as he can a man who is trying to 
warn others of a fire. “Fire!” he screams. And perhaps he adds, at the behest 
of the author, “I mean it! Look at the smoke!” etc. And now a real fire breaks 
out, and the actor tries vainly to warn the real audience. “Fire!” he screams. “I 
mean it! Look at the smoke!” etc.28
*
Langton uses this example to show how a person’s role can prevent him from, in this case, 
performing the illocutionary act of warning the audience that there is a fire. In this case, the 
actor intends to warn the audience that there is a fire, he speaks the appropriate words, and yet 
uptake is still not secured. “Something,” says Langton, “about the role he occupies prevents his 
utterance from counting as a warning. Something, perhaps, about the conventions of theatre 
constrains the speech acts he can make. The same words said with the same intentions by an 
audience member would count as a warning. The actor, though, has been silenced.”29 Langton is 
here asking us to consider whether or not there might be something about the role occupied by 
women or the conventions of a woman’s life that constrain her speech. This is a useful question 
to ask while considering communication and communication failure; it takes the emphasis away 
from whether the speaker, the audience, or both have failed in their exchange and opens up
28 Davidson (1984), p. 269.
29 Langton (1993), p. 317.
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discussion of other options. It also introduces the question of whether or not social forces might 
affect our communication, and invites us to take seriously the ways in which they do.
It is important to note that Langton is talking about a very particular kind of social force 
here. She is talking about how one speech act can silence another speech act, and how the 
speech and power of one person or group can affect the speech and power of another. Speech 
can do this, Langton and Austin both argue, by the power of convention. Langton notes Austin’s 
use of the notion of convention in the establishment of felicity conditions. Recall from section 
1.2 that felicity conditions are the necessary conditions that a speech act must fulfill in order to 
be successful and count as an instance of that act. In this case, Langton notes that the felicity 
conditions for many acts like marriage, voting, and divorce are spelled out in laws. In these 
cases, the speech acts are the utterances of the laws. These utterances demarcate the possible 
speech acts of, say, marriage, and so establish the conventions and felicity conditions of that act. 
However, felicity conditions are not always so carefully and precisely spelled out.
Felicity conditions for illocutions in general are rarely spelled out in the words 
of legal enactments. What then of the conventions that set conditions for other 
illocutions, warning, protesting, urging, and the rest? If it is hard to say just 
what the conditions are, it will be harder still to say what sets them. But again, 
the answer may be that, by analogy with the legal cases, they can be set by 
what is said, this time by informal practices of speech and communication that 
gradually establish precedents and informal rules about what counts as, for 
example, a warning.30
With regard to pornography, the story goes something like this: by viewing and producing 
pornography, we establish “precedents and informal rules” about how a woman can speak in a 
sexual context. The speech act that is pornography, Langton argues, may be gradually 
establishing or may have already established a precedent that makes the speech acts of refusal 
and protest unspeakable for women.
How does Langton justify the expansion of her claim from one or two sets of 
circumstances to a vast general claim about pornography and women? Well, as Langton says, 
these examples “betray the presence of structural constraints on women’s speech”.31 It is not, the
30 Langton (1993), p. 320.
31 Langton (1993), p.323.
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argument goes, simply one set of circumstances that has been adversely affected. There is a 
systematicity present here that is also present in other aspects of women’s speech and life. There 
are structural constraints, present at the junction between language and society, that are limiting 
women’s speech.
The rules fixing possible moves in the language games of sex are such that 
saying “no” can fail to count as making a refusal move, and telling the story of 
one’s own subordination can fail to count as a move of protest. These are 
illocutions whose felicity conditions, it seems, cannot be satisfied by women, at 
least in these contexts.32
In other words, the women in Langton’s examples are trying to perform speech acts that have 
felicity conditions that that may not, and in some cases cannot, be satisfied by women.
Langton’s arguments are strongly rooted in claims about authority. Pornography has a 
certain amount of authority over communication in sexual contexts. It also diminishes the 
authority that a woman has over her own body.
Refusal, here, is a kind of prohibition, and it is an exercitive illocution, in 
' Austin’s terms. To satisfy its felicity conditions, the speaker must have 
authority in a relevant domain. A government that prohibits has authority over 
a large domain; a parent who prohibits has authority within the smaller domain 
of the family; a patient who prohibits treatment has authority within the local 
domain of his own life, his own body. A woman who prohibits sexual 
advances also has authority within the local domain of her own life, her own 
body. If she cannot prohibit, cannot refuse, the authority is absent. If she is 
disabled from speaking refusal, it is a sign that her body is, in a sense, not her 
own. If pornography prevents her from refusing, then pornography destroys 
her authority as it twists her words.33
In other words, pornography takes away a woman’s authority to speak for herself and control her 
own sexuality.34 This notion of authority is important for Langton, and it is useful to anyone 
interested in the relationship between language and power. Langton notes that every authority is
32 Langton (1993), pp. 323-324.
33 Langton (1993), p. 325.
34 Langton does not explain why pornography is the sole or most important defendant in these charges, and why 
other social forces do not share the blame shouldered by pornography. I go some way towards exploring this line of  
thought in this thesis.
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matched to a specific domain: in this case, pornography is the authority, and the domain seems 
shockingly large. If Langton is correct, then pornography has authority over a women’s 
sexuality, over her body, and over her ability to express herself and communicate effectively. 
This appraisal of the scope of pornography’s authority may be surprising to some readers. Here 
is yet another way in which the LSC is useful: Readers may be inclined to consider pornography 
a relatively minor event without much influence in the public sphere. The LSC asks us to 
question this inclination and re-examine the scope of some politically significant speech acts.
Langton does not deny that there may be other explanations for silencing in addition to the 
LSC. Neither does she suggest that the scope of pornography’s authority is a matter for armchair 
philosophy. What she does offer is the suggestion that pornography may be a part of the 
explanation for why some women experience some communication failures, and an argument 
supporting the conclusions of some anti-pornography feminists and legal scholars. That this 
suggestion and its supporting argument are neatly contained in an Austinian package only serves 
to make it that much more interesting. Later in this thesis I will go on to investigate how social 
forces more broad in scope than pornography might influence and impact upon our 
communication in other, less Austinian ways.
1.5 C o nclusio n
In this chapter I have set out some background, both political and philosophical, for the 
concept of silencing. I have suggested that Langton’s innovative use of Austinian speech act 
theory may help us to understand Catherine MacKinnon’s claims about pornography as 
reasonable and useful, if challenging, claims. I have also suggested that silencing is an 
interesting and useful concept in part because of its novel combination of political theory with 
the philosophy of language.
In the next chapter I will continue to examine the LSC and its merits. This time, I will take 
a more critical stance and consider the substantial body of criticism that has been directed against 
Langton.
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Chapter Two
A  C r i t i q u e  o f  S i l e n c i n g
In this chapter I  examine several different critiques o f Langton s silencing claim. 
I  outline arguments based in speech act theory made by Jacobson and Bird. I  also 
look at critiques based in notions o f authority and responsibility, including Nellie 
Weiland’s arguments about convention and linguist Deborah Cameron s work on 
gendered communication and gendered communication failure. Finally, I  
consider Ishani Maitra’s Gricean alternative formulation. With each critique I  
consider the advantages and disadvantages o f using Langton’s silencing 
framework as a way o f understanding politically significant communication 
failure.
2.1 C ritiques Based in Speech Act  T heory
The first set of critiques that I will examine is based on Langton’s understanding and
interpretation of certain aspects of Austinian speech act theory. Langton follows Austin’s lead in
determining (or attempting to determine) what counts as a felicitous illocution and what
distinguishes such acts from their perlocutionary cousins. Alexander Bird and Daniel Jacobson
question Langton’s classification of refusal as an illocutionary act. They argue that the LSC, tied
as it is to illocutionary disablement, will not do the work that Langton needs it to do.
Alexander Bird begins his critique of Langton with the observation that the LSC has some
undesirable consequences. For instance, in the paradigmatic refusal case, Bird argues that the
silenced woman is not really raped if she is not capable of the speech act of refusal.35
... [T]he most important consequence of Langton’s argument is that if a woman 
cannot illocute a refusal, no actual utterance of “No!” (etc.) can be a refusal.
So in the case under consideration, there was not refusal of sex. We might 
imagine that in a trial for rape, counsel for the accused could claim that he did 
nothing that the woman had refused. If she did not refuse sex, why is he a 
rapist?36
35 This criticism was first introduced in Jacobson (1995). Bird cites his agreement with Jacobson’s argument in Bird 
(2002), p. 3.
36 Bird (2002), p. 3.
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It is worth drawing attention to the fact that Bird is asking us to imagine that there is an easy 
bridge between a lack of refusal and the presence of consent. Perhaps this easy bridge is in place 
in many courtrooms and more private places of judgement; I will discuss some problems 
associated with these kinds of judgements in Chapter Three. In this case, Bird does point out 
that a lack of refusal does not necessarily imply the presence of consent.37 However, the 
possibility that a lack of refusal may imply consent in some courtrooms should encourage us to 
take Bird’s critique seriously. It is certainly undesirable that any person in any context should be 
able to use Langton’s argument in defense of rapists. Bird and Jacobson both conclude that this 
potential consequence is unacceptable and presents a serious problem for the LSC.
Bird, however, has a further objection to the LSC. Recall Langton’s paradigmatic example 
of silencing, in which a woman’s refusal of sex misfires because a pornography-viewing man 
fails to understand that her utterances of ‘no’ are meant as a refusal of sex. Bird asks us to 
extend and strengthen this example in the following way. Suppose that pornography has such a 
strong influence on the context in which the refusal takes place that the man not only fails to 
understand that the woman is refusing when she says “No!”, but he also takes her utterance to be 
an indication of consent.38 Strengthened in this way, the example draws our attention to the role 
played by uptake in Langton’s argument.
We might have a situation so perverted by pornography that the male in question 
not only fails to understand “No” as a refusal but even takes it to be consent. If 
the ‘uptake’ is one of consent and that were sufficient for illocution, then the
37 Bird says, “There is a question of legal definition here. For the lack of a refusal is not generally the same as 
giving consent. And so if rape is sex without consent, then a defendant might properly be found guilty despite the 
absence of a refusal if consent is absent too. Nonetheless, putting the legal issues to one side, one might still think 
there is something badly wrong with someone who takes sex in the absence of an invitation, encouragement and so 
on, even if a refusal is absent too. But it does seem less bad than ignoring a refusal.” This passage raises the 
interesting issues of legal interpretation of consent and moral responsibility. Unfortunately, these issues, though 
worth exploring, are beyond the scope o f this thesis.
Also, it is worth noting that Jacobson seems less careful than Bird about this issue. See Jacobson (1995) p. 77.
38 This influence would (I assume) take the form of a widespread acceptance of pornography’s authority in sexual 
matters and the presence o f films that use sexual refusal and utterances of ‘no’ as a form of titillation and consent. 
In other words, pornography would have enough authority to exert influence over the conventions in the language 
game of sexual refusal. I discuss this idea in section 2.2.
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illocution is one of consent. On any definition of rape then, rape has not 
occurred.39
In this passage, Bird is adding force to his claim that Langton believes that uptake is necessary 
for successful illocution. If uptake is both necessary and sufficient, Bird contends, then this 
example demonstrates an even more dangerous consequence of the LSC. Legal questions about 
the absence of refusal will now be brushed aside. No-one can plausibly argue that rape has 
occurred if the woman’s illocution was one of sexual consent.
With this strengthened example, Bird is asking us to consider whether there is any reason 
to think that the content of the uptake is sufficient to determine the content of the illocution. In 
other words, does what your audience takes you to be saying determine what you are actually 
saying? This question is worth exploring. In Langton’s refusal example, the woman is not able 
to communicate refusal because her audience takes her to be saying something else; this example 
seems to support an affirmative answer to Bird’s question, and should give us cause to worry. If 
the content of our utterances is determined, even in part, by our audiences, then we may have 
much less control over what it is that we are able to say. Under such circumstances, the LSC 
might seem particularly relevant and disturbing.
However, it is not yet clear which conditions Langton believes to be necessary and 
sufficient for a successful illocution. This may be because Langton follows Austin’s lead in 
saying that conventions set felicity conditions while noting that Austin himself is not very clear 
about what this means.40 Let us examine some passages from Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts 
in an attempt to be more clear about this. Langton seems quite sure that uptake is necessary for a 
successful illocution:
[I]n determining what illocution is performed...the speaker will also need to 
secure “uptake”: that is to say, the hearer must recognize that an illocution of a 
certain kind is being performed.41
39 Bird 2002, p. 3.
40 Langton (1993), p. 319.
41 Langton (1993), p. 301.
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It is also clear that there is more than just uptake involved:
The intention to perform an illocution of a certain kind is not always a 
necessary felicity condition for that illocution. [Sometimes] the context 
determines the uptake secured, which in turn determines the illocution 
performed.42
In this passage, Langton seems to be saying that the context in which an illocution occurs may be 
more important than the intentions of the speaker. If context can determine uptake, then the 
speaker may not have much control over what they illocute at all. Many of Langton’s critics, 
including Bird and Jacobson, are less than pleased with this position. We will explore this 
tension further in what follows.
In addition to intention, uptake, and the influence of context, Langton also discusses cases 
where there is disagreement about which speech act is performed. In these cases, it is unclear 
what is being said and done. For the purposes of our inquiry here, let us consider pornography to 
be a speech act. Among people who categorize pornography in this way, there is much 
disagreement over what it is that pornography actually says (and therefore does).43 What is it 
that pornography is saying about women? Does it, in fact, lend authority to the claim that 
women mean yes when they say ‘no’? Or is it just entertainment? Or something else? Here we 
find vivid disagreement among audiences about which speech act is performed. Austin attempts 
some resolution by suggesting that in such cases utterances are liable to have “a construction put 
upon them by judges”; Langton responds by asking who is in a position to judge.44
This question introduces a further element to the discussion. In addition to the felicity 
conditions listed above, there is also the possibility that a judge of some sort has the authority to 
determine which speech acts are performed when certain words are uttered in certain contexts. 
However, finding an answer to Langton’s question about who this judge might be proves 
difficult. In some cases, a judge is appointed by an institutional body, and as such has the 
authority to determine what is said and done in certain contexts. One example of such a case is
42 Ibid.
43 For a good summary of the various views about pornography and its message, see Saul (2003) p. 74-107.
44 Langton (1993), p. 108, Austin (1965), p. 114.
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an actual judge presiding over a court of law. This judge has the authority to decide if an 
utterance was an order or a suggestion, an act of murder or a bad joke.45 However, most 
instances of language use are much less institutionalized. A judge cannot determine which act 
the woman in Langton’s refusal example performs when she says “No!”. This partially due to 
the fact that most of us do not think that the meaning of private conversations is a matter for 
judges to decide, but mostly because we have no conventions or established rules that assign 
judges authority over our communication. There are no official institutional arbiters of meaning 
in our culture.46
It seems that in answering Bird’s question about who and what determines the content of 
an illocution, there is a growing tension between the speaker, the audience, the conversational 
context, and the possibility of an external judge. If there is to be no clear judge in our refusal 
example, then we are left with the possibility that either the speaker, the audience, or the context 
determines the content of the illocution. In order to see how this works, we turn again to the 
refusal scenario.
Sometimes “no,” when spoken by a woman, does not count as the act of 
' refusal. The hearer fails to recognise the utterance as a refusal; uptake is not 
secured. In saying “no” she may well intend to refuse. By saying “no” she 
intends to prevent sex, but she is far from doing as she intends. Since 
illocutionary force depends, in part, on uptake being secured, the woman fails 
to refuse... She says “no.” She performs the appropriate locutionary act. She 
means what she says. She intends to refuse. She tries to refuse. Bus what she 
says misfires.47
So the speaker does everything right, but still fails to refuse. (One might argue that the audience 
has failed in some way as well, though Langton provides no account of what the man should 
have been doing in order to succeed or whether he tried to do these things.) In this example there 
is no external judge, and there is no mention of the context except our understanding that the
45 And even this judge is guided and restrained by conventions like legal precedent and norms o f conduct among 
judges.
46 This is not to say that some institutions don’t play a role in standardizing, recording, and assigning meaning. 
Dictionaries record “correct” conventional meanings. Laws and scientific bodies sometimes assign meanings to 
certain technical terms. However, there is no institutional language tribunal , etc.
47 Langton (1993), p. 321
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audience has been influenced by pornography. However, in this passage, Langton makes 
reference to the notion of illocutionary force. A speech act cannot have its intended illocutionary 
force unless uptake is secured. If uptake were secured, then the woman would have successfully 
refused, and her utterance would have the force of refusal.
This last condition is particularly important in understanding the sticking point between 
Bird and Langton. For Austin, illocutionary force is just “what illocutionary act it is that we are 
performing in issuing that utterance”.48 Austin intended the concept of illocutionary force as a 
device to help us to see the difference between performatives and constatives, i.e. that when we 
say things, we utter words but we also perform acts. The meaning of these utterances, abstracted 
from their conversational context, may be different from but will bear a resemblance to the 
meaning of the illocutionary act done when making the utterance. This is where illocutionary 
force comes in. A sentence may have only one literal meaning, but it will probably have several 
different possible illocutionary forces. The force of the illocution will be determined by how the 
words are used in conversation. For example, if I say “It’s getting hot in here,” to my sister, I 
could mean any number of things. I could be informing her of the rising temperature in the 
room, or scolding her about her wasteful use of energy to heat the room, or commenting on the 
tensions between our parents at the dinner table. In order to know what the illocutionary force of 
my utterance actually is, you need to know a lot of things about the conversational context in 
which the utterance took place. Due to considerations about uptake in Langton’s refusal 
example, the audience may play a role in deciding which speech act is actually performed, and it 
is this possibility that Bird wants us to consider.
Illocutionary force is not the only Austinian sticking-point between Bird and Langton. 
Bird also objects to Langton’s reliance on Austin’s notoriously unclear distinction between 
illocutions and perlocutions. The fact that Langton is in line with Austin here is not necessarily 
helpful for those hoping to make clear the language-related issues surrounding the silencing 
claim. Austin himself notes that it is very difficult to effectively distinguish illocutions from 
perlocutions, when he writes that “[i]t is the distinction between illocutions and perlocutions
48 Austin (1965), p. 150.
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which seems likeliest to give trouble”.49 He devotes an entire chapter of How to Do Things With 
Words to the making of this distinction, and then another to how his favorite heuristic for making 
the distinction is to be understood. Clearly, then, the illocution/perlocution distinction is, at the 
very least, complicated. Let’s look at how Austin makes the distinction and where the difficulty 
lies in the hope that such an examination will make Langton’s intentions in using the Austinian 
model more clear.
Austin first states that an illocutionary act is distinct from a perlocutionary act because 
perlocutionary acts produce consequences. However, things quickly become more complicated. 
Austin goes on to note that the illocutionary act is “connected with the production of effects in 
certain senses”.50 To begin,
1. Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
successfully performed.
Now, Austin is careful to state, this is not to say that illocutionary acts are just the achievement of 
certain effects. Rather, this is to say that some effects amount to the bringing about of an 
understanding of “the meaning and of the force of the locution” in the mind of the audience. In 
other words, “the performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.” For 
example, in Davidson’s example about a fire in a theatre, the actor cannot be said to have warned 
his audience unless they have heard his shouts of “Fire!” and have taken taken those shouts to 
mean that there really is a fire in the building and that they should exit as quickly as possible. 
Austin continues,
2. The illocutionary act ‘takes effect’ in certain ways, as distinguished from 
i producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in
the ‘normal’ way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events.
For example, if my utterance ‘I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth' has the effect of christening 
the ship, then you can’t go on to call it the Generalissimo Stalin (Austin’s example). Also,
3. Many illocutionary acts conventionally invite a response or a sequel.
49 Austin (1962), p. 110.
50 Austin (1962) pp. 116-117.
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For example, an order invites obedience, an offer invites acceptance or rejection, etc. This third 
case becomes tricky, as Austin introduces a device to help us to make the distinction between a 
perlocutionary order and an illocutionary order. I could say ‘I ordered him and he obeyed’, and 
my order would be an illocution. However, if I were to say, as we often do, that T got him to 
obey’, then Austin argues that my act is perlocutionary. With this list, Austin means to show that 
there are certain way in which illocutions are connected to, or “bound up with”, effects, but that 
these ways are all distinct from the kind of production of effects that is characteristic of the 
perlocutionary act.51
Another important difference between illocutions and perlocutions is that illocutions are 
usually “utterances which have a certain (conventional) force”.52 One way to understand this is 
that some illocutions are marked out as illocutions by the way that we use language. There are 
certain conventional performative formulas, like ‘I argue that’, or ‘I warn you that’. Note that 
these formulas do not exist for perlocutions. For example, we don’t say ‘I alarm you that’, or ‘I 
convince you that’.53 The force of the illocutionary utterance, or what the utterance does, is 
determined in part by the conventional rules for that utterance. So when I say ‘I argue that el jefe 
ought to be overthrown’, convention dictates that what I am doing is putting forward an 
argument for the conclusion that a certain dictator should be overthrown. It is interesting to note 
that Austin concludes his discussion of the conventionality of illocutions and of this kind of 
example in particular by saying that “we may entirely clear up whether someone was arguing or 
not without touching on the question of whether he was convincing anyone or not”. Though my 
audience does need to secure uptake that I am making an argument, they do not need to be 
swayed by my argument or agree with my conclusions. Taking this back to Langton’s refusal 
case, the man needs to realize that the woman is refusing in order for her to successfully refuse, 
but he does not need to respect her decision or desist in making sexual advances. (Though 
readers may think that the dictates of morality are more relevant than those of speech act theory 
here.)
51 Ibid.
52 Austin (1962), p. 109.
53 These examples are all Austin’s, from his (1962), pp. 103-4.
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This matter of how we use language, or that we can use language to distinguish illocutions 
from perlocutions, is behind the heuristic device that Austin gives us to help with making the 
distinction. The heuristic goes as follows:
1. ‘In saying x I was doing /  or ‘I d id /
2. ‘By saying x I did/  or ‘I was doing/ 5 4
For example, in Austin’s own words, “In saying I would shoot him I was threatening him,” and 
“by saying I would shoot him I alarmed him.” So (1) serves to illustrate illocutions and (2) 
perlocutions. However, Austin is careful to note that these formula will not provide us with a test 
for distinguishing illocutions from perlocutions. For one thing, both formulas will work for 
some illocutions, 5 5  and for another, there are several examples of illocutions that work through 
(2) and perlocutions that work through (1). In other words, the heuristic is useful in some cases, 
as it helps to illustrate what is different about the two kinds of act, however, it does not make the 
distinction any more clear or tractable. This result allows me to say with some certainty that the 
distinction between illocution and perlocution is both difficult and likely to be the source of 
some confusion.
■ As Bird notes, “Austin’s distinction between p-ing in saying that p  and p-ing by saying that 
p  is not enough. ” 5 6  The most commonly cited difference between the two types of speech act, 
Bird claims, is that a perlocutionary act includes some effect on its speaker’s audience.
We might be inclined to take this as a defining feature, one which distinguishes it 
from illocution. Thus the nature and existence of the illocution performed when 
someone utters S  will not depend on the effects of the utterance while the nature 
and existence of the perlocution will so depend. 5 7
However, Bird argues that Langton’s account of illocution will not obey this distinction because 
Langton places such a premium on uptake. The hearer’s recognition of the speaker’s illocution 
or intention to illocute is essential to Langton’s account, and Bird argues that this recognition can
54 Austin (1962), p. 122.
55 Consider ‘In saying ‘no’ I was refusing sex’ versus ‘By saying ‘no’ 1 refused sex’.
56 Bird (2002), p. 12.
57 Ibid
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reasonably be considered to be a perlocutionary effect. Unfortunately for Langton, Austin 
agrees with Bird here. Uptake, according to the passages from Austin cited above, is an effect of 
speaking that is essential to the illocution. Therefore, for Langton as well as for Austin, 
illocutions and perlocutions both necessarily encompass effects. Unfortunately for Bird, and as 
we noted earlier, the effect of securing uptake is not a perlocutionary effect for Austin. Langton 
would argue that refusal is only connected to uptake in that the woman cannot refuse unless the 
man takes her to mean that she does not want sex. Bird argues that Langton owes us a better 
account of this distinction before we must accept that the silencing in question is illocutionary 
and not perlocutionary, or “whether we should really regard the uptake of intended refusal as 
essential to the occurrence of refusal. ” 5 8  Langton’s dependence upon Austin’s authority in this 
matter is not necessarily helpful, as we have seen, since he himself has such trouble making the 
distinction clear.
Jacobson argues that both Austin and Langton are mistaken, and that illocution can be 
performed without uptake, using the following example: Bill receives a wedding invitation from 
Sally. However, Bill believes that Sally has only sent him the invitation in order to gloat, and not 
because she actually wants him to come to the wedding. Sally really does intend to invite Bill to 
her wedding. She succeeds, Jacobson claims, in inviting Bill, even if he willfully 
misunderstands the invitation. 5 9  It seems that Sally can illocute invitation without relying on 
Bill’s uptake of her act.6 0  Bird makes this kind of example even more forceful by asking us to 
consider the following case. Suppose that Bill mistakenly believes that there is no wedding, and 
that Sally is only sending the invitation to make him feel regretful about their chances as a 
couple. In this case, there is clearly no uptake, since Bill does not believe that there is a wedding 
to which he could be invited. However, Bill’s error and his failure to secure uptake do not imply
58 Ibid.
59 Jacobson (1995), p. 73.
60 Langton and Hornsby have published a good critique of this example using Austin’s notion of an abused illocution 
rather than an illocution that misfires. They say that there may be a sense in which Sally invites Bill insincerely, but 
she still invites him. This is a grey area for Austin, thus not a good example. See Langton and Hornsby (1998), p. 
30.
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that he was not invited. For example, when he finds out that there really was a wedding, and that 
he missed it, he can’t then claim that he wasn’t invited. 6 1
This is just the first example of an illocution that does not require uptake. There are many 
more. Even Langton and Austin admit that some institutional illocutions do not require uptake. 
For example, when a judge sentences a prisoner, he still succeeds in sentencing the prisoner even 
if the prisoner does not realize what is going on, though someone had better realize what has 
happened if the sentence is to be carried out. However, there are other examples of illocutions 
that do not come with the trappings of institutional authority and still do not require uptake. As 
Bird says, “John may grumble and Lizzie may be rejoicing, but their doing so requires no 
uptake. ” 6 2  Indeed, these illocutions don’t require an audience of any kind. But what of 
illocutions that are intrinsically communicative in nature? Bird writes,
And even when the act is intimately bound up with communication, the precise 
nature of the illocutionary act being performed need not rest on the recognition of 
an intention. One may slander a person (in the non-legal sense of slander) without 
any one’s taking one to have that intention. Alice and Richard may take 
themselves to be exchanging important information in the serious course of 
. business, but in fact they are really just gossiping. I may forgive you your 
trespasses, and you are forgiven whether or not you know that I intend to forgive
you. 6 3
Thus neither Bird nor Jacobson believe that uptake is necessary for the success of an 
illocution. Bird’s belief is informed by Jacobson’s suggestion that such a position on uptake 
“holds the performance of an illocutionary act hostage to the perversity of one’s audience. ” 6 4  In 
other words, the peculiarities of one’s audience do not, or perhaps should not, have the power to 
determine the speech act that one performs. Going even further, Jacobson claims that the 
relevant audience in the refusal case is not the hearer, but us. No competent user of language 
would say that the woman failed to refuse, he argues. It is clear that the hearer is in error, and it
61 Bird (2002), p. 10
62 Bird (2002), p. 8.
63 Ibid.
64 Bird (2002), p. 4. Jacobson (1995), p. 74.
31
is not his judgement about the case that is relevant, either morally or linguistically. It is our 
judgement that matters. 6 5
Jacobson may be right that our broader judgement as competent language users is what 
counts in deciding what the woman who attempts to refuse means by uttering ‘no’, but in making 
this argument, Jacobson obscures what I believe to be the most compelling part of Langton’s 
claim. Langton is trying to draw our attention to a particular kind of communication failure, and 
she is asking us to consider what might cause such failures, if we can accept that they do occur. 
By drawing our attention away from the context of our refusal case and towards the existence of 
a broader community of language users, Jacobson may take our attention away from the fact that 
the woman in our example could not communicate effectively with the man. As far as the two 
people in the example are concerned, the woman could not get the man to understand her to be 
refusing. There is an interesting connection between the small context of the refusal example 
and the larger context of the community of language users that Jacobson cites as appropriate 
judges. I explore this connection in the next section.
In this section I have surveyed some of the issues involved in Bird and Jacobson’s critique 
of Langton. I have noted the importance of uptake to Langton’s account of what felicitous 
illocution requires, and have discussed some of the problems associated with this view. I have 
also demonstrated some of the complexity present in Langton’s refusal example, and noted that 
Langton has borrowed some of these complications from Austin. In the next section I will 
continue to unpack Langton’s argument, this time under scrutiny from a very different angle.
2.2  C ritiques Based in N o tio ns  o f  Authority and  Responsibility
I now turn to some critiques of the LSC that do not directly address problems with speech 
act-related notions like uptake. However, we will see that the critiques explored in this section 
are connected to the previous discussion of uptake in an important way. In my discussion of 
uptake and whether or not uptake is required for a successful illocution, I made use of the idea 
that linguistic convention and conversational context are also important components of 
illocution. In this section, convention and context will continue to be relevant to our discussion 
of communication failure and the LSC.
65 Jacobson (1995), p.77-78.
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In this section I examine critiques that address problems with what I am calling authority 
and responsibility. These two notions fit together. A crucial part of Langton’s argument rests on 
her contention that pomographers have enough authority over the conventions of our speech, and 
particularly our speech about sexual refusal, that they are able to alter those conventions and 
cause illocutionary disablement. In other words, pomographers may be responsible for these 
convention shifts, and for any harm that comes about because of them. In what follows, I will 
consider how this might work, and whether we are right to think that authority comes with 
responsibility in this case. I will first look at what Langton says about authority and 
pornography, so that we can be clear about what the critiques in this section are responding to. I 
will then turn to Nellie Weiland’s discussion of conventions and pomographers’ authority to 
change them. Finally, I will turn to the work of linguist Deborah Cameron and to a discussion of 
the potential dangers of this convention-changing talk.
Langton suggests that the question of whether pornography has sufficient authority to 
affect what women can do with their words is central to the controversy over pornography. She 
asks us to consider whether or not we think it likely that pornographers have this authority.
* - This question is, I think, at the heart of the controversy. If you believe that 
pornographic utterances are made by a powerless minority, a fringe group 
especially vulnerable to moralistic persecution, then you will answer 
negatively. Not so if you believe, with MacKinnon, that pornography’s voice is 
the voice of the ruling power ... Just as the speech of the umpire is authoritative 
within a certain domain - the game of tennis - so pornographic speech is 
authoritative within a certain domain - the game of sex. The authors of 
pornographic speech are not mere bystanders to the game; they are speakers 
whose verdict counts. 6 6
It is reasonable to take from this passage the conclusion that Langton comes down on the side of 
MacKinnon and the anti-pornography argument, though Langton is careful to avoid any direct 
condemnation of pornography in Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. Her argument defending 
this position involves a defense of the other claim that Langton takes MacKinnon to be making 
about pornography - that pornography subordinates women - and is beyond the scope of this 
discussion. However, she does offer a few independent reasons for why we should believe 
pornography to be authoritative in “the game of sex .
66 Langton (1993), pp. 311 -312.
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First, she alludes to the growing body of empirical evidence which suggests that 
pornography does in fact change our beliefs.
Some, it seems have their attitudes and behavior altered by it in ways that 
ultimately hurt women: they can become more likely to view women as inferior, 
more disposed to accept rape myths (for example, that women enjoy rape), more 
likely to view rape victims as deserving of their treatment, and more likely to say 
that they themselves would rape if they could get away with it. 6 7
Were these studies to prove conclusive, this would provide a secure foundation for Langton’s 
claim that pornography may be authoritative in the sexual domain. However, she does not rest 
with empirical evidence. Langton also relies on a theoretical argument that pomographers set the 
conditions for speech within the sexual domain.
Refusal, here, is a kind of prohibition, and it is an exercitive illocution, in Austin’s 
terms. To satisfy its felicity conditions, the speaker much have authority in a 
relevant domain. A government that prohibits has authority over a large domain; a 
parent who prohibits has authority within the smaller domain of the family; a 
patient who prohibits treatment has authority within the local domain of his own 
life, his own body. A woman who prohibits sexual advances also has authority 
with the local domain of her own life, her own body. If she cannot prohibit, 
cannot refuse, the authority is absent. If she is disabled from speaking refusal, it 
is a sign that her body is, in a sense, not her own. If pornography prevents her 
from refusing, then pornography destroys her authority as it twists her words. 6 8
In other words, if a woman is unable to refuse sex, something has taken away her authority over 
her body and her sexuality. But how do we prove that pornography has taken this authority?
If felicity conditions for such illocutions constrain women in these contexts, we 
need to ask how those conditions came into being. This question was asked about 
the conditions that constrain illocutions of marriage, divorce, and the like, and the 
answer was that they were set by the speech of the legislator. How then are these 
other felicity conditions set? We know that felicity conditions for illocutions in
67 Langton (1993), p. 306. Langton is here referring to Donnerstein, Linz, and Penrod, The question of 
Pornography: Research Findings and Policy Implications', the report from the Minneapolis hearings on 
pornography; other transcripts of hearings held on pornography, and the 1986 Report on the Attorney General’s 
Commission on Pornography. There have been many more studies done since Langton (1993), and the general 
consensus is that there is empirical evidence for both sides of this argument. Therefore, we can say that the 
empirical evidence is largely inconclusive.
68 Langton (1993), p. 325.
34
general can be set by other speech acts. MacKinnon’s claim that pornography 
silences women can be interpreted in just this way. The felicity conditions for 
women's speech acts are set by the speech acts o f pornography. The words of the 
pornographer, like the words of the legislator, are “words that set conditions.”
They are words that constrain, that make certain actions - refusal, protest - 
unspeakable for women in some contexts. This is speech that determines the kind 
of speech there can be. 6 9
So pornography does not take away a woman’s authority over her body by force or hypnosis or 
simply implanting ideas about sex in people’s heads. Langton is claiming that pornography’s 
authority lies in a much more complex maneuver.
First, pornography is widely distributed as erotic and sexually pleasurable material. Then 
it teaches or informs men about how sexual language works. Women are depicted as wanting 
sex, regardless of the words that they use. “In pornography of this kind there would be all kinds 
of locutions the woman depicted could use to make the consent move. “Yes” is one such 
locution. “No” is just another. ” 7 0  In this way, the men watching the pornography learn the 
“rules” of the “sex game”. They learn which speech acts are possible, and which are not. They 
learn which are legitimate, and which are not. If we continue one of Langton’s previous 
analogies, pornography becomes the unofficial umpire of the sex game.
Missing from this analogy is any kind of story about how this pornographic umpire bridges 
the gap between normal, everyday uses of ‘yes’ and ‘no’, where ‘yes’ means affirmation or 
consent and ‘no’ means refusal or rejection, and the new pornography-trained uses of these 
words. How does pornography come to set the conditions for what kind of speech there can be 
in the sexual language game? How does condition-setting happen, and where does the authority
come from?
Nellie Weiland notes that the success of Langton’s argument hinges on whether or not we 
believe that pomographers really are umpires in this way, whether they have sufficient authority 
to set the conventions of sexual discourse. Does a pomographer, or even the entire pornography 
industry, have enough authority to establish conventions about how we are to interpret women’s 
refusals of sex? Weiland, like MacKinnon, argues that they might. More than this, she claims
69 Langton (1993), p. 324.
70 Ibid.
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that it is not difficult to effect conventional change in a particular context. She makes her 
argument by means of a discussion of convention.
As I will argue, pornographers’ linguistic authority in sexual discourse is 
relatively easy to come by: making it the case that ‘x’ means p in a particular 
context only requires that speaker use ‘x’ to mean p in that context, and that the 
likelihood that ‘x’ means p is increased with each use of ‘x’ as meaning p . 7 1
Here, Weiland is supplying us with a crucial missing piece from Langton’s argument: how 
pomographers manage to change linguistic conventions. We are now to understand that when 
pomographers use ‘no’ to mean yes in a sexual context, they can make it the case that ‘no’ does 
in fact mean yes in that context. Also, the more often that pomographers use ‘no’ in this way, the 
more likely it is that they will have established a robust convention. In short, pomographers do 
not need any special authority. They are not doing something unbelievably difficult, something 
that just can’t be done. All they are doing is talking about sex.
Conventions, Weiland claims, are relatively easy to establish in most classes of discourse. 
Following David Lewis, Weiland states that conventions “derive from regularities in intentional 
constructions between speakers and meanings”, and as such, they happen fairly often. 7 2  73
Crucially, a convention is only established (the regularity becomes conventionalized) if the 
following condition obtains:
Regularities are conventionalized only if there is trust and truthfulness between 
members of a given population G such that when ‘x’ is used by some speaker 
S, ‘x’ means p P
Weiland and Lewis both assert that this “trust and truthfulness” is usually present in a given 
population, but more work is required before we understand exactly what this means.
Weiland borrows from Lewis again in order to be more clear:
Returning to Lewis’ analysis, conventions are solutions to co-ordination 
problems: in the case of language, the co-ordination problem speakers face is
71 Weiland (2007), p. 439.
72 Weiland (2007), p. 442
73 Weiland (2007), p. 442.
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how to communicate given that it is possible for each member of G to have a 
unique grammar. Lewis’s solution to this co-ordination problem is for each 
member to trust that ‘x’ means p when used by any S in G . 7 4  (my emphasis)
In other words, trust and truthfulness come into the equation because without trust, each member 
of G will find herself unable to communicate with any other member of G. Unless they trust that 
everyone means p  when they utter ‘x’, no member of G will ever be able to communicate 
successfully about p. Trust and truthfulness allow for coordination and communication.
Consider the following example from Stephen Schiffer.
Imagine that two prelinguistic but precocious speakers Si and S2 are stranded 
on a desert island. Si hopes to convey to S2 that he is angry and knows that S2 
both (i) recognizes ‘grrrr’ as a sound that dogs make when they are angry and 
(ii) knows that, due to circumstances, Si may in fact be angry. Capitalizing on 
these conditions of mutual knowledge, Si utters ‘grrrr’ and expects S2 both to 
uptake the meaning I  am angry and attribute it to Si - rather than, say, the 
meaning there are rabid dogs approaching our campsite. The reason there is a 
chance for S2 to successfully uptake S i’s intended meaning is the mutual 
knowledge between Sx and S2  of conditions (i) and (ii). Admittedly, this first 
• context ci of S i’s utterance is tenuous; it was quite likely that S2  wouldn’t have 
achieved uptake and S i’s utterance would have misfired. However, at a later 
date in context c2) when Si is again angry, he can use ‘grrrr’ to mean I  am 
angry with much greater confidence than he did in ci, and with even greater 
confidence later again in C3 . S2’s confidence in interpreting ‘grrrr’ as meaning 
I  am angry also undergoes a proportionate increase from Ci to c2  to c3, and 
both Si and S2  recognize that the other’s confidence (in interpreting and 
intending respectively) is increasing from context to context. Thus, from ci to 
c2  to C3  the probability that ‘grrrr’ means I  am angry increases 
proportionately. 7 5
In this example, the initial successful communication between Si and S2  depends a great deal 
upon circumstances. For instance, Si will most probably need to be angry immediately while he 
utters ‘grrrr’ for the first several uses, so that S2  can use the proximity of the anger-inducing 
event to help him understand S i’s utterance. However, after multiple uses of ‘grrrr’ to mean lam
74 Ibid.
75 Schiffer (1972), p. 124.
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angry, it is likely that Si can use the utterance whenever he pleases, even several days after an 
anger-inducing event. With every use, the mutual knowledge between S\ and S2 increases, and 
so does the probability that ‘grrrr’ means lam  angry.
Weiland uses Schiffer’s example to demonstrate her point about pornographic speech 
acts. 7 6  Following along with the ‘grrrr’ example, she states that “the probability that ‘no’ means 
yes when uttered by a woman in the context of an unwanted sexual encounter increases with each 
instance of use with this intended meaning”. She goes on to say that “the analogy between 
‘grrrr’ and pornographic representations should now be clear: each new use by Si of ‘no’ to mean 
yes in the context of pornography serves to perpetuate the convention that ‘no’ means yes when 
uttered in similar contexts” . 7 7  In Langton’s example, this means that a large number of 
pornographic films eroticising refusal in this way will serve to establish a robust convention that 
utterances of ‘no’ in a similar context mean yes. Supposing that these films exist, pomographers 
do have sufficient authority to be umpires in the sexual language game, and Weiland therefore 
finds the LSC to be defensible.
One problem posed by this analogy is that we might find it hard to extend the pornographic 
convention-setting example so far as to include the shared knowledge that exists between Si and 
S2 in Schiffer’s example. Are we to suppose that the woman and her rapist share the knowledge 
that ‘no’ has come, increasingly, to mean yes in sexual contexts? Such a supposition makes it 
seem odd that the woman should utter ‘no’ to communicate refusal in the first place, given her 
knowledge about what her utterance might mean to her assailant. However, there may be a way 
of reconciling this seemingly odd behaviour. Perhaps the woman and man come from different 
subsets of G, and that these different subsets have different grammars. Does this supposition of 
competing grammars help? Apparently not, according to Weiland.
In [an unwanted sexual encounter] it is neither mutual nor is it knowledge that 
‘no’ means yes for the very straightforward reason that the speaker indeed 
means no. It is nevertheless plausible that there is mutual knowledge in the
76 I should note that Weiland makes a point of mentioning that she is defining ‘pornography’ in a very particular 
way. I am steering clear of all issues about the definition of the term here, as such debate is beyond the scope of my 
thesis.
77 Weiland (2007), p. 443.
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unwanted sexual encounter; what both speakers know is that there is mutual 
knowledge that ‘no’ means yes in most contexts relevantly similar to the 
unwanted sexual encounter - namely in those pornographic representations. 7 8
So the man and woman may share enough mutual knowledge to establish the convention, even if 
they do have different or competing grammars. Not only this, but if a woman were to provide 
additional signs of refusal, such as physical struggle, these signs might still fail to communicate 
refusal within this context of prior mutual knowledge because pornography eroticizes those signs 
as well. 7 9
Weiland’s interpretation of Langton’s example is challenged in Maitra and McGowan 
(2010). The authors argue first that Langton’s example does not require a convention that 
utterances of ‘no’ in sexual contexts mean yes, and second that pornography’s influence on the 
man in the example does not diminish mens rea. With regard to the first argument, Maitra and 
McGowan state that the Langton example would require a convention flexible enough to change 
the meaning of the many phrases and actions of refusal that a woman might utter to communicate 
sexual refusal, and Weiland does not provide a sufficient explanation for a translation on this 
scale. Also, this kind of convention is unnecessary in the first place, since Langton only requires 
that there is enough room in the context of utterance for subversive elements like sarcasm and 
other devices that disguise or complicate the speaker’s intentions. In the Langton example, this 
device takes the form of a sexual script that the woman might be playing along with.
According to Langton and Hornsby, pornography causes its viewers to believe 
that women say ‘No’ even when they want sex, perhaps in order to play along 
with a sexual script that requires them to pretend to refuse. When confronted with 
an actual ‘No’, such a viewer assumes that the woman is just playing her role in 
that script, rather than really intending to refuse. He therefore fails to recognize 
her intention to refuse, even though there is no change in expression-meaning.
Langton and Hornsby’s conception thus does not require a meaning switch for 
silencing. 8 0
78 Weiland (2007), p. 444.
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The script adds a layer of complexity to the conversational context that allows the man to 
recognize the woman’s refusal as part of a script spoken by women in sexual contexts while still 
maintaining that the word ‘no’ usually conveys refusal. Just as someone might interpret my 
utterance of ‘no’ as sarcasm and treat it as an expression of assent, in this case the word ‘no’ does 
not need to undergo a change in meaning.
Maitra and McGowan are compelling here, but this line of argument ultimately misses the 
point. Whether pornography causes a conventional shift from one meaning to another or from 
one interpretation to another, it may still be the case that pornography plays a role in establishing 
which convention is salient. This, it seems to me, is the broader point, and the point that Maitra, 
McGowan, and Weiland are all trying to help Langton to establish.
Taking up another point, Weiland’s argument that a convention can be established by sheer 
repetition is perhaps overly simplistic; the salience of a particular convention can be established 
by repetition, but repetition is not the only relevant factor. 8 1 According to Maitra and McGowan, 
“salience is sensitive to a much wider range of information than mere instances of past 
occurrence, ” 8 2  making considerations about the salience of the particular convention more 
helpful than just a tally of past occurrences in solving co-ordination problems. In other words, 
we must ask if the ‘no’-means-yes convention is the most salient solution to the relevant co­
ordination problem, instead of just the one used most often. Maitra and McGowan believe that 
this convention is not most salient, since we should take the desires and expectations of the 
woman into account as well as those of the man. On this point, I think Maitra and McGowan 
depend upon a much more egalitarian understanding of convention than my own. Do we take 
information about the desires and expectations of the woman who says ‘No’ into account when 
solving this co-ordination problem? David Lewis might assume that we would, since he pays 
very little attention to considerations of social justice when developing his account of 
convention. However, the silencing debate is grounded in the idea that some people’s words 
count for more than others. In an unjust world, we would not necessarily take the woman’s 
desires and expectations into account in establishing a convention, and this is the point that
81 Lewis (1969), p. 52-64.
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Weiland and Langton make in their exploration of silencing. I discuss this point and some further 
difficulties with Lewis-style convention in Chapter Three.
Weiland does not offer the only convincing explanation of the mechanics behind the LSC. 
Linguist Deborah Cameron investigates the idea that the silencing phenomenon is just a matter of 
communication failure, and therefore that men are not wholly to blame for what is, after all, a 
joint enterprise. She begins her investigation with what she calls the “Mars and Venus myth”, 
after the popular self-help book which proclaims that men and women are from different planets. 
This popular myth may lend support to the belief that men and women often misunderstand each 
other, and that this misunderstanding is due to the fact that they “speak different languages”.
At its most basic, what I am calling ‘the Myth of Mars and Venus’ is simply the
proposition that men and women differ fundamentally in the way they use
language to communicate. 8 3
All versions of the myth share this basic proposition, and most versions also make many of the 
following claims:
1. Language and communication matter more to women than to men; women 
talk more than men.
2. Women are more verbally skilled than men.
3. Men’s goals in using language tend to be instrumental - about getting things 
done - whereas women’s tend to be interpersonal or relational - about 
making connections to other people. Men talk more about things and facts, 
whereas women talk more about people, relationships, and feelings.
4. Men’s way of using language is competitive, reflecting their general interest 
in acquiring and maintaining status; women’s use of language is cooperative, 
reflecting their preference for equality and harmony. Because of this, men’s 
style of communicating also tends to be more direct and less polite than 
women’s.
5. These differences routinely lead to ‘miscommunication’ between the sexes, 
with each sex misinterpreting the other’s intentions. This causes problems in 
contexts where men and women regularly interact, and especially in 
heterosexual relationships. 8 4
83 Cameron (2007), p. 7.
84 Ibid.
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This myth, if applied to the LSC, could explain and possibly even excuse the actions of the 
rapist: it’s not just that he understood the woman to be accepting his advances when she was 
really refusing them. It’s that he couldn’t be expected to understand her in the first place, 
because men and women are fundamentally different and speak different languages.
In spite of the fact that this last statement may seem ridiculous or overly simplistic, there is 
a surprising body of research available in support of similar claims. Though most of this research 
is about inter-gender communication in general and not about communication during contexts of 
sexual force, it nonetheless appears to demonstrate support for the idea that men and women 
speak different languages and therefore are bound to experience communication failure. 
Cameron points to examples of the myth’s pervasiveness throughout Western society and she 
examines the purportedly scientific basis for some of the claims that underpin our attachment to 
the myth. 8 5
The idea that men and women metaphorically ‘speak different languages’ is not, 
of course, new, but the myth of Mars and Venus has given it new currency and 
legitimacy. What was once just a metaphor has acquired the status of literal, 
scientific truth. 8 6
For instance, a study published in the scientific journal Neuroimage in 2005 was picked up by 
media all over the world. The study, conducted at the University of Sheffield, showed that men 
decipher female voices using the auditory part of the brain - the same part that processes music - 
while male voices engage a much simpler mechanism. The media widely reported that the 
University of Sheffield had discovered that men have trouble hearing women because women’s 
voices are more difficult for men to listen to than their male counterparts. 8 7  As Cameron says,
The Sheffield study appears to confirm the truth of a well-worn stereotype (that 
men don’t listen when women talk); it then goes on to supply the kind of 
explanation that many people expect and want (it’s to do with the way men’s 
brains work). This enables the study to be framed as settling an age-old dispute in
85 Cameron notes a few examples that might suggest that this myth is cross-culturally pervasive as well. Cameron 
(2007), p. 30-36.
86 Cameron, (2007), p. 80.
87 Cameron (2007), p. 18. Cameron also notes that the researches at Sheffield University were unhappy about how 
their study was reported. Unfortunately, they were not able to counter the media coverage.
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the ongoing ‘battle of the sexes’. As the report I have quoted puts it, men ‘now 
have an excuse’. Contrary to what women think, men who appear not to be 
listening to them are not being inconsiderate, they have genuine difficulty hearing 
what women say. 8 8
In this way, the “myth” that Cameron writes about is given a scientific casing and is distributed 
to the general public in such a way as to seem to be explaining or confirming a previously-held 
supposition.
Cameron also cites studies about what is known as ‘crosstalk’, or systematic 
misunderstandings which neither group is conscious of. Crosstalk has had a documented effect 
on communication between ethnic groups, and many theorists have attempted to apply this 
research to communication between men and women. 8 9  Unfortunately, what seem to be the main 
causes of crosstalk between different ethnic groups - speaking different dialects of English, a 
lack of contact outside the workplace, being raised in different countries with different social 
traditions - simply do not apply to most examples of communication between men and women. 
Cameron notes that “[m]en and women from one community are not a parallel case. Even if they 
do use some linguistic forms differently, they have enough experience of interacting with each 
other to make the differences comprehensible” . 9 0
Perhaps most relevant to this thesis is Cameron’s analysis of a linguistic research project 
about sexual refusal.9 1  The project took place in the 1990s at a Canadian university where two 
women made complaints against the same man. Their complaints were heard by a university 
tribunal and were recorded for the research project. As you will see, there are striking parallels 
between this case and the example of sexual refusal used by Langton:
Like many rape and sexual assault cases, this one turned on whether or not the 
defendant could reasonably have believed that the complainants consented to sex.
Both incidents had begun consensually, with the woman inviting the man into 
their rooms and engaging in activities such as kissing and touching; but they 
claimed he had gone on to force them into further sexual activity which they made
88 Ibid
89 See Gumperz 1982, Maltz and Borker 1982, Reid-Thomas 1993, as cited by Cameron (2007).
90 Cameron (2007), p. 83.
91 See Erlich (2002) and Cameron (2006).
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clear they did not want. He maintained that they did want it - or at least, had said 
nothing to make him think that they did not. 9 2
The defendant’s claim that the women said nothing “to make him think that they did not” want 
sex is similar to Langton’s man failing to secure uptake of sexual refusal from the woman’s 
utterance of ‘no’. Only, in this case, the man’s choice of words is particularly interesting. He 
claims that the woman said nothing that might make him think that she did not want sex. In 
other words, this man was operating under the assumption that it is the woman’s job to make him 
think one thing or another. In fact, when he was questioned by the tribunal about why he 
“persisted in sexual activity” with one woman while she was either asleep or pretending to be 
asleep, he replied that “she said that she was tired, you know, she never said like “no”, “stop”, 
“don’t”, you know, “don’t do this” uhm “get out of bed” . ” 9 3  Although the analogy between 
Langton’s example and this case breaks down here in that there was explicit refusal by the 
woman in Langton’s example, I will argue that there is still something happening in this case that 
is relevant to the LSC.
As Cameron says,
You don’t have to be a rocket scientist to work out that someone who feigns 
unconsciousness while in bed with you probably doesn’t want to have sex. But 
nobody criticizes the defendant for being so obtuse. In these proceedings, the 
assumption does seem to be that avoiding miscommunication is not a shared 
responsibility, but specifically a female one.9 4
There are several things to take note of here. First although Cameron uses the word 
‘miscommunication’ to describe the interaction between the man and his accuser(s), it remains to 
be seen whether or not this word is the most appropriate label for this event. Second, Cameron 
introduces the idea that someone, in this case the accuser, has a responsibility to communicate 
effectively. Up to this point, I have not explored any issues to do with responsibility and blame. 
To do so in a thorough and systematic manner is beyond the scope of this thesis, but Cameron 
reaches her conclusion about what is happening in this case by way of this issue of responsibility,
92 Cameron (2007), p. 90.
93 Cameron (2007), p. 91.
9 4 Ibid.
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so I will touch on it briefly here. Though Langton does not introduce responsibility into her 
argument for the LSC, we will see that this omission can tell us something important about the 
context and conventions surrounding her example Finally, Cameron draws our attention to the 
fact that communication can, and often does, take place through mediums other than speech. In 
this case, the accuser feigned unconsciousness to signal her refusal of sex. Cameron also 
explores other conventions of refusal in an attempt to show that no right-minded, socially 
competent individual could mistake feigned sleep for sexual consent. If she is right about refusal 
in this case, her argument may have something to tell us about refusal in Langton’s.
In a focus group interview with fifty-eight women, linguists Kitzinger and Frith asked 
women how they communicated sexual refusal to men. Almost all of the women reported that 
they would use subtle, indirect tactics to refuse rather than the direct utterance of ‘no’. Cameron 
reports on this study, saying that “[t]hey judged this (direct refusal) to be an unacceptable way of 
doing things, and likely to make matters worse by giving men an additional reason to feel 
aggrieved. ” 9 5  Instead, the women reported using tactics like offering reasons that reference a 
woman’s inability, rather than unwillingness (‘I have a headache’, ‘I’m really tired’). If this 
seems devious and unassertive on the part of these women, consider sexual refusal in the context 
of general refusal, as Cameron asks us to do here:
All the strategies the women reported using in this situation are also used, by both 
sexes, in every other situation where it is necessary to verbalize a refusal.
Research on conversational patterns shows that in everyday contexts, refusing is 
never done by ‘just saying no’. Most refusals do not even contain the word ‘no’.
Yet in non-sexual situations, no one seems to have trouble understanding them . 9 6
This seems right. Consider the example that Cameron offers of a colleague who asks me if I 
want to join him at the pub after work. If I wanted to refuse the invitation, I would not say ‘no, I 
don’t want to’. Instead, I would probably say something like ‘I’d love to, but I have to catch the 
dry cleaners before they close / stop at the market / (some other excuse)’. Cameron argues that 
this kind of talk is part of the convention of refusal, and the Kitzinger and Frith study shows that
95 Cameron (2007), p. 93
96 Cameron (2007), p. 94.
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this convention is so rigorous that people can immediately recognize when someone is issuing a 
refusal by identifying the features of the convention, which are:
1. A delay in responding, marked by a silent pause or an ‘um’ (whereas 
acceptances are usually delivered without hesitation).
2. A hedging expression, most commonly ‘well’.
3. A ‘softening’ remark, like ‘I’d love to, but...’.
4. An acceptable reason for refusing.
Why is the convention so rigorous? Cameron argues that it must be so, because all refusals 
are tricky, risking the anger or upset of one’s conversational partner.
Because refusing an invitation - even one that is much less sensitive than a sexual 
proposal - is a more delicate matter than accepting one. The act of inviting 
someone implies that you will say yes: if they say no, there is a risk that you will 
be offended, upset, or just disappointed. To show that they are aware of this, and 
do not want you to feel bad, people generally design refusals to convey reluctance 
and regret. 9 7
This kind of analysis, coupled with the evidence cited by Kitzinger and Frith, undermines the 
man’s attempt to claim that he did not understand his accuser’s less than direct refusal in the 
Canadian rape tribunal case. Men and women easily understand refusals that are much less 
direct than a verbal ‘no’ or ‘stop’. We are also attuned to the contextual and conventional clues 
that we all use with our interlocutors to guide us through communication. In other words, the 
woman who feigned sleep to signal her refusal was communicating clearly. She refused sex in 
one of the many ways available to her.
In light of this finding, Cameron has little patience for the kind of talk that privileges 
some kinds of communication failure as an explanation for why a man ignored a woman’s sexual 
refusal. The implication of Cameron’s work is that it is almost impossible to imagine a scenario 
in which a person could not be aware of another person’s sexual refusal. People who claim this 
kind of ignorance are leaning on the myth of Mars and Venus, and aiding the perpetuation of a 
dangerous set of beliefs.
97 Cameron (2007), p. 94.
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I f ‘ordinary’ non-sexual refusals do not generally take the form of saying ‘no’, but 
are performed using conventional strategies like hesitating, hedging, and offering 
excuses, then sexual refusals which use exactly the same strategies should not 
present any special problem. ‘For men to claim that they do not understand such 
refusals to be refusals’, Kitzinger and Frith say, ‘is to lay claim to an astounding 
and implausible ignorance. ’ 9 8
If Cameron is right, it does not seem appropriate to suggest that the woman in any of the rape 
cases we have discussed so far is responsible for ensuring that her communication with her 
assailant is successful. In fact, it seems misleading for Langton to have left out the fact that the 
normal conventions of refusal would be just as much a part of the context in her example as 
would the conventions of pornography. According to Cameron, the question we should be 
asking is not whether pornography introduces this allegedly powerful convention into the 
conversational context, but whether we should allow this man to get away with claiming to be 
ignorant of the illocutionary force of her refusal.
One might object to Cameron’s claim on Langton’s behalf and suggest that pornography 
creates a special context in which apparent refusals are not really refusals. Langton refers to the 
possibility of this kind of context in Speech Acts, saying that the violent sexual imagery that is 
prevalent throughout society may have raised a generation of young men and boys who are 
incapable of knowing that they are committing rape instead of having acceptable sexual 
intercourse. 9 9  However, this suggestion is a non-starter. For one thing, if conventional contexts 
are as easy to create as Weiland, Lewis, and Schiffer suggest, then there is no reason to suppose 
that there are not many different, competing conventions available for communicators to choose 
from. Langton would not have the right to claim a special, somehow superior convention 
without first showing how and why the pornography convention is stronger than any other. On 
the other hand, if Lewis and Schiffer (and Weiland) are wrong, and conventions do not come and 
go so easily, then pornography certainly does not have the power to create a special conventional 
context. If conventions are more rigid than Lewis, etc. allow for, then it will be a challenge to 
demonstrate how pornography overpowers a convention as rigid as the refusal convention 
documented by Kitzinger and Frith. For this objection on behalf of Langton to stand, one would
98 Cameron (2007), p 95-6
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need an argument that supports not only Weiland’s account of convention, but also the choice of 
this particular pornographic set of conventions over all other competing (and robust) versions. 
The requirement presents considerable difficulties for any such objection.
Cameron concludes that this kind of talk about sexual refusal, talk that allows room for 
misunderstanding and miscommunication, is not only unhelpful and confusing, but also serves to 
perpetuate the “Mars and Venus” myth. This myth is dangerous for one very clear reason: it 
presupposes that men who persist in making unwanted sexual advances are genuinely confused, 
and are open to any clarification in the form of clear communication from a woman. “It does 
not,” as Cameron says, “allow for the possibility that men who behave in this way are not so 
much confused about women’s wishes as indifferent to them” . 1 0 0  Claims that women and men 
have communication problems, and that these problems explain the scenarios discussed here, are 
responsible for perpetuating pernicious myths about communication between women and men, 
and are, in this respect, pernicious in and of themselves.
Why, then, does Langton fail to mention that there might be competing conventions at 
work in her sexual refusal example? She is certainly not trying to assert that women are 
responsible for effective communication. Indeed, her claim is that women are prevented from 
effective communication by pornography and its influence over the conventions governing 
sexual interaction. However, it does seem to be the case that, by Cameron’s lights, Langton is 
letting the rapist from her example off the hook far too easily. By focusing her attention on the 
conventional context and on pornography’s authority over that context, she thereby pays very 
little attention to the man and his responsibility and even capability as a competent language 
user. In a way, then, Langton is also too hard on the man. She assumes that he lacks a basic 
competence with language and conventional cues. 101
In this section I have surveyed critiques of Langton’s silencing claim that address issues of 
authority and responsibility. I have discussed the relative ease with which one might establish a 
convention in a conversational context, and the reasons Langton might have to expect that a
100 Cameron (2007) p. 96-7.
101 In Chapters Five and Six I will explore the idea that men like Langton’s rapist might be victims of 
communicative injustice. Even if he is such a victim, this (of course) does not change the fact that he is a rapist. 
However, it may help us to understand the nature of the relevant communication failure.
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pornographic convention might be similarly easy to establish. I have also touched on the matter 
of responsibility, and I have suggested some reasons why it might be a good idea to hold people 
responsible for what they hear as well as what they say. In the next section, I will turn away 
from Austinian speech acts all together, and consider whether the silencing claim might be more 
effective in another medium.
2.3  A Gricean Alternative?
Given these critiques of Langton’s account of silencing, it is reasonable to wonder if there 
is an alternative formulation of the silencing claim, or one that might capture the phenomenon 
with more success. It seems clear from the energetic debate about silencing that Langton has 
touched on an interesting and potentially useful phenomenon; however, as we have seen in the 
previous two sections, it is not clear that illocutionary disablement is the most successful way of 
understanding this phenomenon. In this section I consider an alternative to Langton’s Austinian 
model.
Ishani Maitra offers a competing account of silencing in her Silencing Speech, in which she 
offers a Gricean analysis of what happens when a woman is unable to communicate sexual 
refusal.
Maitra defines the silencing phenomenon as
1. A distinctly speech-related wrong, and
2. A deprivation of (some of) the benefits that lead us to place a special value 
on speech. 1 0 2
This definition is significant because it draws our attention not only to to the fact that there are 
distinctly speech related wrongs (a fact that is often overlooked and that I wish to draw attention 
to in this thesis), but also to the fact that we do place a special value on speech. We use speech 
to persuade, to explain, to succeed, to convey knowledge, to consent and reject, and to explore 
and express our freedom, among many other things.
Speech has, at the very least, great instrumental value. It enables us to get what we
want and need, for ourselves and for others. It constitutes our first line of defense
102 Maitra (2009), p.310.
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against a variety of injuries, from unwanted sexual overtures to tyrannical 
governmental action. And it is essential both to the propagation of knowledge, and 
to the proper functioning of a democratic society. When a speaker is 
communicatively disabled, she is thereby deprived of these (and other) benefits 
that speech can offer. 1 0 3
Speech is very important to us because we do things with it; it does confer benefits, and this is 
why we value it so much. It only stands to reason that we should take an active interest in cases 
where we are denied those speech-related benefits.
Maitra chooses a Gricean framework for two reasons: to avoid the pitfalls of speech act 
theory and to take advantage of a theoretical framework already focused on communication. I 
will discuss each of these reasons in what follows, and then go on to lay out Maitra’s account.
Maitra is certainly correct in her observation that Austinian speech act theory has some 
problematic components. To begin, and as I have already noted in this chapter, it is notoriously 
difficult to distinguish between perlocutionary and illocutionary acts. As I noted in my earlier 
discussion of Bird, Austin himself was never able to give a satisfactory account of the difference 
between the two kinds of speech act. He was only able to give some useful guidelines and 
associations (perlocutions - effects, illocutions - acts) and heuristics (‘by’ versus ‘in’). There has 
been debate about which category various acts fall in to, and refusal is one of those acts. Is 
sexual refusal the effect of the woman’s utterance of ‘no’ in a sexual context, or is it the act 
constituted by the utterance? There is no general consensus about this issue, and this lack of 
consensus is unfortunate because, as we noted in Section 2.1, Langton’s argument depends on 
refusal’s status as an illocutionary act that requires uptake. Although perlocutionary frustration is 
still a serious problem for theorists studying the language of sexual consent, the case against 
pornography will be substantially weakened if Langton cannot argue that pornography takes 
away a woman’s ability to refuse.
According to Maitra, the Gricean account of what a speaker means on a particular occasion 
is supposed to be closely related to what she is trying to communicate on that occasion. 1 0 4  
Communication becomes the focus of the analysis, and silencing is translated into terms of
103 Maitra (2009), p. 331.
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“communicative disablement”. Under this new rubric, a speaker is communicatively disabled 
when her intended communicative act is unsuccessful. 1 0 5 The women in Langton’s refusal and 
protest examples are therefore communicatively disabled, as are the women in Cameron’s rape 
tribunal study.
Success and failure are, in this instance, cashed out in terms of Gricean speaker meaning:
A speaker S  means something by uttering x  if, for some audience A, S  utters x 
intending:
(i) A to produce a response r;
(ii) A to think (recognize) that S intends (i); and,
(iii) A’s fulfillment of (ii) to give her a reason to fulfill (i) . 1 0 6
For example, say that I utter the sentence ‘Let’s get takeout for dinner.’ to my partner. When I 
utter this, I intend that my partner either agree with me and discuss what kind of food he would 
like to order or disagree and offer to cook himself. Because he knows me well, my partner 
should be able to tell that I am looking for this response, and his ability to read me so well should 
prompt him to enter into a discussion of my proposition about dinner, thus ensuring successful 
communication and domestic accord. So far, so good. This is an example of a success story. 
But what happens when things don’t work out so well?
In order to answer this question and demonstrate the advantages of her Gricean framework, 
Maitra distinguishes between intention (i) and intention (ii) above. She calls intention (i) the 
‘informative intention’ and intention (ii) the ‘communicative intention’, and illustrates the 
difference between the two in the following example. 1 0 7
Suppose Ben offers Amy a cup of coffee, and she wishes to refuse it. Part of what 
she wants to do, in refusing, is to let Ben know that she does not want that coffee.
So perhaps we should say: in refusing, the response that a speaker typically 
intends to produce is a belief about her own desires, a belief to the effect that she 
does not want what is being offered. Unfortunately, this isn’t quite right, for Amy 
may refuse the coffee because it is bad for her heart, even though she very much 
wants the jolt of caffeine to wake herself up. (It is unattractive to say here that, in
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refusing, Amy misrepresents her desires.) Still, this complication can be 
accommodated. Given that Amy refuses, it is plausible to suppose that her desire 
for the coffee is outweighed by her desire to do what is good for her heart. Then, 
we should say: in refusing, a speaker typically intends to produce in her audience 
the belief that she does not want what is being offered, all things considered.
She continues,
Suppose that Ben thinks Amy is a habitual liar. Then, even upon hearing her 
refusal, he may not come to believe that she doesn’t want the cup of coffee, all 
things considered. So, Amy’s informative intention isn’t satisfied. Nevertheless, 
intuitively Amy has succeeded in communicating her refusal. That is to say, her 
communicative act has succeeded. Accordingly, satisfaction of the first intention, 
i.e., the informative intention, is not necessary for successful communication. 
Satisfaction of the other two intentions is both necessary and sufficient for full 
success of a communicative act. 1 0 8
In other words, even if Ben thinks that Amy is a liar and that she really does want the coffee, his 
beliefs about the situation do not ultimately prevent a successful communicative act here. Amy 
still manages to refuse the coffee because Ben at least recognizes that she intends to refuse, even 
if he holds the misguided belief that she really wants coffee.
This example helps us to see that satisfaction of the informative intention is not, strictly 
speaking, necessary for successful communication. Also, with this distinction between 
informative and communicative intentions in mind, we can see how minimal the requirements 
for successful communication really are:
It is worth pausing here to stress how little is required for successful 
communication, on this view. A speaker’s communicative act can succeed even if 
she isn’t believed, even if she is judged a liar, as above. Communicative success 
does not require that the audience respect what the speaker is trying to say, nor 
that he be sympathetic towards the speaker. We regularly recognize others’ 
communicative intentions even when we have neither respect nor sympathy for 
them. To this extent, communicative success comes cheaply. 1 0 9
What then, is required for communicative failure? Maitra argues that communicative 
disablement occurs when a speaker’s intended audience fails to satisfy the second and the third
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of her Gricean intentions. 1 1 0  In the previous example about takeout, say that my partner is (for 
some reason) unable to tell that I am trying to have a discussion about dinner, and his inability to 
discover this important fact leads to the unhappy conclusion that he doesn’t have any reason to 
respond with a suggestion of some takeout menus. I am frustrated by his lack of understanding, 
and things deteriorate rapidly from there. Of course, there are a range of communicative 
disablements, some more serious than others.
Silencing, Maitra argues, is one of the more serious cases of communicative disablement. 
For example, in the case of sexual refusal, the speaker must intend that:
(i) her audience come to believe that (all things considered) she does not 
want to have sex with him;
(ii) her audience come to think (recognize) that she has the informative 
intention mentioned in (i); and,
(iii) her audience’s fulfillment of (ii) give him a reason to fulfill (i) . 11 1
Under this account, then, the speaker is communicatively disabled if she is unable to satisfy her 
communicative intention. That is, she is silenced if she cannot get her audience to recognize her 
informative intention. Recall that the informative intention is intention (i) and the 
communicative intention is intention (ii). So in this case, the woman is silenced if she can’t get 
her audience to recognize that she intends him to believe that she doesn’t want to have sex with 
him.
Maitra’s account looks promising, not least because the broad category of communicative 
disablement may be useful for exploring other kinds of communication failures. While it is true 
that Maitra’s account is not as dramatic as Langton’s in that she is not arguing that pornography 
takes away a woman’s ability to commit certain acts, the more moderate language of 
communicative disablement captures the silencing phenomenon in a more intuitive and less 
problematic way. However, let us test this Gricean account against some of the examples that 
proved difficult for the Langton account. Return for a moment to those examples (raised 
previously by Alexander Bird) in which a person’s communication can be successful in spite of
110 Maitra (2009), p. 328.
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an audience’s failure to recognize the speaker’s intentions. For example, can I still issue a 
general invitation even if you do not recognize my intention to invite you?
This case could be understood in one of two ways. First, consider the invitation case as 
analogous to the Amy and Ben case. Amy still manages to refuse coffee from Ben even though 
he does not recognize Amy’s belief that she really does not want coffee. He thinks she secretly 
does want coffee and has lied to him about it. However, in spite of his belief, she still manages 
to refuse the coffee because he recognizes her communicative intention as one of refusal. In this 
way, I might still issue a general invitation, which includes you, even if you think I am lying or 
don’t mean to invite everyone in the room, etc. You might think that I did not really mean to 
include everyone in the invitation because (say) I secretly hate you, but that you are invited 
nonetheless because you were in the room when I spoke. I need only get you to recognize my 
communicative intention, even if you fail to completely recognize my informative one.
On the other hand, it seems disingenuous to say that the invitation case is analogous to Ben 
and Amy’s coffee case because Ben recognizes and respects Amy’s refusal in that he takes her at 
her word and does not get her coffee, but you might not recognize my invitation because you are 
shy or suffer from poor self-esteem, which in turn might cause you to fail to recognize my 
communicative intention. If you fail to believe that I am issuing you an invitation, then it seems 
unlikely that you will be able to recognize that I intend to invite you, or that I intend your 
recognition to inspire belief in my invitation. After all, Ben does not fail to believe that Amy is 
refusing coffee. He only fails to believe that this is what she really wants to be doing. He is able 
to question her secret desires without questioning her refusal. You, on the other hand, cannot 
question my secret desires and motivations without also doubting my invitation. Refusal and 
invitation seem less analogous here.
It seems, then, that Maitra’s Gricean framework can avoid some of the pitfalls of 
Langton’s Austinian speech act framework. In particular, it is not vulnerable to the difficulties 
caused by the problematic illocution/perlocution distinction. Also, because Maitra’s framework 
is couched in terms of communicative acts, it avoids any debate about whether or not illocution 
requires uptake and whether the meaning of my words is, in the words of Jacobson, held hostage 
to the understanding of my audience. Under Maitra’s framework, the audience can
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misunderstand or disrespect your intentions, just as long as they recognize your communicative 
act. However, this account still has difficulty handing some difficult cases, like the second 
invitation scenario above. This difficulty is not necessarily a reason to abandon Maitra’s account 
completely. It is, however, a reason to continue the search for an account that is able to capture 
the injustice of silencing-style cases while avoiding such difficulties.
2.4  C o n c l u s i o n
In this chapter I have looked at several different critiques of the LSC. In Section 2.1 I 
considered critiques based in speech act theory. Though these critiques are rooted in the details 
of Austinian theory, I raised more general issues about the role played by a speaker’s audience in 
a communicative context. In my discussion of the notion of uptake, I began to consider the 
power dynamics that might be present in that context. Who gets to decide what we are able to 
mean with our words? Is it us? Some external arbiter? Our audience? I continued my 
investigation into these questions in Section 2.2 when I considered critiques of the LSC based in 
notions of authority and responsibility. I looked at Weiland’s work on convention and the ease 
with which conventions can be established. Weiland does not require pomographers to possess 
any great authority in order that they establish conventions in the sexual language game. 
Langton argues that pornographers do, nonetheless, have great authority in this domain. 
Deborah Cameron invites us to ask whether or not this authority matters - in the end, men and 
women are familiar with the conventions of refusal and are fully capable of identifying refusal 
and responding appropriately. In Section 2.3 I considered a Gricean alternative to the LSC’s 
Austinian speech act theory. Though the Gricean framework does remove some difficulties from 
Langton’s account, I argue that it is still does not satisfactorily capture what is going on in
Langton’s paradigmatic example of sexual refusal.
In the next chapter I continue to explore the notion of convention. I consider other possible 
candidates that might fill the role Langton assigns to convention in her silencing examples. I 
also begin to carve out space for a framework that might better capture the gist of Langton’s 
example while still paying attention to the broader communicative context.
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C hapter T hree
J u s t i c e , c o n v e n t i o n s , a n d  r e s o u r c e s
In this chapter I  delve more deeply into the ideas behind Langton’s silencing 
claim. I  ask how the man in Langton’s paradigmatic refusal example could have 
taken the woman to be consenting to sex in the face o f all the evidence that she 
was not. I  consider Lewis-style convention as a model for one possible 
explanation and Miranda Fricker’s idea o f a communal interpretive resource as a 
model for another.
3.1 Introduction
Recall my summary of Langton’s silencing example from section 1.3:
A man views pornography that depicts women as coy and sexually insatiable.
Women in these films say ‘no’ to sexual advances when they mean ‘yes’. In other 
words, they do not mean to refuse sex when they say ‘no’; they mean to tease and 
titillate men. The implication is that this kind of refusal, refusal from a woman in 
a sexual context, does not count as a “real” refusal. Instead, it counts as foreplay.
This pornography-viewing man subsequently finds himself in a sexual context 
with a woman. The woman says ‘no’ to his sexual advances, but he does not take 
her utterance to count as a refusal, and he rapes her. 1 1 2
At some point, in between the pornography viewing and the sexual context, the man in this 
example forms the belief that at least some women are sexually insatiable, that they derive 
pleasure from rape and coercion, and that at least some utterances of ‘no’, when made in a sexual 
context, mean yes. How does this happen? How does this man overcome all the evidence that 
women often mean no when they say ‘no’ in sexual contexts? We are not asked to suppose that 
the man in this example is a bad person, or even that he is a misogynist. One could argue that 
some misogyny is implied in this example by the man’s pornography habit, his beliefs about 
sexuality, or his actions in this example. Langton, however, does not make this claim. It is
112 See Chapter 1.3.
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important to note that this kind of claim is unnecessary for the success of Langton’s argument. 
In fact, Langton’s claims about pornography’s authority are more compelling if we take the man 
to be influenced by pornography rather than his own misogynistic belief system. We are only 
asked to suppose that the man watches pornographic films, and that those films somehow bring 
about a scenario of communication failure and sexual violence.
In this chapter I will examine two possible answers to the question raised above: how does 
the man in Langton’s refusal example come to believe that the woman’s utterance of ‘no’ means 
yes? The first potential answer to this question involves the notion of convention as it is 
explored by David Lewis and Nellie Weiland. Langton briefly mentions convention in a 
discussion of the way that felicity conditions set the rules for certain kinds of speech acts. I will 
compare her discussion of felicity conditions with Lewis’s work on convention, focusing on the 
idea that a language might contain two or more competing conventions. This might help us to 
understand how the man in Langton’s refusal example takes the woman to mean yes when she 
utters ‘no’ but the woman takes herself to mean no when she makes that utterance. The second 
potential answer to the question of how this failure to communicate refusal might happen 
involves an examination of Miranda Fricker’s idea that we all share a collective interpretive 
resource that helps us to understand our social experiences. 1 1 3 Fricker argues that sometimes an 
understanding of the experiences of socially powerful groups dominates this shared resource, so 
that less powerful groups sometimes have difficulty understanding and communicating about 
their own social experiences. Though Fricker does not discuss Langton’s refusal example in this 
context, I will do so here in an attempt to answer the question raised above.
I will argue that the answer based on Fricker’s account is more fruitful than the answer 
based on Lewis-style convention, and conclude by raising a concern about our shared 
communicative resources. If inadequacies in our communicative resources can lead to such 
devastating communication failure, might these resources be a site of injustice in and of 
themselves?
113 Fricker (2007) p. 1.
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3.2  La n g to n , Lew is , and  C o nventio n
One story about how the man in Langton’s refusal example comes to believe that ‘no’ 
means yes goes something like this: suppose that some individuals watch pornography that 
depicts women as desirous of rape. When women in these films say ‘no’, they mean yes. The 
viewers become convinced that pornography is authoritative in this matter, and they come to 
believe that women do want sex even when they say ‘no’ to sexual advances. With each viewing 
of a scene depicting a sexual context in which a woman says ‘no’ but means yes, a convention 
that women in scenarios of sexual force mean yes when they say ‘no’ is strengthened. 
Eventually, the convention becomes strong enough to override the “normal” conventions for 
sexual refusal. 1 1 4  In this way, the conventions for what a woman is able to say in certain contexts 
can be established by (among other things) the speech patterns of other people, namely actors in 
pornographic films.
Though this particular story may sound improbable to skeptics, stories of this sort are not 
without precedent. For one thing, speech patterns from films, books, and plays often make their 
way into common parlance. Just think of the many one-liners from films like Casablanca that 
are now a part of our common language or the countless expressions bequeathed to the English 
language from Shakespeare. Though people probably held beliefs about the fickleness of women 
before Shakespeare wrote Hamlet, we can now quote Hamlet’s criticism of his mother when he 
says ‘Frailty, thy name is woman!’ almost without knowing where the quote comes from. The 
quotation has made its way into relatively common language, and it lends Shakespeare’s 
authority to a misogynistic convention about women. Langton’s pornographic convention might 
work something like this, if we allow Langton’s claim that pomographers have sufficient 
authority over sexual contexts. There is also another model for the way that the speech of 
powerful people can affect common language and what we can and cannot say. Laws are a kind 
of speech, and they set the conventions for all kinds of everyday illocutions like voting and 
marrying. 1 1 5 The words of lawmakers are authoritative in establishing which words count as the 
dissolution of a marriage and which do not. Those aspiring to become citizens must say very
114 This scenario is outlined by Nellie Weiland and discussed in my Chapter Two, Section 2, pp. 12-16.
115 Langton (1995), p. 317.
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specific words when they take the oath of citizenship, or else they will not succeed in taking the 
oath and becoming a citizen. In these legal cases, the conventions are easy to establish and to 
understand because they come from and are explicitly set out by a recognized authority. 
However, the cases that we are interested in here are different from cases involving legal 
conventions in one very important way: they are not cases of institutional speech. The 
conventions for how one speaks in situations not regulated by institutional authority are not as 
rigid or accessible as those regulated in this way. Langton notes this difficulty, and suggests a 
way forward:
Felicity conditions for illocutions in general are rarely spelled out in the words of 
legal enactments. What then of the conventions that set conditions for other 
illocutions, warning, protesting, urging, and the rest? If it is hard to say what the 
conditions are, it will be harder to say what sets them. But again, the answer may 
be that, by analogy with the legal cases, they can be set by what is said, this time 
by informal practices of speech and communication that gradually establish 
precedents and informal rules about what counts as, for example, a warning. As in 
the legal examples, felicity conditions can be set by words. The space for 
potential speech acts can be built by speakers, as can the limits on that space, the 
' constraints responsible for the silence of illocutionary disablement. Let us at least 
take this as our working hypothesis. 1 1 6
In other words, informal practices of speech and communication can become conventions that 
have authority over our everyday speech. The fact that the conditions for sexual refusal are not 
specified by an institutional authority should not deter us, then, from supposing that they might 
be specified by some other form of authority, in this case by pomographers.
Langton is interested in the role that speech plays in disabling speakers. She looks to 
Austin for an explanation of how her refusal scenario might work, and she finds an answer 
implicit in Austin’s thoughts about felicity conditions.
Felicity conditions, he says, are fixed by conventions. ... Suppose we go with 
Austin and use “convention” as a loose label for whatever sets felicity conditions.
How do these come into being? When we consider some of Austin’s paradigm
116 Langton (1995), p. 320.
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cases, we see that one way that conventions are brought into being, one way that 
felicity conditions are set, is indeed by means of other speech acts.117
So the speech acts of the pomographers, the scripts and screenplays containing dialogue in which 
women say ‘no’ but mean yes and the films made with those scripts, might bring Langton’s 
pornographic convention into being. These films might set felicity conditions for refusal that 
make refusal impossible for women in certain sexual contexts.
In what follows, I will consider Langton’s working hypothesis that constraints on the space 
for potential speech acts can be built by speakers. In other words, I will look at the idea that our 
speech is governed (at least in part) by conventions established by other people. I follow 
Langton in using ‘convention’ as a loose label for whatever sets felicity conditions. So 
conventions, among other things, serve to set the conditions and criteria that establish whether or 
not a speech act “counts” as a warning, refusal, etc. For example, we can say that it is a matter 
of convention that saying ‘no’ is sufficient for refusal. As we saw in Chapter Two, Nellie 
Weiland argues that it might also be a matter of convention that saying ‘no’ is sufficient for 
sexual consent in certain contexts.118 If both of these examples are plausible, and it seems that 
they are, then there is clearly some tension in our conventions about refusal.
In order to explore this tension, let us take a closer look at the notion of a convention. 
David Lewis gives the following definition of convention:
A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when they are agents 
in a recurrent situation S  is a convention if and only if it is true that, and it is 
common knowledge119 in P that, in almost any instance of S  among members of P,
(1) everyone conforms to R;
(2) everyone expects almost everyone else to conform to R;
(3) everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions;
117 Langton (1995), p. 319.
118 Although Weiland discusses meaning conventions, the point could be put in terms o f felicity conditions.
119 The notion o f common knowledge has proved controversial. I do not have sufficient space here to address this 
interesting debate. Instead, I am simply using a general understanding of common knowledge, so that two people 
have common knowledge about x if “both know that both know that both know” about x.
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(4) everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition that almost 
everyone conform to R;
(5) everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R \ on condition that almost 
everyone conform to R’,
where R ’ is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of P in S, such
that almost no one in almost any instance of S  among members of P could
conform both to R ’and to R.no
In other words, conventions are regularities in the behavior of a group of people with certain 
expectations, preferences, and knowledge. For example, we can say that it is conventional to use 
knives, forks, and spoons as eating implements in Italian restaurants because, among patrons of 
such restaurants, it is true and common knowledge that
(1) everyone eats with knives, forks, and spoons at Italian restaurants;
(2) everyone expects almost everyone else to do so too;
(3) everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding all possible 
combinations of actions, i.e. knives are best for cutting, spoons for scooping, 
and forks for spearing, etc.;
(4) everyone prefers that everyone eat with knives, forks, and spoons at Italian 
restaurants, on condition that almost everyone does too; and
(5) everyone would prefer that everyone use some other kind of implement (think 
of the convention for chopstick use in China), on condition that almost 
everyone else does too.
Perhaps Lewis assumes that our expectations and preferences are somewhat more rational than 
they actually are,120 21 but his definition does capture the idea that a group of people follow one 
convention rather than another (R rather than R on a more or less arbitrary basis. We conform 
to R, we expect others to conform to R, and we prefer that we all conform to R unless some other 
convention R ’ comes along. In that case, we prefer that we all conform to the new convention, if 
that is what everyone else is doing.
120 Lewis (2002), p. 78. There are several other accounts of convention that diverge from the Lewisian account in 
interesting ways - most notably, Millikan’s evolutionary account and Gilbert’s group-based account - but Lewis’s 
account is the one used in this literature and so I confine myself to an account of Lewisian convention here.
121 For a critique o f Lewis along these lines see Millikan (2005).
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Returning to Langton’s refusal case, does the belief that women’s utterances of ‘no’ in a 
sexual context actually mean yes count as a convention?122 Let us take male viewers of 
pornography as the members of population P. Let us assume that the regularity R in question is 
the expectation that all women in sexual contexts mean yes when they utter ‘no’. Let us also 
assume that a situation S is any sexual context in which a man is attempting to have sex with a 
woman. In that case, R could only be called a convention if, at a minimum, all male viewers of 
pornography expect that all women in sexual contexts mean yes when they utter ‘no’, expect that 
all other viewers expect this, and prefer that this expectation holds among all viewers. This 
seems much too strong, even for the arguments that Langton makes in Speech Acts and 
Unspeakable Acts. Most salient among many objections to these requirements are the thoughts 
that Langton does not argue that all viewers of pornography adhere to the pornographic 
convention, or that the convention is so robust that it applies to every sexual context in which a 
man is attempting to have sex with a woman. We should not give up on the possibility of a 
pornographic convention yet, though. Consider what happens when we make some adjustments 
to both the account of convention and the values for some variables.
Lewis adapted his definition in the later Languages and Language, allowing for a less 
robust demand on the population P's conformity to the convention. The new definition also 
accommodates regularities of both action and belief, since regularities between hearers and 
listeners - communication conventions - are usually regularities of belief rather than action. The 
definition is as follows:
A regularity R, in action or in action and belief, is a convention in a population P
if and only if, within P, the following six conditions hold. (Or at least they almost
hold. A few exceptions to the “everyone”s can be tolerated.)
1. Everyone conforms to R.
2. Everyone believes that the others conform to R.
3. This belief that the others conform to R gives everyone a good and decisive 
reason to conform to R himself. [...]
1221 am following Weiland in couching the question as one about meaning conventions. Her construal has been 
criticized by Maitra and McGowan (2010). The question can easily be recast as one about felicity conditions: Does 
the belief that an utterance of ‘no’ from a woman suffices for sexual consent count as a convention?
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4. There is a general preference for general conformity to R rather than slightly- 
less-than-general-conformity - in particular, rather than the conformity by all 
but any one. [...]
5. R is not the only possible regularity meeting the last two conditions. There is at 
least one alternative R ’ such that the belief that others conformed to R ’ would 
give everyone a good and decisive practical or epistemic reason to conform to 
R ’ likewise; such that there is a general preference for general conformity to R ’ 
rather than slightly less-than-general conformity to R and such that there is 
normally no way of conforming to R and R ’ both. [...]
6. Finally, the various facts listed in the conditions [1.] to [5.] are matters of 
common (or mutual) knowledge: they are known to everyone, it is known to 
everyone that they are known to everyone, and so on. The knowledge 
mentioned here may be merely potential: knowledge that would be available if 
one bothered to think hard enough. [...]123
Note that condition four now states that there is a general preference for general conformity to R, 
rather than the earlier requirement that everyone have approximately the same preferences 
regarding all possible combinations of actions. This new condition is significantly easier to 
meet. The new definition also leaves out any mention of situation S, so you can’t narrow the 
scope of the convention based on the situation. Now Lewis’s definition may seem to capture a 
Langton/Weiland style pornographic convention given two different specifications of population 
P: a general version and a more restricted version.
Under the more restricted version, let us specify that the members of population P are a 
subset of male viewers of pornography who are especially susceptible to pornography as a 
teaching manual about correct sexual practice. Let us also specify that the regularity R is 
something like the belief that women mean yes when they utter ‘no’ in sexual contexts. In this 
case, it is plausible that all members of P conform to this belief (condition one), that they all 
believe that all of the others do too (condition two), that everyone else’s beliefs give each 
member of P a good reason to conform (condition three), and that there is a general preference 
among members of P for general conformity to the belief (condition four). Thus far, this seems 
relatively easy to accept. Condition six seems similarly easy to satisfy; it makes sense that this 
regularity would be common knowledge among the members of this population if they are all
123 Lewis (1975), p. 5-6.
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receiving instruction from similar films and are similarly susceptible to that instruction. Things 
get more interesting with condition five, which requires that there be another regularity, like the 
belief that women in sexual contexts mean no when they utter ‘no’, that cannot be conformed to 
at the same time as the original regularity R. This would mean that, if the pornographic 
convention really was a convention, there would be no way the man in Langton’s refusal 
example could possibly take the woman to mean no when she uttered ‘no’, since he was 
conforming to the pornographic regularity, and he couldn’t conform to both at the same time. 
This might support Langton’s case for the existence of a pornographic convention in her 
example; given the presence of the pornographic regularity and the fact that the man could not 
conform to more than one regularity at a time, he would adhere to the pornographic regularity 
and take the woman to be consenting to sex. This also helps to explain why the man didn’t have 
access to or make reference to the “normal”, non-pornographic convention. If the pornographic 
regularity is like a Lewis-style convention, he simply could not do so because the presence of the 
pornographic regularity means that there could be no other convention.
Now consider a case in which we make the membership of population P more general. 
The only difference between this case and the case above is the membership of P; all other 
variables (like the content of R) remain the same. However, in this case, let us specify that the 
members of population P are most members of society in the United States. This specification is 
probably more like the kind of population that Langton intends in her refusal example. Now it 
seems more difficult to construe the pornography regularity as a convention. For instance, it is 
difficult to argue that almost everyone in the United States believes that women mean yes when 
they utter ‘no’ in sexual contexts, or that there is a general preference for conformity to such a 
belief, for the simple reason that many men and women in the United States do not subscribe to 
pornographic conventions or believe that pornography is a reliable teaching tool regarding good 
sexual practice. It doesn’t seem that the pornographic regularity can be a convention for most of 
the population of the United States since more than a few people don’t subscribe to it.
This seems both right and wrong. It seems right because some significant section of the 
general population of the United States does not conform to the pornographic regularity, so it is 
not conventional in the same sense that our use of knives, forks, and spoons in Italian restaurants
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is conventional. However, it seems wrong if Langton is correct and some significant part of the 
population of the United States is heavily influenced by pornographic norms of behavior, and 
many of us have access to knowledge about those norms. This is why Lewis’s sixth condition is 
crucial. Recall the sixth condition:
6. Finally, the various facts listed in the conditions [1.] to [5.] are matters of 
common (or mutual) knowledge: they are known to everyone, it is known to 
everyone that they are known to everyone, and so on. The knowledge 
mentioned here may be merely potential: knowledge that would be available if 
one bothered to think hard enough. [„.]
If almost all of the members of population P can be said to have potential common knowledge 
about the pornographic regularity, then there is a kind of middle ground between the subset of 
people who subscribe to the pornographic regularity and the small subset of people who have no 
potential knowledge of the regularity. These people belonging to the middle ground do not 
conform to the regularity, i.e. they do not believe that a woman means yes when she utters ‘no’ in 
a sexual context, but they are aware that the regularity exists. And as we saw in Chapter Two, 
this knowledge might be enough to establish something like a convention anyway. (It is clearly 
not a full Lewisian convention, since other necessary conditions are not met.) Recall Nellie 
Weiland:
In [an unwanted sexual encounter] it is neither mutual nor is it knowledge that 
‘no’ means yes for the very straightforward reason that the speaker indeed means 
no. It is nevertheless plausible that there is mutual knowledge in the unwanted 
sexual encounter; what both speakers know is that there is mutual knowledge that 
‘no’ means yes in most contexts relevantly similar to the unwanted sexual 
, encounter - namely in those pornographic representations.124
In other words, the man and woman have mutual knowledge that the pornographic regularity 
exists in pornographic representations. Unfortunately, it is not yet clear what this mutual 
knowledge might mean, or what affect mutual knowledge might have on convention. Are non­
conformists to the pornographic regularity subscribers to some form of the regularity anyway
124 Weiland (2007), p. 444.
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because of their mutual knowledge? What happens when two people subscribing to two 
different regularities governing the same situation interact?
Lewis intended his examination of convention to demonstrate a solution to coordination 
problems. For example, local phone calls in Oberlin, Ohio, used to be cut off by the switchboard 
after three minutes. This created a coordination problem, because conversationalists were unsure 
who should call whom in order to resume the call after it was disconnected. Residents of Oberlin 
needed a convention that would inform conversationalists about who should call back and who 
should wait for a call in order to avoid confusion and busy signals. It became conventional that 
the person who placed the call would call back. In this way, the coordination problem was 
solved and local calls went (more or less) smoothly. Langton’s example is different from the 
Oberlin example in that the pornography viewers were not presented with a mutually confusing 
problem to overcome (each person is sure of what ‘no’ means according to their regularity, 
whereas the callers of Oberlin were not initially sure what to do when their calls were cut off), 
but conversational conventions do involve coordinating appropriate or correct responses with 
their various prompts. A conversational convention is relevantly similar to a coordination 
problem in this respect.
There is, however, an important disanalogy between the Oberlin and Langton cases. In 
Lewis-style coordination problems that result in conventions, each member of P is more or less 
equal. They all share common knowledge of P, they are all entitled to expect members of P to 
behave in certain ways, and they all want the same things. Lewis picks up on this sense of 
shared purpose immediately. He calls attention to it at the beginning of his account by using this 
quote from Hume’s Treatise o f Human Nature to summarize what convention means for him. 
Hume writes that convention is
a general sense of common interest; which sense all the members of the society 
express to one another, and which induces them to regulate their conduct by 
certain rules. I observe that it will be to my interest [e.g.] to leave another in the 
possession of his goods, provided he will act in the same manner with regard to 
me. When this common sense of interest is mutually expressed and is known to 
both, it produces a suitable resolution and behavior. And this may properly 
enough be called a convention or agreement betwixt us, though without the 
interposition of a promise; since the actions of each of us have a reference to those
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of the other, and are performed upon the supposition that something is to be 
performed on the other part.125
Members of a subgroup of pornography viewers may turn out to share a general sense of 
common interest. They may expect some kind of reciprocity of behavior among members of the 
group. They may expect that all men would behave as they do in sexual contexts, and that all 
women will always consent to sex. However, it is reasonable to suppose that many men and 
women would not consider themselves to be a part of this subgroup. They would not find that 
the norms imparted to conversational convention by pornography serve their ends, and they 
probably would not say that they share a sense of common interest with men who take women’s 
utterances of refusal as tokens of consent. In other words, most women (and, hopefully, most 
men) do not subscribe to the pornography-affected regularity. They believe, and would prefer 
that everyone else believes, that women mean no when they say ‘no’ in sexual contexts. They do 
not, therefore, share any straightforward kind of common knowledge with the subgroup of 
pornography viewers. Moreover, it is simply not the case that most members of society in the 
United States are on an equal footing. They do not all have the same social position. They
t
cannot all exercise the same degree of social power. They cannot, therefore, be equal parties to a 
convention about sexual refusal in the way that Lewis and Hume have in mind.
In addition to these disanalogies between a Langton-style pornographic regularity and 
Lewisian convention, there seems to be another problem. It seems that there might be two 
conventions at work in the Langton example, as opposed to the one successful convention at 
work amongst the callers of Oberlin. Langton asks us to suppose that pornography has helped to 
establish the convention adhered to by the man, but that the “normal” conventions of refusal and 
acceptance are still present enough to be available to the woman. Do the two conventions 
compete with each other for dominance? Can they co-exist? Is it even possible to have such a 
thing as a normal convention? I will consider these questions in what follows.
125 Hume’s Treatise, III.ii.2.
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Lewis says very little about competing conventions.126 Under his account, the members of 
the population P all (or almost all) agree; there is no room for competition. However, this 
absence is a source of criticism for Lewis. Under the Lewisian account, even after the 
modifications made in Languages and Language, convention requires an extremely high degree 
of conformity. Some critics point out that we have many conventions that are marked not by 
conformity but by breach of conformity. Margaret Gilbert suggests that it might be a convention 
to send thank-you notes after a dinner party, even though hardly any people send such notes any 
more.127 Gilbert also points out that the Lewisian account of convention is devoid of any 
mention of normativity. Conventions are not just descriptions of regularities in people’s behavior. 
They are also descriptions of how they should behave. If it is a convention that we send thank- 
you notes after a dinner party, we should feel suitably guilty for not doing so. (Unless, of course, 
the failure to send such notes has become more of a convention than the original note-sending 
convention.) The convention not only dictates that thank-you notes (or a lack of them) are 
something that we do. It also dictates what we should do. This normativity, says Gilbert, is part 
of what motivates us to maintain the convention. As a result of this, Gilbert concludes that 
Lewis’s account does not provide sufficient conditions for a convention to prevail over other 
regularities.
126 Lewis does allow that other regularities can exist in a language or a population, not only because it is apparent 
that they do exist, but also because a language must allow for flexibility and change. He suggests that languages 
may occur in a cluster, with our actual language existing alongside several possible languages.
The languages o f the cluster have exactly the same sentences and give them corresponding sets of 
interpretations; but sometimes there are slight differences in corresponding truth conditions. These 
differences rarely affect worlds close enough to the actual world to be compatible with most of our 
ordinary beliefs. But as we go to more and more bizarre possible worlds, more and more of our 
sentences come out true in some languages of our cluster and false in others. Lewis (2002), p.201.
In this passage, Lewis is talking about a convention of truthfulness, but the point he makes is relevant to Langton’s 
case. Consider the idea that the man in Langton’s example speaks one language from the cluster (language A), and 
the woman speaks another (language B). Now, these languages are similar enough in most respects to allow for 
successful communication in most contexts. However, let us say that we live in the “bizarre possible world” 
described in Langton’s refusal example. In this world, the sentence “no’ means yes in a sexual context’ is true in A, 
and “no’ means yes in a sexual context’ is false in B. On the understanding suggested here, the Langton example is 
not a case of competing conventions. Rather, it is a case of competing languages. In this way Lewis may be able to 
deal with Langton-refusal-style cases without sacrificing the conformity and dominance requirements of his account 
of convention. However, this is less than satisfactory for my purposes here, since it only serves to push the problem 
back a degree from the level o f competing conventions to the level of competing languages.
127 Gilbert (1992), pp. 349-355.
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However, as is clear from the final part of Lewis’ definition of convention, the option of an 
alternate regularity R ’ must be available. In other words, if the members of population P wanted 
to converge upon some other regularity instead of the current convention, then they must be able 
to do so. There may be other regularities, but a regularity is not a convention until almost all of 
the members of P prefer R to all other options. This is not an unusual move among the various 
accounts of convention. Most accounts want a convention to be a clearly dominant regularity. 
For example, Gilbert’s own account, constructed (in response to Lewis) to allow for normativity, 
involves a community unit that adopts a convention, in contrast to Lewis’ collection of 
individuals from P. Millikan’s account, derived from the game-theoretic roots of convention, 
describes convention as a biological entity that evolves to repel the attack of hostile and 
competing conventions. Most theorists, then, consider dominance to be a minimal requirement 
for a regularity to count as a convention.128
Recall that we undertook this examination of convention in order to answer the following
question: How does the man in Langton’s refusal example come to believe that the woman’s
utterance of ‘no’ means yes? The need for a dominant convention appears to be a significant «
setback to the convention-oriented answer to this question. How are we to understand Langton’s 
claim that the man in her refusal example took the woman to mean yes when she uttered ‘no’ 
because pornographic conventions set the felicity conditions for refusal? A regularity is 
conventional if it is the dominant regularity, and there are at least two sets of regularities at work 
in the refusal example. Neither one is dominant. This leaves us in need of an account that can 
deal with regularities competing for dominance. In the next section I will suggest that Miranda 
Fricker may provide such an account with her notion of collective interpretive resources.
3.3  Fricker and  the  d ivis io n  o f  hermeneutical  resources
Miranda Fricker has a different way of framing the Langton refusal example.
Instead of saying that the woman in the example is rendered unable to perform the act of 
refusal, Fricker says that the climate created by pornography and other forms of sexual
128 The idea is that there is one operative convention - the dominant one - that is the most salient solution to a co­
ordination problem (like the callers of Oberlin). Salience can be established by repetition as Weiland suggests, but 
this is not the only way to establish salience, and this area of the convention literature is controversial. For a 
discussion o f this, see Maitra and McGowan (2010), p. 170.
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objectification might cause what she calls ‘fundamental communicative 
dysfunction’ .129 According to Fricker, this causal chain between a climate of 
objectification and a communication failure is best explained by the presence of what she 
calls testimonial injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when a speaker’s audience rates 
that speaker as not worth listening to or believing simply because of her position in 
society. Taking Fricker’s example, a woman who brings her car to a mechanic might find 
that the mechanic does not listen to her assessment of her car trouble because she is a 
woman, and women (supposedly) don’t know anything about cars. Such a woman would 
be a victim of testimonial injustice.
In the Langton example, Fricker suggests that
[i]n such a climate of sexual objectification, women’s extreme lack of credibility 
would give rise to an especially acute form of testimonial injustice. In such a 
situation, women’s testimony is not quite pre-empted (they do say things to men), 
but it might as well be, since it is not heard as genuine testimony at all.130
In other words, Langton’s example is a paradigmatic case of a pre-existing and unfavorable 
credibility assessment that hangs over a conversational context and hampers communication. 
Fricker notes that this interpretation of Langton’s example relies upon the fact that the woman 
must have a pre-existing lack of credibility. In her words, “there might be social climates in 
which women lack credibility so drastically for certain subject matters that their word fails 
altogether to register in male hearers’ testimonial sensibility.”131 The woman in the refusal 
example has no chance to speak for herself and earn or demonstrate her credibility. She is denied 
credibility from the outset, and as such, her sexual refusal does not count as speech worth taking 
seriously.
Testimonial injustice is related to another kind of injustice brought to light by Fricker: 
hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice “occurs ... when a gap in collective interpretive 
resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social
129 Fricker (2007), p. 139.
130 Fricker (2007), p 139.
131 Fricker (2007), p. 141.
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experiences.”132 It is like testimonial injustice in that it is often the root cause of massive and 
systematic communication failures, but it is different in one important way. Testimonial injustice 
is often committed by one person and directed at another person; it is what Fricker calls agential. 
Hermeneutical injustice, on the other hand, is not perpetrated by any individual or group. 
Instead, it is a purely structural phenomenon. Fricker demonstrates what she means by the 
phrase ‘purely structural’ with the following example:
Consider, for instance, the case where a given social group is informally 
disenfranchised in the sense that, for whatever complex social reasons, they 
tend not to vote. No social agent or agency in particular is excluding them 
from the democratic process, yet they are excluded, and their exclusion marks 
an operation of social power. It seems in such a case that the power 
influencing their behaviour is so thoroughly dispersed through the social 
system that we should think of it as lacking a subject.133
In other words, hermeneutical injustice occurs as a result of very real social forces, but those 
social forces are diffuse enough to prevent us from labeling any one person or group as the 
perpetrator of the injustice. Fricker’s account of complex and dispersed social power bears a 
striking similarity to most general accounts of convention; both are meant to be largely tacit 
forces that shape the way that groups of people behave, think, and communicate.
However, in contrast to convention, hermeneutical injustice is more of a lack of resources 
than a presence of a guiding force. Hermeneutical injustice:
stem[s] from a gap in our collective hermeneutical resources - a gap, that is, in 
our shared tools of social interpretation - where it is no accident that the cognitive 
disadvantage created by this gap impinges unequally on different social groups.134
It is fairly uncontroversial to say, in a general sense, that some groups of people have more 
resources than others. What Fricker is saying here is that some groups of people have more of 
one very particular and important resource: tools of social interpretation. Just what these tools 
are and why they are important is best illustrated by the following example from Susan
132 Fricker (2007), p. 1.
133 Fricker (2007), p. 10-11.
134 Fricker (2007), p. 6.
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Brownmiller’s book about the early days of awareness about sexual harassment. Brownmiller 
relates the story of Carmita Wood, who quit her job because she could no longer cope with the 
repeated and unpleasant sexual advances of her boss. Carmita happened to tell her story to a 
seminar comprised of other women who had similar experiences.
‘Lin’s students have been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual 
advances they’d encountered on their summer jobs,’ Sauvigne relates. ‘And then 
Carmita Wood comes in and tells Lin her story. We realized that to a person, 
every one of us - the women on staff, Carmita, the students, - had had an 
experience like this at some point, you know? And none of us had ever told 
anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound revelation.’135
This profound revelation was then given the name ‘sexual harassment’, and became the focus of 
a legal and social campaign that has fundamentally changed the way that women and men 
interact in the workplace. Knowledge about how people should be treated in the workplace is a 
resource. It is a tool that informs our conduct at work and helps people to feel reasonably secure 
while they perform their job, and it also gives people the wherewithal to seek justice if they are 
victims of harassment. Before these seminars in which the discovery of a shared experience took 
place, women did not have these resources, and it is important to note that men did not have 
them either. The fundamental thing that the label ‘sexual harassment’ did for a generation of 
men and women was that it enabled them to identify and understand a concept and a set of 
experiences that were previously obscured. In other words, there was a gap in our collective 
hermeneutical resources, and this gap was filled by our identification of sexual harassment as a 
widespread phenomenon and by labeling that phenomenon with a widely recognized name.
So what is a collective interpretive resource? Fricker says that our collective 
hermeneutical resources are “our shared tools of social interpretation”.136 What exactly are tools 
of social interpretation, and how do we share them? Social experiences can range from official 
participation in the mechanisms of the state, like voting, to everyday occurrences like 
interactions with waitresses or grocery clerks, and everything in between. Experiences with 
family, friends, enemies, neighbors, and co-workers all qualify. Some of these experiences will
135 Fricker quotes from Brownmiller (1990), p. 280-1.
136 Fricker (2007) p. 6.
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be positive, some negative, some just, and some unjust. Presumably our tools of social 
interpretation are the things (knowledge, beliefs, words, concepts) that we need in order to 
understand and participate in those experiences. For example, Carmita Wood could not 
understand her experience of sexual harassment or protect herself from abuse without the 
concept sexual harassment and its attendant words and knowledge. Her harasser could not fully 
understand his bad behavior without them, either.
Fricker notes that the collective hermeneutical resource can affect us in the following way:
One way of taking the epistemological suggestion that social power has an unfair 
impact on collective forms of social understanding is to think of our shared 
understandings as reflecting the perspectives of different social groups, and to 
entertain the idea that relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical 
resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, 
whereas the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social 
experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in 
the effort to render them intelligible.137
She uses an example about the women’s movement to illustrate:
If we look at the history of the women’s movement, we see that the method of 
consciousness raising through ‘speak-outs’ and the sharing of scantly understood, 
barely articulate experiences was a direct response to the fact that so much of 
women’s experience was obscure, even unspeakable, for the isolated individual, 
whereas the process of sharing these half-formed understandings awakened 
hitherto dormant resources for social meaning that brought clarity, cognitive 
confidence, and increased communicative facility.138
In other words, before the days of consciousness raising seminars like the one that Carmita Wood
1,
participated in, women (and men) had a limited understanding of many woman-dominated 
experiences like sexual harassment or postpartum depression. In some cases, understanding was 
so limited that women could not communicate about their experiences. This is particularly true 
in Carmita Wood’s case, which will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. The point Fricker 
is making in the above quotations is that women have historically had less social power then
137 Fricker (2007), p. 148.
138 Fricker (2007), p. 148.
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men, and this fact is demonstrated by the proportion of women’s experiences that were not well- 
represented in the collective interpretive resource.
Fricker does not simply argue that words, knowledge, beliefs, and concepts that capture 
women’s experiences did not exist in the collective resource. Her assessment of the situation is 
slightly more complicated, in that socially powerful groups and people can actually influence the 
resource with their own beliefs, etc. about the experiences of the less powerful.
... [W]hat is bad about this sort of hermeneutical marginalization is that it renders 
the collective hermeneutical resource structurally prejudiced, for it will tend to 
issue interpretations of that group’s social experiences that are biased because 
insufficiently influenced by the subject group, and therefore unduly influenced by 
more hermeneutically powerful groups (thus, for instance, sexual harassment as 
flirting, rape in marriage as non-rape, post-natal depression as hysteria, reluctance 
to work family-unfriendly hours as unprofessionalism, and so on).139
So less powerful groups like women often find that they are left to interpret their experiences of, 
say, post-natal depression through the lens of someone else’s understanding. If a group with a 
degree of hermeneutical power perceives that some women become hysterical after giving birth, 
then that perception is what fills the collective interpretive resource, rather than an account given 
by mothers detailing what the aftermath of giving birth is actually like. In this way, women like 
Carmita Wood had some resources to work with before the advent of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ - they understood that some bosses flirted, etc. - but their resources were structurally 
prejudiced and therefore inadequate and liable to become catalysts for communication failure 
and injustice.
3 . 4  C ompeting  C o n v e n tio n s , C ompeting  for  Resources
One of Fricker’s claims is that women like Carmita Wood were hermeneutically 
marginalized. That is, they did not participate equally in the practices through which social 
meanings are generated.140 They were not in positions of social power and authority, and so their 
understanding of experiences like childbirth or professional behavior were discounted or given 
less weight. Subsequently, their understandings made less of a contribution to the collective
139 Fricker (2007), p. 155.
140 Fricker (2007), p. 6.
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hermeneutical resource. This marginalization sounds like the kind of thing that might explain the 
presence of competing conventions in Langton’s refusal example, if such competition can be said 
to take place. If women are excluded from the generation of social meanings about the 
conventions of sexual refusal because the conventions are generated by mostly male 
pomographers, then it stands to reason that this exclusion might contribute to those women’s 
unsuccessful attempts to refuse in sexual contexts. Of course, this kind of marginalization will 
not fully explain Langton’s refusal case. We are not all full participants in every practice through 
which social meanings are generated; only consider the generation of most technical and legal 
vocabulary, and you can see that society accepts the dictation of certain kinds of conventions 
from persons and institutions of authority. We still manage to understand some things about 
terms like ‘stem-cell research’ and ‘jet propulsion’ even though we did not participate in their 
generation. However, what Langton and Fricker want to point out to us is the fact that there are 
cases in which we ought to be participating equally in the generation of social meanings, and we 
are not. This lack of participation can have dire consequences:
' This sort of marginalization can mean that our collective forms of understanding 
are rendered structurally prejudicial in respect of content and/or style: the social 
experiences of hermeneutically marginalized groups are left inadequately 
conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves; 
and/or attempts at communication made by such groups, when they do have an 
adequate grip on the content of what they aim to convey, are not heard as rational 
owing to their expressive style being inadequately understood.141
In other words, there are some experiences (sexual harassment, sexual consent and refusal) that 
are valuable or important to women, and that they therefore have an interest in understanding. 
If the collective resource is structurally prejudiced, then women are vulnerable to 
misunderstanding and miscommunication, which, as we have seen in Langton’s refusal case, can
have devastating effects.
Let us run through some examples to see how this might work. In the case of Carmita 
Wood and the other women who were victim to sexual harassment before such experiences had a 
name with a negative connotation, it is clear that these women had an experience that was
141 Fricker (2007), p. 6-7.
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inadequately conceptualized. There simply was no concept of sexual harassment. This 
inadequate conceptualization, in turn, meant not only that Carmita Wood could not understand 
that her experience was a systematic injustice. It also meant that her friends, parents, co­
workers, and the government unemployment centre could not understand her experience or 
respond to it adequately.
[S]he applied for unemployment insurance. When the claims investigator asked 
why she had left her job after eight years, Wood was at a loss to describe the 
hateful episodes. She was ashamed and embarrassed. Under prodding - the blank 
on the form needed to be filled in - she answered that her reason had been 
personal. Her claim for unemployment benefits was denied.142
Carmita Wood’s experience was not well-understood by anyone, and she was largely unable to 
make attempts to communicate about it. We can assume that if she had attempted to do so, she 
would have been met with hostility, confusion, or indifference. She probably would not have 
been treated as entirely rational. And why should she have been? She was reporting on a 
scenario that nobody had the resources to understand.
It is clear that something was preventing Carmita Wood from making sense of her 
difficulties, and it is also clear that this something was not a particular person or group, though 
her boss was clearly responsible for the harassment itself. Fricker notes that
what women like Carmita Wood had to contend with at work was no plain 
epistemic bad luck, for it was no accident that their experience had been falling 
down the cracks. As they struggled to make sense of their various experiences of 
harassment, the whole engine of collective social meaning was effectively geared 
to keeping these obscured experiences out of sight. Her unequal participation is 
the deeper reason why Carmita Wood’s cognitive disablement constitutes an 
injustice.143
In this passage, Fricker points to another important aspect of hermeneutical injustice. Carmita 
Wood was a victim of marginalization because there was a gap in the collective hermeneutical 
resources where an understanding of sexual harassment should have been. However, this 
passage suggests that, in addition to the presence of this gap, the “engine of collective social
142 Fricker quotes from Brownmiller (1990), p. 280-1.
143 Fricker (2007), p. 153.
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meaning” was actively keeping the gap wide open. It was perpetuating the marginalization by 
keeping the experiences of women like Carmita Wood out of sight. Fricker’s use of active 
language to describe the “engine of collective social meaning” and its various maneuvers to 
ensure the continued marginalization of women may invite skepticism. However, consider the 
social collusion and shared preferences necessary to maintain a convention under Lewis’s (and 
most other) account. What Fricker is describing here is not so different from the tacit consensus­
building that happens in the background when a convention is being established and maintained 
in a population. This need not be a deliberate conspiracy in order for us to take it seriously. The 
salient difference between these accounts (Fricker and Lewis) is that Fricker is suggesting that 
this social collusion is not always just, and that it sometimes results in the marginalization and 
exclusion of groups of people.
Hermeneutical marginalization might serve as an explanation for the presence of 
competing conventions in Langton’s refusal example. Recall Carmita Wood’s case as an 
example. Ms. Wood and her harasser both had access to an inadequate collective hermeneutical 
resource with regard to conventions about workplace gender relations. This resource governed 
Carmita’s experience in the unemployment insurance office when she was at a loss to describe 
her prior experience that led to unemployment. After she found the consciousness-raising group, 
she gained a new understanding of her experience and a new name to use in the campaign 
against sexual harassment. It seems reasonable to suppose that there were then two different 
conventions regarding appropriate workplace gender relations: one from the old, inadequate 
hermeneutical resource, and one new convention formed at the consciousness-raising group and 
slowly spread throughout the population via political and legal campaigns. If we apply this 
model to Langton’s refusal case, we are left with the following scenario: Langton’s man and 
woman both had access to a collective hermeneutical resource with regard to the conventions 
about sexual refusal and consent in certain situations. The resource contained, among other 
things, the belief that utterances of ‘no’ are used to communicate refusal in many situations, 
including sexual contexts. However, according to this story, as pornographers gained social and 
hermeneutical power, the resource changed and became structurally prejudiced by the input of 
pomographers and other hermeneutically powerful groups who objectify and subordinate
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women. These groups introduced the pornographic regularity that utterances of ‘no‘ mean yes in 
some sexual contexts, but they did not have the power or intent to get rid of the old convention. 
There are therefore two competing conventions about sexual refusal in the collective 
hermeneutical resource. The man was drawing on the pornographic convention and the woman 
was drawing on the earlier convention, with devastating results. The presence of two different 
conventions makes it more difficult to understand sexual experience, and makes the resource 
inadequate for the communicative and interpretive needs of both the man and the woman in 
Langton’s example.
3.5  C o nclusio n
Fricker’s model provides a reasonable answer to the question posed at the beginning of this 
chapter: how does the man in Langton’s refusal example come to believe that the woman’s 
utterance of ‘no’ means yesl It does so by providing the idea of a collective interpretive resource 
shared by all but vulnerable to structural prejudice. In this way, we can understand how there 
might be several conflicting interpretations of social experience available in the same resource. 
A pornographic regularity might exist alongside a more generally applicable refusal regularity. 
The pornographic regularity might gain strength and robustness in the resource if it was 
condoned by a hermeneutically powerful group like Langton’s pomographers. We also avoid the 
problems posed by various accounts of convention, such as the need for a salient convention that 
is dominant over all other options. According to Fricker, multiple interpretations of the same 
social experience might all be contained in the collective resource.
Fricker’s work draws our attention to the idea that marginalized groups may struggle with 
interpretive resources that are inadequate, or at least less adequate than those of more socially 
powerful groups. This idea presents us with a new kind of injustice: hermeneutical injustice. In 
the next chapter, I will investigate Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice more thoroughly. 
I will offer a critique of Fricker’s account and attempt to isolate the problem posed by structural 
prejudice in our collective hermeneutical resources.
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C h a p t e r  Fo u r
A  C r i t i q u e  o f  H e r m e n e u t i c a l  In j u s t i c e
In this chapter I  examine Miranda Fricker’s work on hermeneutical injustice. In 
particular, I  argue that Fricker’s insistence that there is a particular kind o f  
asymmetry between the victim o f this injustice and her surrounding social 
colleagues is problematic. I  offer several different lines o f argument that combine 
to form a critique o f this asymmetry claim.
4.1 Fricker . Sexual Harrassment, and  Hermeneutical injustice
In Epistemic Injustice (2007), Miranda Fricker outlines and lays groundwork for a variety 
of claims supporting the idea that people can be wronged in their capacity as knowers. There are 
two basic kinds of injustice defined in the book. Both can interfere with effective 
communication. The first is testimonial injustice, or the injustice suffered by people whose
*
testimony is not taken seriously because they suffer from what Fricker calls a credibility deficit 
and are therefore not taken to be reliable sources of knowledge. Second, and most relevant to 
my work here, is hermeneutical injustice. In Chapter Three I discussed the idea of a collective 
hermeneutical resource and the way that our collective resources can become structurally 
prejudiced in favor of socially powerful groups. I will give a more complete account of 
hermeneutical injustice here.
Hermeneutical injustice is perhaps best approached by way of an example, but before I 
discuss what Fricker calls “the central case of hermeneutical injustice”, it is worth noting several 
things about Fricker’s approach that may provide useful background information to her claims 
about injustice. First, Fricker is writing in the tradition of feminist theorists “concerned with the 
way in which relations of power can constrain women’s ability to understand their own 
experience.”144 In other words, and according to this tradition, society is at least partially 
constituted by relations of power, and these relations of power can either constrain or enhance
144 Fricker 2007, p. 147. For more on this idea, see Harding (1993) and Fricker (1999).
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your life depending on where you are situated in the social order. If you have a lot of social 
power, or at least more of it than another group or person, then you can probably do more with 
your life than those people or groups with less power than you. This is one of the points 
developed by Rae Langton in her Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. According to Langton, “[t] 
he ability to perform speech acts of certain kinds can be a mark of political power. To put the 
point crudely: powerful people can generally do more, say more, and have their speech count for 
more than can the powerless. If you are powerful, there are more things that you can do with 
your words.”145 To develop this idea and its connection to a body of feminist work, Fricker 
quotes standpoint theorist Nancy Hartsock: “The dominated live in a world structured by others 
for their purposes — purposes that at the very least are not our own and that are in various 
degrees inimical to our development and even existence.”146 The implication here is that women 
and other dominated or marginalized groups are socially situated in a less than advantageous 
manner, and that these disadvantageous social situations may have serious consequences for the 
marginalized group.147
Fricker is interested in one particular disadvantage stemming from women’s situation 
within an unjustly structured society. This disadvantage has to do with something that Fricker 
calls ‘social power’ and its influence on what she calls ‘collective forms of social understanding’. 
I touched briefly on these notions in Chapter Three. Recall the following quotation:
One way of taking the epistemological suggestion that social power has an unfair 
impact on collective forms of social understanding is to think of our shared 
understandings as reflecting the perspectives of different social groups, and to 
entertain the idea that relations of unequal power can skew shared hermeneutical 
resources so that the powerful tend to have appropriate understandings of their 
experiences ready to draw on as they make sense of their social experiences, 
whereas the powerless are more likely to find themselves having some social
145 Langton (2009), p. 30.
146 Hartsock (1998), p.241.
147 This is not to imply that all women are in the same social position. Spellman (1990) offers a critique of the 
thought that all women share a sameness. She suggests that we should also pay attention to divisions of class, race, 
etc. In fact, some socially privileged women may have more social power than some less socially privileged men. 
However, the point stands that a woman and man who are otherwise equally socially privileged may still experience 
a difference in social power because of their difference in gender.
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experiences through a glass darkly, with at best ill-fitting meanings to draw on in 
the effort to render them intelligible.148
The precise meaning of phrases like ‘collective forms of social understanding’ and ‘shared 
hermeneutical resources’ is not yet clear. However, it seems reasonable to take Fricker as 
suggesting that different social groups each contribute their perspective on various topics such as 
gender roles, workplace conventions, racial stereotypes, and other socially constructed concepts 
to a communal resource, which is then used by society at large as a tool to understand and 
interpret various situations relevant to those concepts. Because some social groups have more 
power (social, economic, etc.) than others, these powerful groups will not only contribute more 
information to the communal resource, but they will also have more access to the resource when 
they need to understand some aspect of their role in society. This is presumably because 
powerful groups and individuals have more authority over social conventions and over which 
perspectives are the “right” perspectives, and therefore are also able to relate to the communal 
resource more easily since it contains familiar materials. Over time, the communal resource will 
come to reflect the perspective of powerful groups more than that of less powerful groups. Less 
powerful groups will have more and more difficulty understanding their own social experiences 
because they, and the community at large, lack the resources that are supposed to help them form 
such understandings. This is a rough sketch of the situation that Fricker suggests is both present 
in our society today and responsible for hermeneutical injustice.
Fricker cites the following story of sexual harassment and the circumstances of the 
women’s movement in the early eighties as the “central case of hermeneutical injustice”. This 
example comes from Susan Brownmiller’s memoir In Our Time:149
One afternoon a former university employee sought out Lin Farley to ask for her 
help. Carmita Wood, age forty-four, bom and raised in the apple orchard region 
of Lake Cayuga, and the sole support of two of her children, had worked for eight 
years in Cornell’s department of nuclear physics, advancing from lab assistant to a 
desk job handling administrative chores. Wood did not know why she had been 
singled out, or indeed if she had been singled out, but a distinguished professor 
seemed unable to keep his hands off her.
148 Fricker (2007) p. 148.
149 Brownmiller 1990, p. 180-1, as cited by Fricker (2007), p. 149-150.
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As Wood told the story, the eminent man would jiggle his crotch when he stood 
near her desk and looked at his mail, or he’d deliberately brush against her breasts 
while reaching for some papers. One night as the lab workers were having their 
annual Christmas party, he cornered her in the elevator and planted some 
unwanted kisses on her mouth. Wood ... requested a transfer to another 
department, and when it didn’t come through, she quit. When the [unemployment 
insurance] claims adjustor asked why she had left her job after eight years, Wood 
was at a loss to describe the hateful episodes. She was ashamed and embarrassed.
Under prodding — the blank on the form needed to be filled in -- she answered 
that her reasons had been personal. Her claim for unemployment benefits was 
denied.
‘Lin’s students had been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual 
advances they’d encountered on their summer jobs,’ Sauvigne relates. ‘And then 
Carmita Wood comes in and tells Lin her story. We realized that to a person, 
every one of us — the women on staff, Carmita, the students — had had an 
experience like this at some point, you know? And none of us had ever told 
anyone before. It was one of those click, aha! moments, a profound revelation.’
The women had their issue. Meyer located two feminist lawyers in Syracuse,
Susan Horn and Maurie Heins, to take on Carmita Wood’s unemployment 
insurance appeal. ‘And then...,’ Sauvigne reports, ‘we decided that we also had to 
hold a speak-out in order to break the silence about this.’
The ‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had no name. ‘Eight of us 
were sitting in an office of Human Affairs,’ Sauvigne remembers, ‘brainstorming 
about what we were going to write on the posters for our speak-out. We were 
referring to it as “sexual intimidation,” “sexual coercion,” “sexual exploitation on 
the job.” None of these names seemed quite right. We wanted something that 
embraced a whole range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviors. Somebody 
came up with “harassment.” Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed. That’s 
what it was.’
Carmita’s experiences as described here are made more egregious by the fact that she had 
no words to describe what had happened to her. Brownmiller notes that Wood “was at a loss to 
describe the hateful episodes.” She “was ashamed and embarrassed” when she was questioned 
about them. Perhaps most telling is the fact that, when pressed to fill in the blank on the 
insurance claim form stating the reason she left her job, she did not know what to say. She 
eventually wrote ‘personal’. The implication of such a statement is that she left the job for 
reasons of her own, reasons that had nothing to do with her place of work, the conditions under
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which she was expected to work, or her co-workers. Wood did not come to see that her reason 
for leaving might have been something that was not “personal” until she spoke with the other 
women in Lin Farley’s seminar. Given the support and the perspectives of other women with 
similar experiences, women in the seminar came to see that this experience described by Carmita 
is something that they have all experienced. It is not a private, personal experience, but a public 
experience shared in common by many women in the workplace. They have their aha! moment, 
and they give the experience a name.
Before the aha! moment, there was no way for Carmita to make sense of her experience, 
either to herself or to anyone in her community. Because of the lack of what Fricker calls 
‘shared hermeneutical resources’ regarding what was to become known as ‘sexual harassment’, 
Carmita could not do a whole list of things, including but not limited to understanding her 
experience and communicating it to others in an intelligible manner, standing up to her harasser, 
and claiming unemployment insurance. Her inability to claim unemployment insurance 
threatened her physical well-being and that of her dependent children. Her inability to stand up 
to her harasser threatened her sense that she was a reasonable person who belonged in the
*
workplace and not a sexual object. Most important for our purposes here, her inability to 
understand her own experiences and make them intelligible to others in her community 
threatened her ability to communicate.
All of these inabilities stem from what Fricker describes as a gap in the collective 
hermeneutical resources, a hermeneutical lacuna in collective resources where information about 
a woman’s experience in the workplace ought to be. Fricker writes,
’ Here is a story about how extant collective hermeneutical resources can have a 
lacuna where the name of a distinctive social experience should be. So described, 
we can see that women such as Carmita Wood suffered (among other things) an 
acute cognitive disadvantage from a gap in the collective hermeneutical 
resource.150
This gap creates some of the conditions for injustice, and when a woman like Carmita Wood 
experienced what she did, she suffered from an acute cognitive disadvantage in addition to the 
unpleasantness of what was to become known as ‘sexual harassment’.
150 Fricker 2007, p. 150-151.
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Now that we have a general sense of what Fricker means when she talks about 
hermeneutical injustice, I am in a better position to elaborate on the idea by giving an account of 
how it occurs. To begin, hermeneutical injustice does not come out of nowhere. Background 
social conditions set the scene.
Women’s position at the time of second wave feminism was still one of marked 
powerlessness in relation to men; and, specifically, the unequal relations of power 
prevented women from participating on equal terms with men in those practices 
by which collective social meanings are generated. Most obvious among such 
practices are those sustained by professions such as journalism, politics, academia, 
and law ... Women’s powerlessness meant that their social position was one of 
unequal hermeneutical participation, and something like this sort of inequality 
provides the crucial background condition for hermeneutical injustice.151
At the time when Carmita Wood was struggling to function in the workforce, men and women 
did not exist on anything close to a level playing field. Most men and women had limited 
expectations about what a woman might do in the workforce. Consequently, women were not 
able to join with men in the “practices by which social meanings are generated”, either because 
they did not expect to, did not want to, or were prevented from doing so. Most doctors, lawyers, 
and lab technicians were men, and so popular understanding of what those jobs were like did not 
include much input from women. Women’s relative social powerlessness meant that they did not 
contribute as much content as men to the collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the 
workplace.
Fricker further argues that some of these background expectations helped to conceal the 
fact that there were inequalities present in the hermeneutical climate.
Flermeneutical inequality is inevitably hard to detect. Our interpretive efforts are 
naturally geared to interests, as we try hardest to understand those things that it 
serves us to understand. Consequently, a group’s unequal hermeneutical 
participation will tend to show up in a localized manner in hermeneutical hotspots 
— locations in social life where the powerful have no interest in achieving a proper 
interpretation, perhaps indeed where they have a positive interest in sustaining the 
extant misinterpretation (such as that repeated sexual propositions in the
<51 Fricker 2007, p. 152.
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workplace are never anything more than a form of ‘flirting’, and their uneasy 
rejection by the recipient only ever a matter of her ‘lacking a sense of humor’).152
If we have a vested interest in sustaining one particular understanding of a social event, other 
understandings (or the fact that there might be other understandings) might come as a surprise. 
For example, sexual harassment was especially difficult to detect because as it was an ongoing 
practice that was ignored or concealed by any number of glib glosses or attempts at misdirection. 
It was as if nobody wanted to see it, until Carmita Wood shared her experience with that small 
group of women.
As they struggled in isolation to make proper sense of their various experiences of 
harassment, the whole engine of collective social meaning was effectively geared 
to keeping these obscured experiences out of sight. Her unequal hermeneutical 
participation is the deeper reason why Carmita Wood’s cognitive disablement 
constitutes an injustice.153
In other words, society and the workplace were structured so that women had less social power 
than men. Our understanding of workplace gender relations reflected this structure. We didn’t 
-see women’s struggle to understand their experiences of harassment because we didn’t 
understand those experiences as instances of harassment. Instead, we understood them as failed 
jokes, etc., because that was the dominant perspective present in the collective hermeneutical 
resource. One reason why Wood’s experience was an injustice is that the perspectives of women 
like her were discarded in favor of the perspectives of men who dominated the workplace. The 
background social conditions set Carmita Wood up for hermeneutical failure.
Against this background of social inequality and unequal hermeneutical participation, 
Fricker states that women were hermeneutically marginalized.
Let us say that when there is unequal hermeneutical participation with respect to 
some significant area(s) of social experience, members of the disadvantaged group 
are hermeneutically marginalized. The notion of marginalization is a moral- 
political one indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice that 
would have value for the participant.154
152 Fricker 2007, p. 153.
153 Ibid
154 Ibid.
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Marginalization, then, stems from a fundamental inequality in background social conditions. It 
leads, in turn, to moments of hermeneutical injustice. The process goes something like this: 
women and men live in an unjust society. Women do not have equal access to the workplace and 
do not contribute to the generation of shared social meanings about the workplace. Women 
therefore exist in a state of hermeneutical marginalization. However, they do not become victims 
of hermeneutical injustice until they are confronted with their marginalization, as Carmita Wood 
was in the aftermath of her experience of sexual harassment. Ms. Wood was marginalized for the 
eight years that she worked for Cornell’s nuclear physics department. She became a victim of 
hermeneutical injustice when she tried to understand and communicate about her experience and 
found that she was unable to do so.
It is clear, from our current perspective, that Carmita Wood’s experiences were rife with 
injustice. But what is the mark of a hermeneutical injustice? Is any gap in our collective 
resources potential evidence of marginalization and injustice for those affected? This seems 
unlikely, as our collective resources must be rife with lacunae in response to a rapidly changing 
social world. Fricker argues that only a particular kind of knowledge gap brings about the kind 
of marginalization necessary for a hermeneutical injustice to occur. According to Fricker, the 
source of the injustice is at least partially to be found in background social conditions. If, she 
poses, a person suffers from a poorly understood medical condition that affects her social 
behavior, then that person may be at a hermeneutical disadvantage. She will not be able to 
understand her experiences or render them intelligible to others. However, that person is not a 
victim of injustice, but of circumstantial epistemic bad luck. The difference between the medical 
condition case and Carmita Wood’s case, Fricker suggests, lies in the background social 
conditions. Carmita Wood’s disadvantage was pushed into the realm of injustice by the 
background of sexism and gender-based social exclusion in which she lived and worked.155 I 
will return to this distinction between disadvantage and injustice in Section Three.
Fricker ties hermeneutical injustice to pre-existing conditions of social inequality in at least 
one more way. According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice can be either systematic or 
incidental. An injustice is systematic if it “tracks the individual through a range of different
155 Fricker 2007, p. 152.
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social activities besides the hermeneutical.”156 For example, if a subject is hermeneutically 
marginalized, he or she will probably also be socio-economically marginalized, since 
[hermeneutical marginalization] entails non-participation in professions that make for significant 
hermeneutical participation (journalism, politics, law, and so on). 157 People who are 
systematically hermeneutically marginalized probably suffer from the effects of wide ranging 
social phenomena like racism and sexism, and therefore must simultaneously deal with injustice 
on many fronts. Incidental hermeneutical injustice is more of a “one-ofF :
Whereas systematic cases will tend to involve persistent, wide-ranging 
hermeneutical marginalization, incidental cases will tend to involve hermeneutical 
marginalization only fleetingly and/or in respect of a highly localized patch of the 
subject’s experience. Incidental hermeneutical injustices, then, stem not from any 
structural inequality of power, but rather from a more one-off moment of 
powerlessness.158
Fricker’s example of incidental hermeneutical injustice comes from Ian McEwan s novel 
Enduring Love. Joe, the protagonist, is stalked by a religious fanatic. All sorts of harm comes to 
Joe because of this, and he is unable to communicate about his experiences. Fricker says that 
there is a lacuna preventing us all from understanding Joe s experiences, and so Joe is 
hermeneutically marginalized. However, the marginalization occurs not because of, but rather 
in spite of, the social type he is.”159 Fricker’s point here is that systematic injustice is worse than 
incidental injustice because it is compounded by other social iniquities.
4 .2  T he A s y m m e t r y  C laim
Thus far, I have understood Fricker to be describing a gap in our collective social 
knowledge and the effects that gap can have on individuals in certain social groups. In the case 
of knowledge about the term ‘sexual harassment’ and the behaviors and practices named by that 
term, this knowledge gap can prevent women who are affected by the gap from understanding
156 Fricker 2007, p. 156.
157 Fricker (2007), p. 155-156.
158 Fricker 2007, p. 156.
159 Fricker 2007, p. 158.
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their own experience and acting on that understanding. Fricker states that Carmita Wood 
“suffered (among other things) an acute cognitive disadvantage from a gap in the collective 
hermeneutical resource.”160 This description is interesting in (at least) two ways. First, Fricker 
describes the disadvantage suffered by Ms. Wood as a cognitive disadvantage. That is, she was 
disadvantaged by being somehow unable to process and understand her situation with respect to 
her experience of sexual harassment. This cognitive disadvantage is separate from the other 
subsequent disadvantages (denial of employment insurance, loss of job, etc.) she suffered. 
Second, at this stage Fricker characterizes Ms. Wood as suffering a disadvantage, not an 
injustice. In what follows I discuss the reasons for this characterization.
The cognitive disadvantage suffered by Carmita Wood also affects other members of 
society, including men. If Ms. Wood was at a loss to understand what happened to her and why 
she ought to have been able to claim unemployment benefits, then her other co-workers 
(including her harasser) were also likely at a loss to understand the situation. They may have had 
theories - Fricker’s suggestion that many people saw women who were unreceptive to 
harassment as lacking a sense of humor may be relevant here. However, ignorance and 
misinformation are relevantly similar to the resource gap-induced disadvantage suffered by 
Carmita Wood. It is clear that, under Fricker’s description of this hermeneutical lacuna, both 
men and women suffered from a similar cognitive disadvantage.
However, Fricker says,
...this description does not quite capture [hermeneutical injustice], for if the 
epistemic wrong done to Carmita Wood were construed simply as a matter of 
plain cognitive disadvantage, then it is unclear why the epistemic wrong is 
suffered only by her and not also by her harasser. For the lack of proper 
understanding of women’s experience of sexual harassment was a collective 
disadvantage more or less shared by all.161
The implication here is that, since the cognitive disadvantage is shared broadly by society, there 
must be something more that shows us why Carmita was a victim in this case and her harasser 
was not. Also,
160 Fricker 2007, p. 151.
161 Fricker 2007 p. 151.
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[different groups can be hermeneutically disadvantaged for all sorts of reasons, as 
the changing social world frequently generates new sorts of experience of which 
our understanding may dawn only gradually; but only some of these experiences 
will strike one as unjust. For something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but 
also wrongful, whether because discriminatory or otherwise unfair.162
We are to understand that Carmita suffered more than a disadvantage, that there is something 
special about the kind of disadvantage suffered by North American women (as opposed to men) 
in the early 1970s. This difference, according to Fricker, is as follows: The disadvantage 
suffered by Carmita and other women was harmful and wrongful, whereas the disadvantage 
suffered by Carmita’s harasser and other men of that time was only harmful. This is the 
beginning of what I am calling Fricker’s Asymmetry Claim:
Asymmetry Claim Men and women suffered an asymmetrical disadvantage
as a result of the hermeneutical lacunae in the case of 
knowledge and understanding about the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ and the behaviors and practices so named.
Fricker defends the Asymmetry Claim in the following way. First, she claims that the man 
who harassed Carmita Wood did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result of his cognitive 
impairment.
In the present example, harasser and harassee alike are cognitively disadvantaged 
by the hermeneutical lacuna - neither has a proper understanding of how he is 
treating her - but the harasser’s cognitive disablement is not a significant 
disadvantage to him.163
Second, she claims that the limited disadvantage suffered by the harasser may have advanced his
cause.
Indeed, there is an obvious sense in which it suits his purposes. (Or at least it suits 
his immediate purpose, in that it leaves his conduct unchallenged. This is not to 
deny that if he is a decent person underneath, so that a better understanding of the 
seriousness of his bad behavior would have led him to refrain, then the 
hermeneutical lacuna is for him a source of epistemic and moral bad luck.)164
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid
164 Ibid
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Finally, she claims that Ms. Wood’s cognitive impairment was a significant disadvantage to her.
By contrast, the harassee’s cognitive disablement is seriously disadvantageous to 
her. The cognitive disablement prevents her from understanding a significant 
patch of her own experience: that is, a patch of experience which it is strongly in 
her interests to understand, for without that understanding she is left deeply 
troubled, confused, and isolated, not to mention vulnerable to continued 
harassment. Her hermeneutical disadvantage renders her unable to make sense of 
her ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from protesting it, let 
alone securing effective measures to stop it.165
In the following sections of this chapter I will argue that Fricker’s first two claims are wrong and 
her third claim is misguided, and further that her entire asymmetry claim rests on the unclear and 
somewhat unstable notion of significant disadvantage. It is not clear what Fricker intends the 
necessary and sufficient conditions for a such a disadvantage to be, nor how the relationship 
between significant disadvantage and injustice is to function. It is my contention that Fricker’s 
lack of clarity about such matters not only weakens her case for hermeneutical injustice, but that 
it also allows her to overlook an important and potentially helpful understanding of epistemic 
harm.
4.3  T he Asymmetry C ritique , Part O n e : T he arg um ent
In order to see where Fricker goes wrong in making the asymmetry claim, we might begin 
by looking again at the claim itself. Fricker makes the asymmetry claim in the middle of her 
definition of hermeneutical injustice. The asymmetry between the harasser and the harassee in 
the sexual harassment case is just one aspect of the injustice, and the idea of asymmetry is 
introduced when we discover that men and women both suffer a cognitive disadvantage as a 
result of the hermeneutical lacuna. The asymmetry claim is about the extent of this disadvantage 
and how it applies to different parties. To review, the asymmetry claim is grounded in the 
following argument:
1. The man who harassed Carmita Wood did not suffer a significant disadvantage as a result 
of his cognitive impairment.
2. There is a sense in which the harasser’s impairment suits his purposes.
165 Ibid.
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3. Ms. Wood’s cognitive impairment was a significant disadvantage to her (and therefore 
did not suit her purposes).
4. Therefore, Carmita Wood and her harasser experienced an asymmetrical disadvantage as 
a result of their cognitive impairment about the term ‘sexual harassment’ and the 
behaviors so named.
We are to conclude that Carmita Wood suffered more than her harasser, that she suffered a 
serious or significant disadvantage, that her harasser’s disadvantage was not significant to him 
and that it was not in his interest to understand the patch of experience occluded by the lacuna, 
and that this purported asymmetry is grounds for thinking that she was a victim of injustice while 
he was not.
As she outlines the asymmetry claim, Fricker runs together two different ways of 
characterizing her argument. Each characterization uses different language, and accordingly, 
each had different implications. The first way involves a discussion of the notion of 
hermeneutical injustice as a disadvantage and the claim that the disadvantage suffered by 
Carmita Wood was significant, whereas the disadvantage suffered by her harasser was not. The
t
second way involves a discussion of the notion of hermeneutical injustice as consisting in some 
combination of harm and wrong. I will discuss both of these characterizations in what follows.
The Disadvantage Version
One way of understanding the asymmetry claim rests on the idea of significant or serious 
disadvantage. For example, Fricker states that both “harasser and harassee alike are cognitively 
handicapped by the hermeneutical lacuna ... but the harasser’s disablement is not a significant 
disadvantage to him ... By contrast, the harassee’s cognitive disablement is seriously 
disadvantageous to her.”166 But what is the nature of the significant disadvantage? What makes 
it significant? How do we know that Carmita Wood suffered a significant disadvantage but her 
harasser did not? Is there something particular about Carmita Wood that makes women like her, 
and not her male co-workers or any other group of people, a victim of this disadvantage?
166 Fricker 2007, p. 151.
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Flicker does not answer these questions directly. Instead, she makes a kind of tally, adding 
up the interests, experiences, and abilities of harasser and harassee and concluding that the 
heavier burden of unpleasantness falls upon Carmita Wood. Weighing down Wood’s side of the 
scales are:
1. A cognitive disadvantage (i.e. the inability to process and understand sexual harassment);
2. A background of social powerlessness;
3. A lack of understanding of “a patch of experience which it is strongly in her interests to 
understand”;
4. The resulting trouble, confusion, and isolation;
5. A vulnerability to continued harassment;
6. An inability to protest her harassment, and
7. An inability to secure effective measures to stop the harassment.
On her harasser’s side we find:
1. A cognitive disadvantage (i.e. the inability to understand and process sexual harassment), 
and
2. The possibility (if “he is a decent person underneath”) of being a victim of epistemic and 
moral bad luck.
According to this tally, Wood clearly suffers more than her harasser, at least in so far as she has 
more individual disadvantages in her tally. Fricker can now say that Wood’s disadvantage is 
significant and her harasser’s is not. However, we are still no closer to understanding the notion 
of significant disadvantage.
For example, at this point Fricker has given us no reason to suppose that the initial 
cognitive disadvantage shared by both Wood and her harasser is not a serious or significant 
disadvantage. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that she expects us to distinguish between a 
victim and a perpetrator of sexual harassment. Recall that, when describing the cognitive 
disadvantage resulting from hermeneutical lacunae, (and initiating the asymmetry claim), she 
writes:
But this description does not quite capture it, for if the epistemic wrong done to 
Carmita Wood were construed simply as a matter of plain cognitive disadvantage,
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then it is unclear why the epistemic wrong is suffered only by her and not also by 
her harasser.167
There is a sense here that there must be something additional, that the cognitive disadvantage 
described so far must not capture the entirety of the injustice. The intuition Fricker relies upon 
here is that the perpetrator of sexual harassment is not a victim. Evidence for the fact that she 
relies upon this intuition is laid out in her later claim that the harasser’s cognitive disablement 
suits his purpose. The implication here is that the disablement is not a real disadvantage, at least 
not in comparison to the harassee, who is prevented from understanding a part of her experience 
which it is strongly in her interest to understand.168
Now we appear to be making some progress. Let us assume that, by ‘significant or serious 
disadvantage’, Fricker means ‘a disadvantage that prevents a person from understanding a part of 
their experience which it is strongly in their interest to understand’. This is a useful definition, 
but it only leads us into further trouble. Consider: we can easily understand that Carmita Wood 
suffered a significant disadvantage. She was clearly prevented from understanding her 
experience of sexual harassment, and it was clearly strongly in her interest to understand her 
experience. However, Wood’s harasser was also prevented from understanding his experience 
(as well as hers). Who is to say that is was not strongly in his interest to understand that part of 
his experience? Indeed, it is plausible to suppose that, had he understood his experience as a 
perpetration of sexual harassment, he might not have subjected Ms. Wood to such a harrowing 
ordeal. He might have restrained himself out of professionalism, fear of litigation, or out of a 
respect for Ms. Wood. It seems plausible to suggest that it would have been in his interest to 
understand this area of his experience. Our new understanding of ‘significant disadvantage’ 
cannot help us here.
167 Fricker 2007, p. 151.
168 This is not to say that harasser and harassee are in the same epistemic position. For example, she is confronted 
by a struggle to understand, while he is not. She may, paradoxically, be more self-aware than he is as a result of this 
struggle. However, the relevant claim for our purposes here is that they are both epistemically disadvantaged by the 
hermeneutical lacuna regarding ‘sexual harassment’. The claim Fricker must defend is that Carmita’s epistemic 
disadvantage is somehow significant in a way that her harasser’s is not.
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At a later point, Fricker draws another contrast between hermeneutical disadvantage and 
injustice. This time, we are asked to imagine “similarly serious hermeneutical disadvantages that 
do not inflict any epistemic injustice.”169
If, for instance, someone has a medical condition affecting their social behaviour 
at a historical moment at which that condition is still misunderstood and largely 
undiagnosed, then they may suffer a hermeneutical disadvantage that is, while 
collective, especially damaging to them in particular. They are unable to render 
their experience intelligible by reference to the idea that they have a disorder, and 
so they are personally in the dark, and may also suffer seriously negative 
consequences from others’ non-comprehension of their condition. But they are 
not subject to hermeneutical injustice; rather, theirs is a poignant case of 
circumstantial epistemic bad luck.170
I assume that the bad luck in this case is related to the fact that the medical condition is as yet 
undiagnosed. However, I do not find this example, and therefore this distinction (between 
disadvantage and injustice) compelling for the following reason.
Suppose that the undiagnosed medical condition in Fricker’s example is a mental illness 
like depression, schizophrenia, or multiple personality disorder. All of these conditions affect 
social behavior and are still widely misunderstood by many people. Though we have made 
advances in awareness and diagnosis in recent years, campaigners for the rights of the mentally 
ill tell us that we still have a long way to go before we will be able to say that we treat mental 
illness with the respect and gravity that we lend to other kinds of illness. For example, imagine 
that a person suffering from schizophrenia in the early days of our understanding of that 
condition was denied care or told that he was possessed by demons. The resulting confusion and 
social alienation would have been a devastating blow to be endured in addition to the symptoms 
of his schizophrenia. There are a lot of parallels between this case and Carmita Wood’s 
experiences with sexual harassment. In both cases, background social conditions created 
climates in which the relevant person was likely to be hermeneutically marginalized. In both 
cases, the collective resource was rife with prejudice and a general lack of understanding about 
the relevant experience. In both cases a lacuna was present where knowledge about
169 Fricker 2007, p 152.
170 Ibid.
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schizophrenia or the role of women in the workplace should have been. In both cases, the 
relevant individual lived in a climate of marginalization until the moment of unjust exclusion 
came along. Why, then, is schizophrenia a “poignant case of circumstantial epistemic bad luck” 
and sexual harassment a case of hermeneutical injustice?
Given Fricker’s framework, we are unable to answer this question. In spite of our lack of 
success with this distinction and with the notion of significant disadvantage more generally, one 
thing remains clear. Fricker needs the injustice that is already present in the background social 
conditions of the U.S.A. in the 1970s in order to get Carmita Wood’s case of hermeneutical 
injustice off the ground. A background of sexism and social exclusion is what makes Wood’s 
disadvantage different from her harasser’s disadvantage. It is what makes everything seem 
worse for Ms. Wood. It is the invisible presence that makes her list of disadvantages so much 
longer than his. It is the one salient feature that makes us intuitively think that there is an 
epistemic difference between a perpetrator and a victim of sexual harassment. One is an agent of 
sexism who is taking advantage of his position of power, the other is a victim of sexism who 
suffers because she lives in a position of relative powerlessness. After all, sexism is 
asymmetrical. Women suffer many more injuries and injustices than men do as a result of 
sexism.
In light of Fricker’s reliance upon background social conditions, it seems that one of the 
following two options might be the case. Either:
a) there is no special epistemic quality to hermeneutical injustice, or
b) the injustice applies to both Wood and her harasser.
Option a) might be the case if hermeneutical injustice consists of sexism plus the general 
cognitive disadvantage. In this scenario, Ms. Wood and her harasser both suffer the same 
cognitive disadvantage as a result of the lacuna, but she is a victim of sexism and he is not. 
Since there is no special epistemic difference between Wood’s experience and her harasser’s 
experience here, we must conclude that there is therefore no special epistemic quality to Wood’s 
experience of injustice. This option seems unlikely, given Fricker’s compelling account of 
epistemic injustice in general. More likely is option b), that there is a genuinely epistemic 
injustice present here, but that the injustice applies equally to Wood and her harasser. After all,
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on an epistemic level, both are affected in equal epistemic measure by the gap in the collective 
hermeneutical resource.
I want to leave room for a possible third option here. It may be the case that:
c) Wood and her harasser both suffer from a disadvantage, but there is no injustice present. 
In other words, it might be the case that there is no reason to believe that there is any epistemic 
injustice present in the Carmita Wood example if there is no epistemic asymmetry between 
harasser and harassee. This would leave us with an example of a situation in which both people 
suffer from an epistemic disadvantage as a result of the hermeneutical lacuna, but the 
disadvantage does not amount to an injustice. Fricker’s account may be vulnerable to this 
scenario if the asymmetry claim proves unstable. However, I will suggest a way out of this 
difficulty in Chapter Five.
For now, let us focus on the idea that claim b) seems likely. If this is right, and both Wood 
and her harasser are victims of hermeneutical injustice, then Fricker’s asymmetry claim is wrong.
T he Harm / W r o n g  Ve r sio n
As we saw in the previous section, Fricker clearly intends the wrong at the root of 
hermeneutical injustice to encompass more than the cognitive disablement suffered by both 
Carmita Wood and her harasser. Recall that, according to Fricker, both men and women were 
harmed by the hermeneutical lacuna that existed over the experiences of women in the 
workplace in the early 1970s. Carmita Wood suffered an injustice because she was not only 
harmed by the lacuna but was also wronged in some way.171 Fricker argues that this additional 
wrong was suffered by women like Carmita Wood and not by her male co-workers (or harasser), 
and that this additional wrong is what allows us to characterize what Ms. Wood experienced as 
an injustice. There are at least three different kinds of wrong that Fricker might have in mind 
here. In this section I will examine each of these three wrongs and the roles they play in 
Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice. I will offer a critique of each, suggesting that none 
of them are good candidates for the kind of wrong needed to make the asymmetry claim
J71 Recall: “For something to be an injustice, it must be harmful but also wrongful, whether because discriminatory 
or because otherwise unfair.” (Fricker 2007, p. 151.)
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successful because none of them can explain why some people might be wronged and others 
merely harmed. I will conclude that without the right kind of wrong to move Wood’s experience 
from the classification as a harm to the classification as an injustice, Fricker’s argument for the 
asymmetry claim is unsuccessful.
First, the wrong could be somehow connected to the area of hermeneutical “gloom” that 
hovered over women like Carmita Wood before the discovery of the term ‘sexual harassment’ 
and the subsequent advances in understanding that took place. In writing about this kind of 
wrong, Fricker cites the case of Wendy Sandford, who had her own aha! moment at a 
consciousness-raising group about postpartum depression.172
The guiding intuition here is that as these women groped for a proper 
understanding of what we may now so easily name as post-natal depression, the 
hermeneutical darkness that suddenly lifted from Wendy Sandford’s mind had 
been wrongfully preventing her from understanding a significant area of her social 
experience, thus depriving her of an important patch of self-understanding. If we 
can substantiate this intuition, then we shall see that the area of hermeneutical 
gloom with which she had lived up until that life-changing forty-five minutes 
constituted a wrong done to her in her capacity as a knower, and was thus a 
specific sort of epistemic injustice -- a hermeneutical injustice.173
So in Sandford’s case, this hermeneutical darkness was wrongfully preventing her from 
understanding her experiences after the birth of her child, and it constituted a wrong done to her. 
Presumably, in this case, both Sandford and her husband and other members of her community 
were also harmed by the hermeneutical gloom. After all, none of them were able to understand 
the sense of alienation and loneliness that is sometimes experienced by new mothers who are 
“supposed” to be enjoying a special time with their new babies. Mr. Sandford’s ability to relate 
to and understand his wife, his experience of being a new father and partner to a new mother, 
was made more difficult by this hermeneutical gloom. Although Wendy experienced the actual 
depression, many members of her community, including her husband, experienced and were 
affected by the hermeneutical gloom. In this case, we must be careful not to confuse Sandford’s 
depression itself with the epistemic phenomena that surround her depression. Sandford did
172 Fricker 2007, p. 148-9.
173 Fricker 2007, p. 149.
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suffer something that her husband did not; she had postpartum depression. However, neither 
Wendy nor her husband knew about postpartum depression and the devastating effects that it can 
have on a new mother. Both of the Sandfords suffered from the hermeneutical gloom insofar as 
they lacked knowledge about something that they both shared an interest in understanding.
Perhaps Fricker might argue that Wendy’s hermeneutical gloom was somehow darker and 
more difficult to deal with than her husband’s because the experience obscured by the gloom was 
her own. Mr. Sandford was prevented from understanding his wife’s experience; this may have 
been less of a trial than being prevented from understanding his own experience. All one need 
say in response to Fricker here is that Wendy may experience a darker gloom than her husband, 
but both Sandfords may experience gloom. Moreover, we could easily imagine a scenario in 
which Mr. Sandford’s gloom was darker than his wife’s. Suppose that he is an extremely 
attentive partner, and experiences severe anxiety, sadness, and frustration about his wife’s 
growing depression and her alienation from him and their child. Fricker has not designated 
anything about the gloom that would explain why it might oppress one person more than another. 
So far, the claim that there is something fundamentally asymmetrical about hermeneutical 
injustice appears unfounded.
Another candidate for the wrong of hermeneutical injustice is the social position of unequal 
hermeneutical participation that many women like Sandford and Wood experienced.
In order to find the deeper source of the intuition that there is an epistemic 
injustice at stake in the examples from Brownmiller [like Carmita Wood and 
Wendy Sandford], we should focus on the background social conditions that were 
conducive to the relevant hermeneutical lacuna. Women’s position at the time of 
second wave feminism was still one of marked social powerlessness in relation to 
men; and, specifically, the unequal relations of power prevented women from 
participating on equal terms with men in those practices by which collective social 
meanings are generated.174
In this case, the background social conditions are the culprits. Unequal relations of power 
between women and men were responsible for the fact that women did not participate in “those 
practices by which collective social meanings are generated”. These unequal power relations
174 Fricker 2007, p. 152.
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presumably (at least partially) make up the background social conditions, which, in turn, are 
responsible for the hermeneutical injustices suffered by Carmita Wood and Wendy Sandford.
If women like Carmita Wood and Wendy Sandford suffer due to the background social 
conditions of gender inequality, then Fricker may have a stronger case to make in defense of the 
claim that some people are wronged while others are just harmed. Gender inequalities in the 
early 1970s, and particularly gender inequalities in the workplace, were a significant hurdle for 
women attempting to pursue professional lives. These inequalities were important injustices, and 
Fricker is right to take special notice of them in her discussion of epistemic injustice. However, 
there are several reasons why the background conditions themselves cannot be the additional 
wrong that tips the balance from a harm done by cognitive disadvantage into the wrong of 
hermeneutical injustice.
If background social conditions are affecting gender roles in the workplace, they must be
affecting both men and women. It may be the case that men are not harmed by these conditions
while women suffer significant harm. It is certainly the case that some social conditions made it
easier for men to succeed in the workplace at the expense of their female colleagues. Fricker 
«
notes that there is a sense in which the background social conditions serve the harasser’s 
immediate purposes in that they allow him to get away with his behavior. However, it is not 
clear that the ability to sexually harass women does yield benefits for men. Is it to the advantage 
of a man that background social conditions allow him to get away with morally problematic 
behavior without providing him enough information to judge that he ought not to be doing what 
he does? I will return to this question in the next section. For now, it is enough to note that 
background social conditions are unlikely to tip Fricker’s scale from harm to wrong in any clear 
and unproblematic way.
Finally, a third candidate for Fricker’s wrong that brings the harm of cognitive 
disadvantage into the realm of hermeneutical injustice is the collection of material misfortunes 
that are effects of the lacuna. Carmita Wood lived under an umbrella of hermeneutical gloom 
and against a background of gender inequality, and these conditions contributed to her 
experience of what we now call ‘sexual harassment’. She also lost her job and her ability to 
support herself and her children. She was unable to communicate about her experience to an
99
insurance claims adjuster, which in turn resulted in the denial of her unemployment insurance 
claim. These things happened to Carmita Wood. They did not happen to her harasser. All of 
these negative experiences might constitute the wrong that Fricker has in mind when she writes 
about hermeneutical injustice. Although these effects are devastating and certainly constitute an 
injustice of some sort, it is not clear that this wrong is epistemic in nature. This kind of wrong is 
not clearly a hermeneutical injustice; instead, it is a description of the results of one form of 
sexism. Perhaps Fricker might say that the epistemic harm was already done and exists in the 
form of the cognitive disadvantage suffered by both men and women. The further harm of 
hermeneutical injustice does not need to be a purely epistemic harm. We need only note that the 
initial disadvantage results in a collection of subsequent wrongs that together constitute the 
injustice.
In response to this claim, it is worth pointing out that what Fricker needs here is a 
demonstration that the collection of subsequent wrongs suffered by Carmita Wood is more 
problematic than any collection of subsequent wrongs suffered by her harasser or other men in 
her workplace. This would make it the case that Fricker could justifiably tip the scales from 
harm plus wrong to injustice. Setting aside issues that we have already raised in the previous 
section about tallying up disadvantages, harms, and wrongs, it is important to note that Fricker 
may not have presented a complete picture, if such a task is even possible, of the wrongs suffered 
by people affected by the ‘sexual harassment’ lacuna, particularly by men in the 1970s American 
workplace. Some effects of early sexism in the workplace are not as concrete as sexual 
harassment is now, and are, perhaps for that reason, poorly understood and largely 
undocumented. Arguably, these effects should count in any tally of the wrongs suffered as a 
result of poorly understood and stunted gender relations in the workplace.
For example, the basic structure of our companies and our workday was established during 
the 1950s and 1960s. The workday was designed around what was then understood as the 
traditional family unit, consisting of a man who worked a long day and a woman who stayed at 
home and took care of children and other domestic affairs. This structure may have led to 
circumstances that were less than hospitable for women in the workplace, but it also led to 
circumstances that made it difficult, and in some cases impossible, for men to care for their
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children and attend to their own domestic affairs. Men are rarely able to secure paternity leave. 
They are not encouraged to allow any care-taking demands to interfere with a working day that 
pays no heed to school hours or childhood illnesses. The very fact that companies hesitate to 
hire women with plans to become pregnant or with young children implies that they are 
unwilling to accommodate men who want to assume those family responsibilities traditionally 
assigned to women.175
As this example demonstrates, it is plausible to suggest that some men have been wronged 
by a social structure that holds us to rigid gender roles in the workplace, and this wrong goes 
largely unnoticed. The irony of this situation lies in the fact that men who want to have careers 
and also be caregivers now suffer from a hermeneutical lacuna similar to that experienced by 
women who were victims of sexual harassment in the early 1970s. Corporate culture, as well as 
society in general, is only beginning to find the words and ideas to express the problems 
presented to today’s workforce by the structures left to us through antiquated gender roles. 
Flexible working hours and a decreased social dependence on “working men” may alleviate a 
gender imbalance in our workplace by allowing both men and women to achieve a work/life
*
balance. In this case, both men and women are wronged by antiquated gender roles in the 
workplace. I think this example is a good demonstration of the difficulties present in the task of 
demonstrating that Carmita Wood’s wrongs are somehow more problematic than any wrongs 
suffered by her harasser. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that everyone affected by the 
hermeneutical lacuna was wronged, and it is likely that everyone was wronged in a subtly or not- 
so-subtly different way. It may be the case that some of these wrongs constitute injustices and 
some do not, but I have found no guidance about how to make this distinction here.
Without this guidance, none of these candidates for the role of the injustice-making wrong 
can succeed. Neither hermeneutical gloom, background social conditions, or material 
misfortunes can provide Fricker with a way to distinguish between the experiences of victims of 
hermeneutical injustice and their social colleagues. Setting aside the difficulties already outlined
175 For more information on some o f these issues see the California Senate OfFice of Research report on paid family 
leave, Balancing Work and Family. The report can be found at: http://www.paidfamilyleave.org/pdf/ 
paidfamily07.pdf. For a British perspective on these issues, see the Department for Business, Enterprise, and 
Regulatory Reform’s International Review of Leave Policies and Related Research, available at http:// 
www.berr.gov.uk/files/file40677.pdf.
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in the Disadvantage Section, Fricker needs to provide a clearer explanation of exactly how 
victims are wronged in addition to the general epistemic harm in order to get her account of 
injustice off the ground.
At this point, my critique of Fricker’s Asymmetry Claim follows two lines of argument. 
First, Fricker relies heavily on the notion of significant disadvantage while failing to provide us 
with a sufficient explanation of this term. Without such an explanation, it is difficult to decide 
which disadvantages are significant and which are not, who is a victim of injustice and who is 
not. Crucially, it may be the case that both people in Fricker’s paradigm example are victims of 
hermeneutical injustice. Second, Fricker states that an injustice is harmful and wrongful while 
failing to give an account of how these two notions fit together or how we are to understand the 
idea of a wrong. In the sexual harassment example, both Carmita Wood and her harasser were 
harmed by the hermeneutical lacuna, but the exact nature of Wood’s crucial additional wrong is 
not clear. Without this crucial understanding, or a way to argue that Wood was wronged and her 
harasser was not, the Asymmetry Claim is weak. At this stage, it seems that Fricker’s 
Asymmetry Claim is under threat. In the next section I continue my critique of this claim, this 
time examining the conceptual approach to hermeneutical injustice.
4 . 4  T h e  A s y m m e t r y  C r it iq u e , Pa r t  TWo : T h e  C o n c e p t u a l  P r o b l e m
Let us consider Fricker’s asymmetry claim from another angle: Rather than looking at 
what she has done and how she has built her arguments, let’s look instead at Fricker’s starting 
point. Say that, loosely speaking, Fricker is trying to claim that people sharing (or lacking) 
common knowledge can have different epistemic experiences. In this section I will ask the 
following questions: What might this mean? Is such a thing even possible? Can a gap in 
collective hermeneutical resources be more of an epistemic disadvantage to one party than it is to 
another? Is it possible for a malfunction in what is essentially supposed to be common 
knowledge to be more of a disadvantage to one person than another person? Note that I am not 
asking if a gap in collective resources can harm only one party; Fricker has acknowledged that 
any such gap leads to a cognitive disadvantage that is harmful to all parties concerned. What I 
am asking is whether a gap in collective hermeneutical resources can result in different epistemic
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disadvantages to different people, and whether it even makes sense to think about a shared 
epistemic resource in this way. The difficulty presented by these questions is a part of what I am 
calling the “conceptual problem” with Fricker’s asymmetry claim.
Any answer to the above questions will require us to consider the separation of the 
epistemic wrongs suffered by Carmita Wood from the other kinds of injustices she suffered as a 
victim of sexual harassment. Unfortunately, it is not clear that such a separation is possible. The 
concept of hermeneutical injustice is complicated by the fact that background social conditions 
of social injustice are a necessary pre-requisite for a climate of hermeneutical marginalization 
and thus for moments of hermeneutical injustice. Hermeneutical injustice does not arise unless 
conditions of social injustice are already present in the relevant context. It is therefore very 
difficult to separate an instance of hermeneutical injustice from any background social injustice. 
The former is dependent on the latter. This dependence upon social conditions was intentional 
on Fricker’s part and is essential to how she conceives of epistemic injustice.
It is only when the collective impoverishment is concretely situated in specific 
social situations that it comes to be especially and unjustly disadvantageous to 
some groups but not to others. Hermeneutical lacunas are like holes in the ozone - 
it’s the people under them that get burned.176
There is a way to understand this passage that entails something close to a contradiction. People 
are “collectively impoverished”, but it is only the people “under” the lacunas that are harmed. In 
other words, hermeneutical lacunae deprive everyone in a community of knowledge about the 
relevant topic but are also somehow only “above” the groups that are especially and unjustly 
disadvantaged. I will investigate this tension in what follows.
' According to Fricker, hermeneutical injustice involves no culprit. It is a purely structural 
notion, hence the importance of background social conditions as catalysts for moments of 
injustice. As such, we must keep in mind the fact that, in the case of sexual harassment, the 
harasser is not a perpetrator of hermeneutical injustice. Instead, the injustice “erupts” out from a 
background of inequality and marginalization.
176 Fricker 2007, p. 161.
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But the moment of hermeneutical injustice comes only when the background 
condition is realized in a more or less doomed attempt on the part of the subject 
to render an experience intelligible, either to herself or to an interlocutor. The 
hermeneutical inequality that exists, dormant, in a situation of hermeneutical 
marginalization erupts in injustice only when some actual attempt at intelligibility 
is handicapped by it.177
It is this “attempt at intelligibility” that I would like to consider here, in the hopes that we can see 
just who is at a disadvantage, how they are disadvantaged, and whether these disadvantages 
differ in any way. In order to begin our consideration, let’s look at the following two cases:
C a s e  O n e : R e n d e r in g  a n  ex per ie n c e  intelligible t o  o n e s e l f
In this case, Carmita Wood or someone like her has experienced sexual 
harassment but has not yet attended a consciousness-raising group or learned 
that other women have similar experiences. She is trying to explain to herself 
why she left her job, but she cannot. She can’t think of a good word to 
characterize her experiences. She is confused, ashamed, and embarrassed by 
the possibility that her harasser was just flirting. She has a suspicion that she 
ought to have been able to deal with such behaviour. In the end, she gives up 
and succumbs to frustration that she can’t entirely explain why she acted the 
way she did and guilt that she perhaps ought to have acted differently.
C a s e  TWo : Re n d e r in g  a n  e x pe r ie n c e  intelligible t o  a n  in te r l o c u to r
In this case, our victim is in the same scenario as she was in Case One. 
However, instead of only trying to justify her actions to herself, she must also 
justify them to others. For example, she must tell the insurance claims adjustor 
why she left her job in order to claim unemployment benefits. She must tell 
her friends and family why she no longer has a source of income. She must tell 
her next employer why she left her old job. As Brownmiller noted in her 
description of Carmita Wood’s case, Ms. Wood was unable to answer any of 
these questions. After a difficult and embarrassing struggle with herself, she 
ends up saying that she left her job for “personal” reasons.
I77Fricker2007, p. 159.
If a person only ever had to deal with the scenario in Case One, and only had to render an 
experience intelligible to themselves, then we might be warranted in thinking that there is an 
asymmetrical quality to hermeneutical injustice, given the following additional condition: 
Carmita struggles to understand herself but her harasser does not. After all, if both Carmita and 
her harasser struggle in silence to understand their respective experiences of sexual harassment, 
then the asymmetry claim seems less warranted. They both struggle in silence. However, under 
our additional condition, Fricker could argue that Carmita Wood’s harasser is unlikely to have 
struggled to express to himself his experiences as a harasser, and that therefore there is some 
fundamental asymmetry to the experience. In any event, instances of only Case One are highly 
unlikely. It is much more likely that a combination of Case One and Case Two will arise; a 
person will need to understand her own experiences in order to be able to tell other people about 
them.
In such cases we must keep in mind the fact that the injustice is perpetrated, if such a word 
is appropriate in this kind of case, by a structural force. In other words, no one person 
perpetrates hermeneutical injustice. Instead, hermeneutical injustice occurs because background
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social conditions have led to a situation in which our collective hermeneutical resources are 
structurally prejudiced. This situation affects resource-users in a broad sense. Everyone who 
might communicate about sexual harassment is vulnerable. In other words, Carmita Wood may 
have been unable to understand her own experiences or communicate them to others, but other 
people touched by sexual harassment will also be affected. Ms. Wood’s harasser will be affected. 
Ms. Wood’s office-mates will be affected. People who are unrelated to Ms. Wood in any way but 
are trying to make their way in society in the America of the early 1970s will be affected. All 
manner of resource-users will suffer the same cognitive disadvantage, will suffer from the same 
lack of knowledge and understanding.
In cases of structural inequality, it is difficult to see hermeneutical injustice as a structure­
wide phenomenon precisely because the injustice manifests itself differently in different social 
groups. Often, one group is easy to cast as victimized while another group seems complicit in 
perpetrating and maintaining the unjust system. However, in this case, members from different 
social groups attempt to communicate with each other. Carmita tries to discourage her boss’s
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bad behavior. She struggles to communicate with the insurance agent. In any communicative 
scenario, both speaker and interlocutor will be affected by a gap or deficit in the collective 
hermeneutical resource. They will both be affected in spite of any other additional injustices or 
social advantages present. This is the nature of communication: it is a co-operative enterprise. If 
one party is afflicted, the other party will be affected by that affliction.
In this section I have made the point that there is something problematic about Fricker’s 
claim that there is a fundamental asymmetry in hermeneutical injustice, that Ms. Wood’s harasser 
was not as seriously affected by the injustice as Ms. Wood was. People who suffer from an 
impoverishment of their communal hermeneutical resources do so as a community. On an 
epistemic level, Ms. Wood’s harasser suffered from an inability to understand his role in the 
harassment, and also from a potential inability to understand Ms. Wood as she tried to 
communicate with him about his problematic behavior. The insurance claims adjustor suffered 
from an inability to understand what Ms. Wood was trying to communicate when she filled out 
her unemployment insurance claim. Any number of other people in that community suffered 
from an inability to understand and communicate about sexual harassment. Some of these 
people are forced to contend with more serious consequences as a result of this inability than 
others, but as I noted earlier, those consequences are not epistemically relevant in any 
straightforward way. The idea that hermeneutical injustice rests on a fundamental asymmetry is 
therefore problematic in conceptual terms as well as argumentative terms.
4 . 5  C o n c l u s i o n
In this chapter I have outlined Miranda Fricker’s notion of hermeneutical injustice. I have 
also offered a critique of that notion based on difficulties with the asymmetry claim. How can 
we reframe hermeneutical injustice such that we still capture the gist of what Fricker has done 
but refine the account so that it avoids problems presented by the asymmetry claim? I suggest 
we move away from a reliance on background social conditions. Why lean on social conditions 
like sexism or racism, when the important thing is that individuals in scenarios of injustice do not 
understand their experiences? It does not seem like we can map hermeneutical injustice onto 
sexism in any clean, easy way. After all, Carmita is a victim of sexism while her harasser is not,
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but both might be victims of hermeneutical injustice. I think a more promising avenue might be 
one where we place our epistemic requirements and capabilities at the centre of the account. The 
idea that we require certain epistemic goods in order to live a good life or that basic skills of self­
understanding and communication are necessary parts of life in a just society is either 
commensurate with or a reasonable extension of most varieties of political liberalism.178 It is my 
view that an account of epistemic injustice is both more interesting and more compelling if the 
loss or privation of epistemic goods and skills is at its heart.
If we reformulate hermeneutical injustice in this way, what are the consequences? We lose 
a tidy parallel with pre-existing conceptions of sexism and its attendant wrongs. However, we 
might gain a more nuanced field of debate. For example, we might come to think about the 
Carmita Wood story as evidence that sexual harassment was poorly understood by everyone -  
both men and women. This allows us to see the breadth of damage done by hermeneutical 
injustice: both powerful and less powerful people are epistemically compromised by distortions 
and deficits in the communal resource.
In the next chapter I will demonstrate my commitment to these ideas by developing my 
own account of the injustice experienced by people like Carmita Wood and her harasser. I use 
Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice as a starting point, and go on to provide an account 
of what I call Communicative Injustice.
178 For sympathetic accounts, see Nussbaum and Sen’s work on the capabilities approach.
C hapter Five
To w a r d s  a  D e f in it io n  o f  R e s o u r c e -Ba s e d  C o m m u n ic a t iv e  In j u s t ic e
In this chapter I  give an account o f each o f the three parts o f  my working 
definition o f communicative injustice: the deficit in the communal communicative 
resource, the communicative attempt, and the vital need condition. I  then put all 
three parts together in the form o f a working definition. I  also work through two 
potential counterexamples that give me an opportunity to explain communicative 
injustice in more detail.
5 .1  To w a r d s  a  W o r k in g  D e f in it io n , Pa r t  O n e : R e s o u r c e  D e f ic it
My account of communicative injustice involves three equally important elements. The 
first is a deficit in what I call the communal communicative resource.179 In this section I will 
provide a basic sketch of both this resource and a resource deficit. I will give several examples 
of the kind of interaction between community and communicative resource that I am interested 
in. In particular, I will note that the relationship between a community and its language will 
change and adapt over time, and that a gap in the communal communicative resource, or the fact 
that the resource demonstrates room for growth and change, does not necessarily mean that the 
community or resource have been harmed. I will discuss several examples of community- 
resource interaction, and note the kind of interaction that might lay the groundwork for 
communicative injustice.
In Chapters Three and Four I outlined Miranda Fricker’s idea of a hermeneutical 
resource. Fricker introduces us to the idea of such a resource by painting a picture of what 
happens when some members of the community are less able to understand and communicate 
about their social experiences than others. 179
1791 use the term ‘communicative’ here instead of following Fricker’s use o f ‘hermeneutical’ because my project is 
about our communicative abilities rather than our hermeneutic abilities. This is not to say that there is no overlap 
between the two notions. However, I wish to focus here on resources that we may need for communication.
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This sort of marginalization can mean that our collective forms of understanding 
are rendered structurally prejudicial in respect of content and/or style: the social 
experiences of hermeneutically marginalized groups are left inadequately 
conceptualized and so ill-understood, perhaps even by the subjects themselves; 
and/or attempts at communication made by such groups, when they do have an 
adequate grip on the content of what they aim to convey, are not heard as rational 
owing to their expressive style being inadequately understood.180
Here, the resource is something like “our collective forms of understanding”. When those forms 
of understanding are compromised or arranged in such a way as to give one person or group an 
unfair advantage over another person or group, the resource might be conceived of as damaged 
or sub-optimal in some important way. This is not to imply that there is (or ought to be), some 
optimal or perfect version of the resource; I understand Fricker to be suggesting only that a 
compromised resource can lead to inadequate understanding of the social experiences of 
marginalized groups. That is, the fact that our resource has formed in a certain way means that 
some of us can’t understand ourselves and communicate that understanding as well as others.
I take Fricker to be saying something like this: the presence of these marginalized groups 
of people who struggle to understand their experiences draws our attention to the fact that there 
are other groups of people who do not struggle to understand, or who do not struggle as much as 
marginalized groups struggle. These groups who struggle less have (at least) two valuable skills 
that the marginalized groups lack: they can better understand their social experiences, and they 
can better communicate about their understanding. These skills of understanding and 
communication and the words, ideas, and concepts that facilitate such skills comprise a kind of 
resource that we all should have access to: our collective hermeneutical resource.
Fricker’s collective hermeneutical resource will serve as a basic model for my communal 
communicative resource. Say, roughly speaking, that our language is a resource. We all share 
this resource. We all use it to communicate with each other and to process, categorize, and 
understand the world around us. The reason I can talk to you about dogs, work, and weekends is 
that you and I share a communicative resource and we both have access to roughly the same dog, 
work, and weekend words and concepts. We may share certain beliefs about work and weekends. 
We may differ in our beliefs about dogs. We use the same terms to pick out roughly the same
180 Fricker (2007), p. 6-7
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objects. This set of terms, concepts, beliefs, and abilities is our communal communicative 
resource. I intend the term to be vague and elastic -  a grouping loose enough to avoid 
controversy while still remaining intuitively plausible.
In what follows I will give several examples of interactions between members of our 
language community and our communal communicative resource. I begin with an example of an 
interaction that demonstrates the normal growth and flexibility of the resource, in which no one 
is harmed and no one suffers injustice. I move on to examples of interactions between people 
and our resource that are less harmonious. I hope that these later examples, and the contrast 
between this first case and the later cases, will help us to identify the features of a communicative 
resource deficit.
Example One: The Pluot
My first example is about the kind of term that enters the communal linguistic resource 
through invention or necessity. We have a new thing, so we need a new word. Scientists and 
engineers often create things that need names, and this means that new words often enter our 
resource. This also means that old bits of technology often fall out of use or favor, and so their 
names become less used parts of our resource. Some terms may fall out of use all together, 
except for their cataloguing and preservation by historians and scholars.
The pluot is a cross between a plum and an apricot, created by orchardists and fruit 
growers who wanted to enjoy the tangy flavor of a plum while still tasting the floral notes of an 
apricot. As a fruit, it might be considered both old and new. Orchardists, amateur gardeners, and 
mother nature have been crossing plum and apricot trees for what must be a very long time. In 
this sense, a plum-apricot hybrid is no new thing. However, the pluot is a relatively new fruit. It 
was bred to a specific formula, and this formula was created and patented by Zeigar’s Genetics in 
the late 20th centuiy.181 Despite its relatively recent appearance, there are many pluot enthusiasts 
and you can find pluots at many North American farmer’s markets.
181 For more information about the pluot, see Chip Brantley’s The Perfect Fruit: Good Breeding, Bad Seeds, and the 
hunt for the Elusive Pluot, Bloomsbury: 2009.
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Pluots are part of a growing group of hybrid fruits, including the plumcot and the aprium, 
which are fruits related to but importantly different from the pluot. All of these fruits are 
instances of the type of fruit called ‘interspecific plum’, and the genetics of each are carefully 
catalogued and patented. Before the late 20th century and the advent of genetic copyright, 
farmers and orchardists certainly crossed various fruit trees to produce new fruits. Usually, 
farmers crossed trees with a certain goal in mind. For example, one tree might have rootstock 
particularly suited to the soil in a certain region, and another might have a particularly tasty fruit. 
A cross between those two trees might yield a tree that can produce very tasty fruit and still 
flourish in difficult soil conditions. Alternately, people have crossed trees simply to pursue new 
and different flavor profiles for their fruit crops. It is likely that plums and apricots have been 
crossed to produce pluot-like fruit many times before. However, in the late 20th century, a 
special combination of circumstances occurred. Farmers and orchardists began to patent their 
produce (‘pluof is a registered trademark of Zeigar’s Genetics). At the same time, local food 
enthusiasts and food journalists wrote about new and tasty fruits on food blogs and in other 
media, using the word ‘pluot’ to describe this specific type of apricot/plum hybrid, thereby
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establishing a large pluot following. People now sell pluots, eat pluots, make foods and drinks 
from pluots, and talk about pluots. When they use the word ‘pluot’, they refer to a particular 
proprietary hybrid fruit produced to Zeigar’s Genetics specifications.
Before the advent of fruit patents and food blogs, some pluot-like fruit probably existed. 
Farmers and orchardists had probably bred a plum hybrid with pluot-like characteristics. 
However, before the Zeigar’s Genetics company copyrighted the name ‘pluot’ and patented the 
genes behind the hybrid, people could not talk about the fruit in the same ways they can today. 
First, there was no widely used and understood name for the fruit, and thus no way to identify 
exactly what the conversation was about (beyond a vague use of the words ‘plum’ and ‘apricot’, 
or some kind of indexical like ‘that fruit over there’).182 Second, there was no clear and 
identifiable plum-apricot hybrid that was a pluot, but only a range of interspecific plums with
1821 suppose there were fanners known for the flavor profile of their fruit. In this way, for example, a fanner called 
Jansen might be known for his plums, which come to be known themselves as Jansen’s Plums. Jansen’s Plums 
might eventually become a new type of plum in this way. This story is similar to the pluot story, but the distribution 
and broad use o f the term ‘Jansen’s plums’ would have taken considerably longer without web-based media, and, 
one suspects, Zeigar’s marketing team.
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varying characteristics. Now, when we use the word ‘pluot’, we know that we are talking about 
a particular kind of fruit with a particular (and predictable) flavor and texture profile. Pluots 
have been given a name. We can now use the term ‘pluot’ to pick out certain fruits and exclude 
others.
Before the copyright of ‘pluot’ and the corresponding popularization of the word (and the 
fruit that goes with it), we could not talk about this interspecific plum without using indexicals or 
referring to genetic terminology and orchardists’ notes and descriptions. As a result, we were 
unable to generalize easily from one plum-apricot hybrid to many other tokens of the same type. 
We didn’t distinguish between varieties of pluot-like fruits well enough to establish (on a broad 
scale, to a large group of people) which similarities were relevant to the concept of pluot. Now, 
thanks to Zeigar’s patent and the rapid distribution of the word ‘pluot’ on food blogs, we can talk 
about pluots with relative ease.183 We can instruct our local market to stock pluots, and we can 
read, write, and dream about things to do with pluots. However, nobody in this scenario is a 
victim of communicative injustice, either before or after the Zeigar’s patent. Nobody suffered 
from the lack of terminology to describe a particular interspecific plum. There was no hole or 
gap in the resource before the advent of ‘pluot’. Our communal linguistic resource was not in 
deficit. It simply grew to accommodate the newly defined hybrid fruit. The fact that we have 
benefitted from the increased richness of our language that resulted from the addition of ‘pluot’ 
to our communal linguistic resource does not necessarily mean that we were at a disadvantage 
before.
Example Two: ‘Sexual Harassment’
This now familiar example is about a word that we needed in a way that we didn’t need 
‘pluot’. In some cases, we need certain words and the understanding that comes with them in 
order to do vitally important things like communicate, understand our experiences, and protest
183 Imagine a conversation: ‘What’s a pluot?’ ‘It is a plum/apricot hybrid.’ ‘But so are plumcots and apriums. How 
is a pluot different?’ ‘Well, it is part of that family but has the following predictable, consistent characteristics that 
set it apart. Pluots are x while plumcots are>> and apriums are z.' ‘Ok, yes. I see the difference now.’
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against injustice. The fact that we have this need for certain words may help us to see what a 
resource deficit -  a situation in which we lack these words - is like.
In Chapter Four I recounted Carmita Wood’s story about her experience of sexual 
harassment before she had the term ‘sexual harassment’ to describe her experience. Carmita 
Wood’s story is Fricker’s paradigmatic case of hermeneutical injustice. It is also a classic 
example of a success story for the correction of a particular kind of communicative injustice. 
Ms. Wood’s story follows a very tidy format: a person struggles to understand and communicate 
about her experience because of a gap in the communal communicative resource; that person 
goes on to find a group of people with similar experiences; the members of this group use these 
similarities to identify with each other’s experiences and come up with a common name for that 
experience; the group ensures that the new term is distributed widely throughout the 
communicative resource. This is an example of the kind of growth we might hope for in our 
communicative resources. It is an example of society correcting for an injustice and ensuring a 
greater likelihood of successful communication about a particular thing in the future.
To review, the details of the case are these: Carmita Wood worked for a North American 
university in the early 1970s, at a time when significant numbers of women had not been 
members of professions like politics, academia, and the law for long. We had no nuanced 
understanding of professional gender relations. At a time when we had no concept of what 
sexual harassment was, Carmita Wood’s boss made unwanted sexual advances to her in their 
place of work. Carmita did everything she could to avoid or alleviate the situation before 
succumbing to stress and trauma and quitting her job. Her subsequent claim for unemployment 
insurance was denied because she could not name or describe to her (or anyone else’s) 
satisfaction the reason for her unemployment. Carmita eventually found a women’s group that 
fostered discussion of women’s experiences in the workplace. She discovered that her 
experience was not uncommon. Members of this group chose to name their shared experience 
‘sexual harassment’, and they used this name in a successful campaign to make sexual 
harassment illegal. Carmita Wood’s story is also an account of the origins of the term ‘sexual 
harassment’.
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The final step in this process, and the reason that the term ‘sexual harassment’ is 
considered such a remarkable success story, is the popularization step. The members of Wood’s 
women’s group were not meeting to talk about their experiences in the workplace only for 
support. They were campaigning to change the way that women and men behaved in the 
workplace. The legal campaign waged by these women was remarkably successful. Sexual 
harassment in the workplace is now against the law - that is, many corporations prohibit sexual 
harassment amongst their employees as a kind of preventative move, in order to help the 
company avoid a vulnerability to costly and damaging sexual discrimination lawsuits. Also, 
there are now laws specifically against sexual harassment in several countries (including the 
EU).184 Most of us have now heard the term ‘sexual harassment’, and we know roughly what it 
means, what we can protest, and what we are to avoid. This is a good example of positive 
growth in our communicative resource.
In this case, the gap in the resource is clearly a significant factor in Carmita Wood’s 
communication difficulties. It is important to note that the difficulty that we want to focus on 
here is not the experience of sexual harassment, though this is certainly a problematic 
experience. Instead, the difficulty we want to focus on here is a communicative difficulty. It is 
the fact that Carmita Wood did not have the resources to understand and communicate about her 
experience. She needed to be able to communicate about her experience in order to do important 
things like claim unemployment insurance, protest against her treatment, press charges against 
her employer, and maintain a sense of dignity and self-worth. We might also say that the pluot 
farmers needed to be able to communicate about pluots in order to do important things like make 
a living, introduce the world to pluots, and tell the world about their life’s work. However 
important these abilities are, they are somehow different from the abilities that Carmita Wood 
lacked. For example, nobody’s life or ability to flourish as a human person depended on the 
advent of the term ‘pluot’, but we can imagine that contemporaries and predecessors of Carmita 
Wood who were victims of sexual harassment without access to women’s groups or pioneering 
legal campaigns were less able to flourish. Their lives, their ability to pursue their own projects
184 See Directive 2006/54/EC o f the European Union, which came into force in 2006.
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in an environment of justice and dignity, were significantly impacted by inadequate 
communicative resources.
The advent of the pluot may have enriched lives, but the lack of a term to describe pluots 
before they came along did not harm anyone. For example, it is not the case that there are people 
who can only eat pluots, or could only live by growing pluots, and so need to be able to tell us 
about this and understand it themselves in order to survive. It is not the case that people who 
make livings from pluots could not have made any other kind of life for themselves. In contrast, 
Carmita Wood needed to be able to talk about sexual harassment in order to protect herself, both 
in terms of her physical security and bodily integrity and in terms of her dignity and 
understanding of herself as a human person with rights and intrinsic value. Her experience of 
sexual harassment was a threat to these things too, but people may live through experiences of 
injustice, or at least live through them more easily, if they have the tools to understand and 
defend themselves and can appeal to a society that understands in a clear way that they have 
been wronged. In this sense, our lack of the term ‘sexual harassment’ was damaging in a way 
that our lack of the term ‘pluot’ was not.
r
Example Three: “Rape”-Rape and General Confusion
My final example is somewhat less tidy and much less optimistic than the case of ‘sexual 
harassment’. This is the case of a word that has been present in the communal linguistic resource 
for a very long time. Over the course of its long and varied life, this word has meant many 
different things. Due to these different meanings, or possibly due to the sensitive and taboo 
nature of the concept, nobody is very sure precisely what this word means. The word, of course, 
is ‘rape’. ‘Rape’ once meant something akin to theft of property, when woman were understood 
as the property of some man. We now feel fairly confident that we can use it to refer to some 
kinds of non-consensual sex, but we cannot all agree about the correct extension of the word. 
Does it apply to married couples? Does it apply to consenting people under a certain age? Does 
it apply when the victim is drunk or dressed provocatively? Confusion abounds.
This kind of case will help us to see that resource deficits do not have to take the form of 
missing parts. They can also be old, vital parts of the resource that don’t do what we need them
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to do. In the case of the term ‘rape’, there is no broad consensus on the specifics of what rape 
actually is. It is not enough to say that there is a dominant paradigm that we all agree on. In this 
case, the dominant paradigm is the weapon-wielding stranger jumping out from behind a bush 
and forcing a woman to have genito-genital intercourse with him. Statistically speaking, this is 
not the most common kind of rape -  you are more likely to be raped by a person you know.185 
The paradigm does not help us to understand and identify these kinds of cases. This is just one 
way in which the concept rape is impoverished, and therefore our resources for understanding 
and communicating about it are impoverished as well. The following is another example of a 
similar problem.
This example is taken from recent news, but I have replaced names with idealized titles in 
an attempt to remove some irrelevant complexities and allow us to focus on the use of the term 
‘rape’ instead of any disputed facts about this case. Prosecutors from California have been trying 
to mount a case against Big Director, who fled the U.S.A after being convicted of rape charges 
more than 20 years ago. Allegedly, Big Director forced an underaged woman to have sex with 
him. There has been a public outcry on both sides of this case. Some people feel that Big 
Director should be extradited from Switzerland (where he is currently being held) and sent to the 
U.S. to face charges. They feel that he should not be shown leniency simply because he is 
famous and makes good movies, or simply because time has passed, or simply because his 
victim has dropped the charges. On the other side, a large number of actors and public figures 
have come out in support of Big Director. These people feel that the charges should be dropped 
for a number of reasons. One well-publicized line of reasoning in support of Big Director 
appeals to the idea that he did not actually commit “real” rape. As Prominent Actress says, it was 
not “rape”-rape.
What does Prominent Actress mean by this statement? Let us assume that she knows the 
facts of the case. Presumably she intends to imply that Big Director’s charges should be dropped 
because he did not “really” rape his putative victim. Presumably she means that he did 
something else (possibly behaved badly) that does not count as rape. ‘Rape’ is a word used to 
describe a concept that most of us are very confused about. Prominent Actress’s assertion that
185 See, for example, the U.S. Department o f Justice’s National Crime Victimization Study from 2005.
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Big Director’s case was not a case of “rape”-rape is a testament to this widespread confusion. 
This confusion exists even when a putative instance of rape meets the criteria set out in criminal 
law. For example, Big Director confessed to the crime of rape. He was convicted (but not 
sentenced) in a court of law. His victim was under the legal age of consent. There is a clear, 
unambiguous, and uncontested description of the event on public record. However, as we can 
see, even this record has not been particularly helpful in this case.
The words that Prominent Actress uses here are a good illustration of the deep conceptual 
confusion. The term “‘rape”-rape’ implies that there are (at least) two kinds of rape: “rape”-rape 
and some other, possibly less serious kind of rape. How are we to tell the difference between the 
two kinds of rape? And why should Big Director be punished for one but not the other? That 
Prominent Actress and others should make such claims about this case in spite of the authority of 
evidence, a confession, and the legal system speaking for the extradition and sentencing of Big 
Director suggests that confusion abounds and public opinion is deeply divided. It also seems to 
suggest that there is at least one kind of rape that is not serious enough to warrant condemnation 
from Famous Actress.
»
The word ‘rape’ has existed in our collective linguistic resource for a long time. Its 
meaning has changed as our social rules and laws have changed. At the present time, the 
extension of the term ‘rape’ is so badly understood that our language community cannot use it 
any consistent way even when a case of rape meets all of the legally defined conditions. 
Communication using ‘rape’ is often futile, and, as in the Prominent Actress case, may do more 
harm than good. We cannot effectively generalize from one instance to many instances of the 
kind rape. We don’t have a clear, widespread understanding about what does and does not count 
as rape. There are few good ways to communicate effectively about rape, and therefore few 
good ways to educate about, prevent, prohibit, and understand it.
In this case, the communal communicative resource clearly contains some resources for 
communication about rape, but these resources are inadequate, and this inadequacy harms 
victims, some potential perpetrators, and many other members of their communities (like judges, 
lawyers, and juries, to name just a few examples). Victims are harmed because they don’t 
always have the resources to understand and communicate about their experiences. If we are not
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clear about what counts as rape and what does not, then people who experience these disputed 
cases will have an even more difficult time understanding what has happened to them and 
reporting the crime. They will have an even more difficult time talking to anyone else about 
their experience, because they will lack Fricker’s ‘cognitive confidence’ about whether theirs 
was a case of rape or not. Similarly, if we are not clear about what is rape and what is not rape, 
then we will find it more difficult to educate people about the boundaries of acceptable sexuality. 
A confused understanding about rape may mean that some people go on to commit rape when 
they might not otherwise have done so. Unlike the case of ‘sexual harassment’, we do have 
some terms and resources available to us as we try to communicate about rape. However, better 
understanding about rape would mean better communication about rape. Our lack of consensus 
is a sign that our communal communicative resource is inadequate. This inadequacy is another 
kind of resource deficit.
What do all of these cases have in common? They all describe a kind of interaction 
between a community and its linguistic resource: Orchardists and food bloggers spread the word 
about a new hybrid plum. Lawyers make the term ‘sexual harassment’ a part of our workplace 
lexicon. Public personalities, law enforcement personnel, and you and I struggle to decide if Big 
Director really raped someone, and if it matters that he did. Also, all of these cases focus on the 
importance of our ability to generalize: Zeigar Genetics made the pluot a specific, patented, 
replicable kind of organism. Those in the know can distinguish a pluot from an aprium, and they 
can tell us how to do it, too. Many corporations provide detailed descriptions of the kinds of 
behaviors that constitute sexual harassment so that employees can identity and avoid these 
behaviors in the workplace. In the case of ‘rape’, it is precisely this ability to generalize that we 
lack. We find it difficult to consistently generalize about what counts as rape with any kind of 
confidence or authority, and this difficulty has a serious impact on our communication about 
rape.
In these three examples I have tried to model some ways that communities and 
communicative resources grow and change together. In the first example, the resource grew to 
accommodate the new plum-apricot hybrid and our need for a word to describe it. However, the 
community did not struggle to communicate before the word ‘pluot’ came along. The resource
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was not in deficit, but it did grow and change to accommodate talk of the new interspecific plum. 
In the second example, members of the community were harmed by the resource deficit. They 
needed the word ‘sexual harassment’ and its attendant concept in order to perform vital 
functions. In the third example, members of the community are still harmed by the resource 
deficit regarding ‘rape’. We have a term and concept in place, but they do not foster effective 
communication. Successful communication about rape can be prohibitively difficult in some 
circumstances.
Throughout this section I have suggested a loose way of understanding the notion of a 
communal communicative resource. I will now suggest a similarly loose way of understanding 
what it means for such a resource to be in deficit:
If members of a community have a particular kind of need for words and/or 
concepts, and those words and/or concepts are not contained in the resource, then 
the resource is in deficit.
This particular kind of need will be explored more fully in the next section.
5 . 2  To w a r d s  a  W o r k in g  D e f in it io n , Pa r t  T w o : T h e  C o m m u n ic a t iv e  At t e m p t
As we saw in the last section, a deficit in the communal communicative resource can 
contribute to many serious problems. Such deficits can take one of (at least) two forms:186
1. a lack of a word, as in ‘sexual harassment’, or
2. a lack of clarity with respect to a word or concept, as in ‘rape’.
However, by itself, a resource deficit is not yet a communicative injustice. We begin to see what 
communicative injustice might be when someone struggles to use the communal communicative 
resource and fails. Failure, in this case, means that the individual or conversational group in 
question is unable to successfully communicate. This might mean that a person like Langton’s 
silenced woman is unable to communicate her refusal of sex. It might mean that the person in 
charge of helping Carmita Wood with her unemployment insurance form doesn’t know what
186 Recall that terms created as names for new technology (like ‘laptop’, ‘iPod’, or ‘pluot’) do not redress a deficit in 
the communal communicative resource under my account. The reason for this will become clear in the course of 
this chapter. For now, let me just say that our need for words like ‘iPod’ is importantly different from our need for 
words like ‘rape’ or ‘sexual harassment’.
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Carmita should write in the part of her claim that explains why she left her job. It might also 
mean that a person like Prominent Actress is unable to communicate effectively with her 
interlocutor when she uses the word ‘rape’. In cases like these, a person struggles to find or use 
a word to communicate, either with themselves or with an interlocutor. The failure can be 
caused by a lack-of-words deficit or by a lack-of-clarity deficit.187
These are all cases in which someone makes a failed attempt to communicate about some 
topic that has been obscured by a deficit in the communal communicative resource. These failed 
attempts are the second part of my definition of communicative injustice. I refer to this second 
component as the communicative attempt. In any communicative attempt, the following set of 
conditions must be met:
1. A person or group makes an attempt to communicate, where communication
encompasses both speaking and responding to speech.
2. That person or group fails to communicate.
3. A term or concept obscured by or missing because of a resource deficit is necessary for
the communication, and
4. The communication failure occurs because of the resource deficit, either because the
resource is insufficiently clear (as in the case of rape) or because the resource lacks a
necessary term (as in the case of sexual harassment).
For example, Carmita Wood attempts to explain her experience of sexual harassment to herself 
and the person in charge of her unemployment claim. She finds that she is unable to explain the 
circumstances to her satisfaction, though she cannot say why, and she leaves the relevant part of 
her claim blank. She is forced to leave this part of the claim blank because our communal 
communicative resource had no word or concept for sexual harassment. If Carmita did have 
access to adequate resources, she would have been much more likely to successfully submit a 
claim for unemployment insurance.
Thus far we have achieved some understanding of a communal communicative resource 
and how a deficit in such a resource can impact on some attempts to communicate. However, we 
are still unable to say that we have arrived at a satisfactory understanding of communicative
187 There may be other causes as well as the two listed here.; these are the two I have explored in this thesis.
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injustice because the harm described so far is not quite strong enough. At this point, I have given 
an account of a phenomenon that affects a very large number of people. We have been following 
a course that leads us from a focus on the entire language community to smaller and smaller 
groups of individuals. I started with a conception of a communal resource that suffered a deficit 
of some sort. At this stage, almost everyone might suffer from the same linguistic deficit. So far 
our case is analogous to Fricker’s description of the cognitive deficit suffered by many members 
of a community if there is a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource. Next, I narrowed the 
number of people involved by stating that the individual or collection of individuals has to make 
a communicative attempt. They must be engaging with the linguistic resource in some way, and 
the resource user(s) must struggle and fail. However, though the scenario described at this point 
characterizes the experiences of Carmita Wood and the woman in Langton’s silencing case, it 
also describes the experiences of Prominent Actress and the person handling Carmita Wood’s 
insurance claim. At this stage it seems more intuitively plausible that some of these individuals 
(Carmita Wood, Langton’s silenced woman) might be victims of communicative injustice than 
others (Prominent Actress, insurance claims adjuster).
Suppose that Carmita Wood actually spoke to an insurance claims adjuster instead of 
struggling alone with her paperwork. In this case, the claims adjuster would have been unable to 
translate the experience that Carmita struggled to describe to her into something appropriate for 
the ‘reason for unemployment’ line on the claims form. She may have had sympathy for 
Carmita, but she would not have been able to recognize her experiences as instances of sexual 
harassment. She would have been unable to help Carmita with her form. Though there may be a 
weak sense in which this woman is wronged, it does not seem right to classify this wrong as an 
injustice. She certainly fails to understand Carmita’s communication. Perhaps she is a 
particularly diligent claims adjuster and so is particularly hard-hit by her inability to fully 
understand and assess the situation. There may be a way of interpreting the scenario such that 
the claims adjuster is also a victim of communicative injustice, but as things currently stand it 
doesn’t seem like she is harmed enough by her experience of communication failure for that 
experience to qualify as an injustice. The struggle to communicate successfully while using 
frustratingly inadequate resources cannot be an injustice, or many of us would be victims of
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communicative injustice distressingly often. Communication and self-expression do often come 
with frustration and struggle. A communicative injustice, therefore, cannot be the experience of 
struggling to communicate, even under conditions of of resource inadequacy. It seems that we 
require some further condition.
What is distinctive about the more intuitively plausible cases of communicative injustice? 
Why classify their communication failures as injustices? I propose that the difference between 
Carmita Wood’s communication failure and the claims adjuster’s failure is that Carmita needs to 
be able to communicate about sexual harassment in a way that the claims adjuster does not. That 
is, it means a great deal more to Carmita, and for her life, that she be able to understand that she 
was sexually harassed and be able to use a word to talk about her experiences that has all of the 
normative force of ‘sexual harassment’ attached. Carmita needs to understand that she was 
treated badly. She needs to be able to rely on the fact that everyone else will understand that she 
was treated badly when her experience is classed as an instance of sexual harassment. She needs 
this information in order to take vital communicative action (potential prosecution, future verbal 
self-defense, unemployment insurance claim) and to understand and feel good about her place in 
the social world. On the other hand, it is conceivable that the claims adjustor simply needs to 
know what to put in the blank on the insurance form. She is much less invested in the scenario. 
Her job is not at stake, and nor is her self-respect or her place in the community. In light of this 
difference, I propose that a working definition of communicative injustice requires what I will 
call a vital need condition.
5 . 3  To w a r d s  a  W o r k in g  D e f in it io n , Pa r t  T h r e e : T h e  V ital  N e e d  C o n d it io n
Martha Nussbaum advocates for a kind of political theory based on what she calls human 
capabilities. She argues that governments across the world should establish constitutions that 
ensure that people live at a certain minimal social level — “a bare minimum of what respect for 
human dignity requires”.188 Nussbaum describes her project in the following way:
188 Nussbaum (2000), p 5.
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I shall argue that the best approach to this idea of a basic social minimum is 
provided by an approach that focuses on human capabilities, that is, what people 
are actually able to do and to be - in a way informed by an intuitive idea of a life 
that is worthy of the dignity of a human being.189
In other words, we should come up with a list of things that humans are characteristically 
capable of doing and being, and then we should arrange our laws and governments so that they 
protect those capabilities and ensure that people are able to do and to be the things on the list. 
Nussbaum further states that
in certain core areas of human functioning a necessary condition of justice for a 
public political arrangement is that it deliver to citizens a certain basic level of 
capability. If people are systematically falling below the threshold in any of these 
core areas, this should be seen as a situation both unjust and tragic, in need of 
urgent attention - even if in other respects things are going well.190
In other words, if a person falls below the minimum threshold of capability for any item on the 
list, he or she is a victim of injustice. Further, every item on the list of capabilities is important. 
Nussbaum’s list includes obvious things like life, bodily health, and bodily integrity. However, it 
' also includes things like practical reason and the ability to have “the social bases of self-respect 
and non-humiliation”.191
There is some dispute over what ought to be on the list of central human functional 
capabilities. Nussbaum’s list is as follows:
1. Life.
2. Bodily health.
3. Bodily integrity.
4. Senses, imagination, and thought.
5. Emotions.
189 Ibid.
190 Nussbaum (2000), p. 71.
191 Nussbaum (2000), pp. 78-80.
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6. Practical reason.
7. Affiliation (A): the capacity for social affiliation.
8. Affiliation (B): protection against discrimination because of your affiliations.
9. Living with other species.
10. Play.
11. Control over one’s environment (A): political.
12. Control over one’s environment (B): material.192
Amartya Sen argues for the capabilities approach differently, but both Sen and Nussbaum agree 
that there are central human capabilities vital for a good life in a just society, and that states are 
not governing justly if they do not protect and foster these capabilities.193 Communication is an 
integral part of many of the items on Nussbaum’s list. For example, some successful 
communication may require the freedom of speech. Free speech falls under item eleven, the 
control of one’s political environment. Nussbaum elaborates this in terms of “[bjeing able to 
participate effectively in the political choices that govern one’s life”. Protest and political 
campaigning are also important kinds of communication that involve participation in the political 
system. Nussbaum’s conception of practical reason is also relevant here. Having the capability 
for practical reason means “[bjeing able to form a conception of the good and to engage in 
critical reflection about the planning of one’s life”. Inadequate communicative resources might 
plausibly interfere with this. Finally, it is perhaps most easy to see the need for communication 
when it comes to bodily integrity. A person can’t protect her bodily integrity if she can’t 
communicate her consent to or refusal of physical intimacy, medical treatment, and demands of 
physical labor. Though Nussbaum does not single out communication as a central capability, 
communication seems fundamental to many of the capabilities on Nussbaum’s list.
I would like to adopt something very similar to Nussbaum’s capabilities approach in my 
working definition of communicative injustice. In the last section, I noted that not every person
192 Ibid.
193 For more on Sen’s approach, see Sen (2009).
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who makes a communicative attempt seems to be a plausible victim of injustice. For example, 
employees handling Carmita Wood’s unemployment insurance claim do not seem to be victims 
of injustice. In order to make it clear that communicative injustice is an injustice and not a 
misfortune or instance of bad luck, I need some way of distinguishing victims of injustice from 
other kinds of struggling communicators. In this section, I will argue that the feature that 
distinguishes victims of communicative injustice from people who merely struggle with the 
resource is the presence of something I will call the vital need condition. In my explanation of 
the vital need condition I have borrowed heavily from Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.
Nussbaum says of her approach, “[wjhat this approach is after is a society in which 
persons are treated as each worthy of regard, and in which each has been put in a position to live 
really humanly.”194 To understand why this approach is relevant to my concerns about justice 
and communication as they occur in this thesis, consider again Carmita Wood’s story. Recall her 
humiliation and discomfort when she tried to complete her unemployment insurance form. 
Recall the further harms that accrued (loss of income, loss of future employment, loss of self­
esteem and respect in her community) because of her inability to understand her experience and
*
communicate her understanding to others. Consider the story of the woman in Langton’s 
example about sexual refusal and silencing. One of the factors that contributed to that woman’s 
sexual assault was a massive communication failure. Both of these examples are cases where 
successful communication might have shifted the balance from an unjust experience to a just 
one. This is what I mean when I say that both Carmita Wood and Langton’s silenced woman 
meet the vital need condition. They have a vital need to communicate successfully, and less than 
successful communication, in these cases, resulted in both women living without some of the 
capabilities Nussbaum and Sen claim are vital to life in a just society.
Again, I borrow from Nussbaum to explain myself here. When speaking of a person as 
someone with “central human functional capabilities”, we speak of those capabilities as 
something of value, something we seem to hold dear across cultures and national boundaries.
194 Nussbaum (2000), p. 74.
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We see the person as having activity, goals, and projects - as somehow awe- 
inspiringly above the mechanical workings of nature, and yet in need of support 
for the fulfillment of many central projects.195
Without this support, the person is less able or perhaps unable to have goals and projects. The 
person, Nussbaum argues, becomes more like the mechanical workings of nature and less like 
the awe-inspiring end-in-herself that she ought to be. It is interesting to note that mere 
subsistence is not enough to meet Nussbaum’s requirements for a person to be fully human. 
Merely having enough food to stave off starvation is not enough. This conception of justice 
demands more for a person.196 Under a capabilities-like framework, we might add 
communication to any list of central human capabilities that must be nurtured and protected by a 
just state.
If I adopt a capabilities-like approach to communication, then the following things about 
the vital need condition become clear. First, though communication is not explicitly present on 
Nussbaum’s list of capabilities, it is clear that communication is at least a necessary component 
of many items on the list. Communication is necessary to the functioning of a flourishing person 
in a just society. Second, this means that an inability to communicate successfully about certain 
things is a mark of injustice, or at the very least that a government is unjust if it does not ensure 
its citizens’ communicative capabilities in at least certain vital contexts.197 Finally, it only 
remains to determine when a person’s need to communicate is a vital need. Clearly, the ability to 
communicate is valuable in itself, but given that some communication is possible in most states, 
what kinds of communication can be described as vital? For the purposes of my working 
definition, let us say that
a need to communicate successfully is a vital need if  failure to 
communicate successfully would interfere with a person’s ability to 
flourish and pursue her own projects.
I leave a more precise explanation of what this claim entails for future projects. For now, 
consider the needs of Carmita Wood and Langton’s silenced woman as core cases of individuals
195 Nussbaum (2000), p. 71
196 For a discussion of the capabilities approach, see Jaggar (2006) or Robeyns and Brighouse (2010)
, 197 For the purposes of this thesis, I am forced to set aside the case o f a severely disabled person. This kind o f case 
would clearly pose a problem for this understanding o f both justice and a flourishing human life.
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who meet the vital need condition. In both cases, failure to communicate successfully interfered 
with the subject’s ability to flourish and pursue her own projects. In Carmita Wood’s case, this 
meant dealing with the material and emotional consequences of sexual harassment. In Langton’s 
silenced woman’s case, this meant enduring sexual assault. In both cases, the women’s 
communication failures meant that they were less able to flourish. Both women, then, had a vital 
need to communicate successfully.
5.4  A W orking  Definition
A resource-based communicative injustice consists, then, of three elements that must all 
be present in order for a particular communication failure to count as a resource-based 
communicative injustice. First, there must be a deficit in the communal communicative resource. 
This deficit can take one of two forms: either a lack of a term, concept, etc., or a debilitating 
confusion over a term or concept. Second, a person or group of people must make a 
communicative attempt. This means that (a), this person or group must fail to communicate, and 
. (b) that their failure must be deeply involved with and made significantly more likely by a 
resource deficit. Finally, the person or group must have a vital need to communicate. In other 
words, the communication failure must interfere with the communicator’s ability to flourish and 
pursue her own projects.
A very basic model of the definition might look something like this:
RCI = Resource Deficit + Communicative Attempt + Vital Need
In the next two sections I will consider two potential counterexamples to my model. In 
working through these counterexamples, I hope to avoid some misunderstandings and 
misinterpretations. I will also use these examples as an opportunity to elaborate and defend my 
working definition.
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5.5  C ounterexam ple: Haslanger , C o n flic t , and  Relativism  About  Social  
Tr u th198
I presented an early version of my working definition of communicative injustice to 
MIT’s Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, and Sally Haslanger raised an objection along the 
following lines.
Suppose that two groups of people, in this case some parents and their pre-teen daughter, 
disagree about whether or not an item of clothing is to be considered “cute”, and therefore 
appropriate attire for the daughter. One such item that Haslanger has written about is a “crop- 
top”, or a tiny t-shirt that leaves a large portion of one’s midriff bare. The parents hold one set of 
beliefs about the clothing, the daughter another. The parents believe that crop-tops are too 
revealing, that they over-sexualize young girls, and as such they are inappropriate attire for their 
daughter. The daughter believes that the “cool” girls at school wear them, that this makes the 
tops cute, and that crop-tops are therefore appropriate attire.
In this scenario, the parents and their daughter disagree about what constitutes a “cute” 
top. Haslanger writes about the nature of this disagreement in her “But Mom, Crop Tops Are 
Cute!” Social Knowledge, Social Structure and Ideology Critique. Borrowing from John 
MacFarlane’s work on relativism and disagreement, she argues that both parents and daughter 
can be right about the cuteness of crop-tops.199 Each may be right from within their own 
particular social milieu, which Haslanger defines in the following way:
For the purposes of this paper it will be useful to define an individual’s (general) 
social milieu in terms of the social structures within which he or she operates, 
whether or not the public schemas in question have been internalized. Although 
we can choose some of the structures within which we live, it is not always a 
matter of choice, e.g., I am governed by the laws of the United States whether I 
choose to be or not. Of course, individuals do not live within only one milieu; and 
milieus overlap. One’s workplace, place of worship, civic space, and home are 
structured spaces; each of these structures are inflected by race, gender, class, 
nationality, age, and sexuality to name a few relevant factors. So it will be 
important to specify an individual’s milieu at a time and place and possibly in
198 See Haslanger, ““But Mom, Crop Tops Are Cute!” Social Knowledge, Social Structure and Ideology Critique” 
Philosophical Issues 17, the Metaphysics of Epistemology, 2007.
199 MacFarlane, J. 2007. Relativism and disagreement. Philosophical Studies 132:1 (January): 17-31.
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relation to specified others. In this essay I will not be able to give precise 
conditions that specify what milieu is operative for an individual in a given 
context; we’ll just have to rely on clear-enough cases for now.200
In the daughter’s milieu, cuteness is determined by what the “cool” kids wear and do. In this 
sense, the daughter is right to say that crop tops are cute, since the cool kids wear crop tops and 
thereby make them cute. In the parents’ milieu, cuteness is determined by some other set of 
criteria -  one that emphatically does not involve the over-sexualization of young girls.
At this stage, we can see how the conversation will play out. The daughter is going to 
ask the parents for a crop-top. The parents will say no, because crop-tops are inappropriate for 
young girls. The daughter will then say, as in the title of Haslanger’s paper, “But mom, crop-tops 
are cute!” The parents will disagree, and so on and so forth, in homes and families across much 
of the world. At this stage, we can also begin to see a potential problem for my account of 
communicative injustice. Is this kind of communication failure a communicative injustice? 
Haslanger suggested that it is. After all, the resource was potentially in deficit in that the parents 
and children disagree about what falls under the extension of cute. It is possible that the term 
* ‘cute’ is insufficiently clear, that it does not allow for effective communication. Also, the parents 
and their daughter made a communicative effort: they both tried to explain why crop-tops either 
are or are not cute, to no avail. Finally, one might argue that the family has a vital need to 
communicate with each other about these things to ensure domestic harmony and justice in the 
family. No one person should get to decide what counts as cute for the entire family. Both sides 
have some claim to being right about cuteness. Haslanger argues that her example fits all three 
criteria for a resource-based communicative injustice.
i. However, it does not seem right to call this kind of everyday disagreement an injustice. 
No-one is wronged by the disagreement, at least at this stage. (We can all imagine subsequent 
actions leading to punishments that may seem like wrongs to one party or the other.) This 
scenario does not seem to be like other kinds of injustice. There is no systematic discrimination. 
There is, for example, no class of people who are wronged by either use of ‘cute’. Users of the 
word ‘cute’ do not seem to suffer any deep harm. Though this case may seem to fit my criteria 
for a communicative injustice, it does not seem intuitively plausible that it is one. In what
200 Haslanger (2007), p. 80.
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follows, I will try to respond to this objection. I will do so by working through my account part 
by part.
Part One: Resource Deficit
In many ways, we can see Haslanger’s idea of a social milieu as analogous to my own 
concept of a communal communicative resource. Haslanger’s emphasis is on social structures 
and internalized norms. The communal communicative resource includes norms and social 
structures of work, worship, and home, but it also includes words and concepts that may not be 
related to these structures. The main difference between my approach to the communal 
communicative resource and Haslanger’s social milieu is that Haslanger allows for the existence 
of more than one milieu. Recall: “Of course, individuals do not live within only one milieu; and 
milieus overlap. One’s workplace, place of worship, civic space, and home are structured spaces; 
each of these structures are inflected by race, gender, class, nationality, age, and sexuality to 
name a few relevant factors. So it will be important to specify an individual’s milieu at a time 
and place and possibly in relation to specified others.” In contrast, the communal 
communicative resource is one unified resource shared by all members of society. All of the 
different parts of Haslanger’s different milieux are included in the collective resource. 
Everyone’s communal resource is the same, though different people and different sections of 
society may use certain parts more than others.
Under my definition, then, the parents and the daughter don’t have different 
communicative resources. They share the same one. It may turn out to be the case that the 
resource is insufficiently precise about cuteness. In this sense, one might argue that the resource 
is in deficit. However, I think that this understanding of the function of evaluative terms like 
‘cute’ is unhelpful. Different people are able to use evaluative terms differently. We can 
disagree about what falls under the extension of words like ‘cute’. The resource is a tool used by 
the entire community, not an arbiter of taste. In fact, in the case of certain terms like ‘art’ and 
‘freedom’, it is not clear that the imposition of one extension over all others is helpful in any 
attempt to grasp the meaning of the term. It might be the case that the resource users require a 
’ certain plasticity in some of their terms.
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In Haslanger’s example, the parents know what their daughter thinks and the daughter 
has some sense of what her parents think. Their disagreement actually allows this elucidation to 
take place, and this, in turn, allows for disagreement about whether something is or is not cute. 
Disagreements sometimes even serve to make each party’s understanding of the issue more clear 
than it would normally be, as in this case. The daughter explains to her parents that cuteness is 
defined for her by what the “cool” kids wear. The parents explain to their daughter that cuteness 
is not defined in this way. In this case, both parties have more information than an average 
conversational group would have about the possible extension of a disputed term. Usually, we 
talk of something’s being cute in passing, without waiting for the assent or dissent of the other 
party. The other party’s agreement (or disagreement) is incidental, because we understand that 
‘cute’ usually means something like cute to me. In Haslanger’s example, the disagreement is a 
kind of communication. Disagreement is not necessarily a communication failure. It can be the 
case that both parties understand each other and still disagree.
It is important to note that words like ‘rape’ cannot include this kind of feature. If the 
concept rape means something like rape as I  understand it, then people communicating about 
and trying to understand rape would lose the sense that other people understand what they mean 
by ‘rape’, the sense that we all mean the same thing. With this loss comes a loss of Fricker’s 
notion of ‘cognitive confidence’, the sense that you are justified in your beliefs and have value as 
a giver of testimony. People could no longer be sure that they were talking, writing, or 
legislating about the same thing. We would have an even more difficult time identifying and 
prosecuting rape than we do now, because there would be very little widespread agreement about 
what falls under the extension of the term ‘rape’. This does not happen with words like ‘cute’ 
because, again, we understand that different people will find different things to be cute. This 
element of individual interpretation and taste is part of the concept of cuteness.201
There is also a sense that this element of individualization doesn’t capture what we want 
to mean when we use a word like ‘rape’. Like ‘cute’ the word ‘rape’ has an evaluative
201 This is not to say that productive disagreement about the extension o f the term ‘rape’ is impossible. Participants 
in such a dialogue would simply need to signal that this kind of discussion was taking place. This might happen in a 
formal debate about rape legislation, for example, where it would be understood that participants were putting 
forward their own views. The same effect might also be achieved just by prefacing statements with signposts like 
‘In my opinion...’, etc.
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component. That is, rape is broadly considered to be a bad thing. Rapists have done a bad thing, 
and rape victims have (at the very least) been harmed. If we disagree about what counts as rape, 
then we lose some of the force of this evaluative content. After all, your ideas about what counts 
as rape may well be different from someone else’s. Opinions about what counts as rape do, in 
fact, differ widely. If we’re not sure that something is rape then we’re not sure that it has the 
negative valence that we want ‘rape’ to carry. Cases in which nobody is sure if an event counts 
as rape or not are the cases that weaken the evaluative content of rape as a whole. However, the 
same is not true for cute. Disagreement over whether crop-tops are cute does not weaken the 
sense that cute things are good, or make it more difficult for people to pick out the things that 
they think of as cute. In this sense, there is a fundamental disanalogy between ‘cute’ and ‘rape’. 
It is therefore not clear that the resource is in deficit in the case of ‘cute’. However, for the sake 
of argument I am willing to grant that Haslanger might argue that there is some difficulty with 
the resource. Let us move on to look at the communication that took place.
Part two: Communicative attempt
Recall the four conditions that must be met in order for a person or group to make a 
communicative attempt:
1. A person makes an attempt to communicate.
2. That person fails to communicate.
3. A term or concept obscured by or missing because of a resource deficit is necessary for
the communication, and
4. the communication failure occurs because of the resource deficit, either because the
resource is insufficiently clear (as in the case of rape) or because the resource lacks a 
necessary term (as in the case of sexual harassment).
Clearly the parents and daughter make an attempt to communicate, though I have already argued 
that there is no genuine trouble with the resource, making conditions three and four problematic 
for the Haslanger-style critic. However, I would like to think more about condition two. Are the 
parents and daughter really unable to communicate?
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Both parties seem confident about what ‘cute’ means and how it applies or does not apply 
to crop-tops. Both parties have sufficient resources to express their position. I would even argue 
that both parties have sufficient resources to secure uptake -  both parents and child are able to 
tell the opposing party what they think and why. What they cannot do is convince each other that 
they are right. Is this kind of problem a communication failure?
As I argued in the previous section, it is not clear that it is a communication failure. Both 
parents and daughter have been able to make their own interpretation of what counts as ‘cute’ 
and argue for their case. Again, disagreement is not the same thing as communication failure. 
Finally, let us move on to the vital need condition.
Part Three: Vital Need
Do the parents have a vital need to communicate with their daughter about cuteness? 
Does the daughter have a vital need to express herself in this way to her parents? If we 
understand a vital need as a need that must be met in order for an individual to flourish as a 
human person, then the answer to these questions is no. This is not to say that parental authority 
and teenage self-expression are not important. Rather, it is to say two things. First, both parents 
and daughter have other communicative avenues available to them in this case. The parents can 
explain their decision to their daughter using other terms, such as ‘over-sexualized’ or 
‘inappropriate’. The daughter can also explain her preferences to her parents using other terms, 
such as ‘popular’ or ‘worn by Cady and Sophie’. It does not seem like either side has a special 
need for the term ‘cute’. And second, an individual disagreement about cuteness does not seem 
to threaten either party’s ability to flourish as a human person. Perhaps if the parents 
systematically shut down all of their daughter’s opinions in an authoritarian manner then the 
daughter’s ability to flourish might be threatened. This is a particularly tricky case because the 
teenage and pre-teen years are a time when a child is learning how to engage with her own 
autonomy by testing her parents authority. This is bound to be a bit rocky, and it is therefore 
particularly difficult to define what flourishing means for teens and pre-teens. However, in this 
case, based on this one individual instance of communication, neither parents nor child cease to 
flourish because they disagree about what counts as cute.
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Therefore, in response to Haslanger, I can say that this example is not a case of resource- 
based communicative injustice because it is not clear that there is either a resource deficit, a 
genuine communication failure, or a vital need to communicate. The next counterexample I 
consider is another case where it seems that all three of the conditions for resource-based 
communicative injustice are in place, but this time the case seems more like an example of 
misfortune or bad luck than genuine injustice.
5 .6  C ounterexam ple: M isfo rtun e , Bad Luck , and  Other  Rare Breeds
Fricker makes a distinction between epistemic injustice and epistemic misfortune or bad 
luck. One example she uses to make this distinction is the case of an undiagnosed illness. 
Suppose you have an undiagnosed illness, and that your behavior and lifestyle are therefore 
widely misunderstood by most people. For example, many kinds of mental illness 
(schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder) were not understood as illnesses until relatively 
recently, and rates of successful diagnosis and treatment may still be lower than they should be 
today. If you were to have suffered from schizophrenia at a time in history when we did not 
understand what schizophrenia was, then we would not have understood your behavior as the 
result of an illness. We might have invented alternate stories (devils, demonic possession, etc) to 
explain your behavior. ‘Schizophrenia’ and all of its attendant understanding and communicative 
resources would not have been available to you. You would have lacked the resources necessary 
to understand your own social experience, and your social peers would have lacked these 
resources as well. However, according to Fricker, this is just bad luck. You had the misfortune 
to be born at a time when we had not yet diagnosed schizophrenia. For Fricker, this is not an 
injustice, because there were no background social conditions that connect your resource deficit 
with a broader iniquitous social structure.
Setting aside the argument that prejudice about mental illness might be analogous to 
sexism, racism, or homophobia in terms of background social conditions, this kind of 
counterexample rests on the intuition that there will be all sorts of gaps in our collective 
communicative resource due to discoveries that we have yet to make or things that haven’t yet 
caught enough of our collective attention. The intuition, shared by Fricker, is that these gaps and
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any communicative attempts and vital needs that come along with them, ought not to count as 
injustices. Sometimes we just don’t have a word or idea yet. As in the case of ‘laptop’ and 
‘pluot’, this lack should not necessarily mean that a communicative injustice will follow.
A particularly good example of this intuition comes from a recent Radiolab podcast.202 
During an episode about navigation, the podcasters told the story of a woman who has a rare, 
recently diagnosed illness. This illness shares some features with the schizophrenia case, but it 
has some potentially challenging features of its own.
The example goes something like this. When she was about eleven, Mary was playing 
baseball in a field near her home. All of a sudden, she felt very strange and decided to go home. 
She looked around, but failed to recognize any of her surroundings. Since the baseball field was 
very near her home and very familiar to Mary, this strangeness was very frightening. She ran 
haphazardly down streets and into a yard, and randomly found her mother. She burst into tears 
of relief, threw herself into her mother’s arms, and asked her mother what she was doing in this 
strange place. Her mother looked irritated and told Mary not to be silly. Mary was actually 
outside of her own home.
This kind of thing happened now and then throughout Mary’s life. She eventually 
discovered that the strange feeling preceding these episodes meant that her axis, the way that she 
was oriented to the world, was rotating by ninety degrees. Her internal map effectively rotated 
by a quarter of a turn for no apparent reason at periodic intervals. Also, Mary discovered that she 
could sometimes correct this by spinning in circles in the opposite direction. This meant that 
Mary was often lost and often felt the need to find closets, restrooms, and small spaces in which 
to practice her spinning remedy. Mary’s mother inexplicably advised her not to tell anyone about 
her condition because she might then be burned as a witch, so Mary never told anyone of her 
condition. She was afraid of the judgments of others, and she was afraid that she was crazy. 
She never sought help from doctors or friends. When she got married and started a family, her 
husband and children didn’t know.
Due to a series of coincidences brought about by television and the internet, Mary found 
her way to a doctor who was studying a related set of syndromes, and he was able to diagnose
202 Radiolab is a podcast produced by New York Public Radio. Each week the podcasters explore an idea or an issue 
through the stories o f several different people. See “Lost and Found” podcast from www.radiolab.org.
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Mary’s condition. She and a very small number of people suffer from a rare disease that affects 
the way the brain maps its surrounding territory. Mary now has a name for her condition (let us 
call it ‘rotation illness’), a doctor to help her, and access to a community of people who share her 
experiences. The analogy between Mary and Carmita Wood should be clear: both lacked an 
officially sanctioned and widely recognized term with which they might describe their 
experiences (‘rotation illness’, ‘sexual harassment’). Both had other words with which they 
might describe their experiences, but these other words were inadequate (‘office games’, ‘men 
being men’; ‘witchcraft’, ‘craziness’). Both had an aha! moment when they met other people 
who shared their experiences and found words to describe them. However, it seems reasonably 
clear that Carmita Wood was a victim of communicative injustice. Was Mary? Or is Mary just a 
victim of misfortune or bad luck? Is it simply unfortunate that Mary was born with an as-yet 
undiagnosed condition that, when diagnosed, affected so few people that it would never be 
widely recognized or publicized?
To answer this question, let us run quickly through the three parts of the communicative 
injustice definition:
Part One: Resource deficit
Before doctors discovered rotation illness, the collective communicative resource lacked 
a term for Mary’s rotation illness just as it has lacked terms for many of the things that we have 
gone on to discover and name. This seems relatively straightforward, and it tugs our intuitions 
towards placing Mary’s condition in a pile with pluot-like cases -  cases that demonstrate our 
communal linguistic resource growing and changing in time with our science and medicine. 
These cases do not seem like injustices. However, Mary’s case presents an additional
complication. Cases of rotation illness are so rare that they will never be common enough to 
make rotation illness easily recognizable. Like many other medical conditions, rotation illness is 
apparent only to specialists. The term ‘rotation illness’ will never be a commonly used part of 
the collective communicative resource. In this sense, it is like many other bits of technical 
terminology present throughout most branches of human knowledge.
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There are two components to this potential resource deficit, then. First, there is the fact 
that we didn’t have a term to describe rotation illness until doctors and scientists isolated the 
illness and named it. Unfortunately for Mary, this advance did not take place until she was an 
adult. Mary went through childhood and part of life as a grown woman without a term or 
concept to describe her experiences. Second, there is the fact that rotation illness is a rare 
condition. This means that most people will never hear or speak about it. Even though the term 
‘rotation illness’ is now a part of the communal communicative resource, most of us will never 
use it. This means that Mary still won’t be able to use ‘rotation illness’ by itself to describe and 
explain what she experiences. She will have to preface any explanation with words that explain 
the fact that she suffers from a rare neurological condition.
With regard to the first component, the ‘rotation illness’ case has more in common with 
the ‘sexual harassment’ case than the ‘pluot’ case. The advent of both ‘rotation illness’ and 
‘sexual harassment’ meant that people like Carmita Wood and Mary were better able to 
understand their experiences. They had cognitive confidence and other skills that they 
previously lacked; Carmita Wood could recognize that she was wronged and respond
t
accordingly, and Mary could recognize that she was not crazy or ill in some other worrying and 
unknown way and look after herself accordingly. The advent of ‘pluot’ did not have this kind of 
impact on the lives of farmers and geneticists. In this case, therefore, the resource was in deficit 
before the discovery and initial diagnosis of rotation illness. The second component is more 
difficult. Was the resource still in deficit after the diagnosis of rotation illness because Mary and 
other patients did not gain immediate or easy access to the term and concept? Does the fact that 
the term remains uncommon and hard to come by mean that the resource is in deficit? These are 
questions about our access to terms and concepts in the resource. The issue of access to 
communicative resources is too big to discuss with any thoroughness here. Let me just stipulate 
that in this case, since nothing prevented Mary from discovering the term ‘rotation illness’ except 
its scarcity and the fact that technical terms are usually relegated to the borders of the resource, 
this does not count as a resource deficit.
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Part TWo: Communicative Attempt
Mary certainly must have found herself in contexts where she tried to communicate about 
her condition but was unable to do so because she didn’t have the necessary communicative 
resources. The podcast includes one such story. Mary was on her way to her brother’s house - a 
place she visited often - when she had an episode. She called her brother in tears, only to be told 
that she was just streets away. What followed was a very difficult conversation between Mary 
and her brother in which she tried to explain her experience, the fact that she had always had 
similar experiences, and the fact that she was not crazy. She couldn’t tell her brother exactly 
what was going on because she didn’t have a diagnosis and all that comes with it. She couldn’t 
convince her brother that she wasn’t crazy because neither of them had the necessary words and 
concepts to understand what it means to have rotation illness.
This experience meets all of the criteria for a communicative attempt. Mary tried to 
communicate with her brother, but she failed. Her communicative attempt consisted in an 
attempt to explain what it was like to have rotation illness before she had the term ‘rotation 
illness’, and the conversation was a communication failure because of the resource deficit, i.e. 
the absence of the appropriate medical term and all the validation that a diagnosis brings with it.
Part three: Vital Need
It seems easier to make the case for Mary’s having a vital need to communicate than it 
does for Haslanger’s family disagreement. Mary needs to be able to communicate about her 
condition for two equally important reasons. The first reason is related to her physical health and 
safety. Mary needs to be able to communicate about her illness so that she can warn and educate 
the people in her life. She needs to be able to explain why she gets lost, and her friends and 
family need to be able to help her re-orient herself again. In order to do these things, she needs to 
be able to understand that she suffers from a diagnosed medical condition and be able to tell 
people about it. Second, Mary also needs to understand that she has a diagnosed medical 
condition rather than a dose of witchcraft or some other bad thing. She needs cognitive
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confidence and self-respect and all of the other things that can come from gaining self­
understanding. Both of these reasons make a good case for Mary’s vital need.
With these three conditions in place, we can see that Mary’s case is complicated. It 
seems clear that she made a communicative effort, and she had a vital need to communicate. It 
also seems plausible to say that the collective communicative resource was in deficit before the 
initial discovery and diagnosis of rotation illness because of rotation illness patients’ 
communicative needs, but less plausible that it was in deficit afterwards, even though the term 
‘rotation illness’ was hard to find. So we may argue that Mary was a victim of resource-based 
communicative injustice in her youth, but it becomes more difficult to make this argument 
successful once rotation illness has been discovered and its name entered into the communal 
communicative resource. This answer is somewhat unsatisfying, since Mary was not measurably 
better off in terms of her communicative needs after the discovery of her condition. The issue of 
access to specific (less accessible) parts of the resource is a difficult one, worthy of further 
thought and study.
«
5.7 C o n c lu sio n
In this chapter I have set out each of the three elements that make up a resource-based 
communicative injustice. I have put the elements together in a working definition, and I have 
used this definition to work through two potential counterexamples. In the next chapter I will 
revisit each of the major examples discussed in this thesis so far and introduce one new example 
as well. I will work through each of these examples with my definition of resource-based 
communicative injustice, using each case to demonstrate the strengths of the communicative
I,
injustice model.
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C hapter S ix
REVISITING RESOURCE-BASED COM MUNICATIVE INJUSTICE
In this chapter I  revisit each o f the major examples I  have considered thus far in 
this thesis and add one final contemporary illustration o f politically significant 
communication failure. I  work through each case as a potential example o f  
resource-based communicative injustice. I  use this review o f RCI to illustrate the 
strengths and advantages o f the resource-based communicative injustice 
framework.
6.1 Intro ductio n
In the last chapter I presented each part of my working definition of communicative 
injustice: the resource deficit, the communicative attempt, and the vital need condition. Under 
my account, communication failures that meet each of these three conditions are instances of 
communicative injustice. Because these cases depend in part on a deficit in the communal 
communicative resource, I will now call this kind of injustice a resource-based communicative 
injustice. I do this to draw attention to the resource-based nature of the injustice and to 
differentiate this from future work on other kinds of communicative injustice.
In this final chapter I will bring together all of the major examples that I have considered in 
this thesis so far. I will apply my definition of a resource-based communicative injustice from 
Chapter Five to each example, thereby demonstrating the strengths of the RCI framework.
6.2  La n g to n ’s Refusal  Example
The first example of communication failure in this thesis occurs in Chapter One. In that 
chapter I outline Langton’s defense of MacKinnon’s claim that pornography silences women.203 
Langton uses the Austinian speech act framework to argue that pornography silences by
203 To review this claim, see sections 1.1 - 1.3 of this thesis.
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preventing some women’s utterances of the word ‘no’ and other similar expressions of refusal 
from counting as actual refusals. “Some speech acts are unspeakable for women in some 
contexts: although the appropriate words can be uttered, those utterances fail to count as the 
actions they were intended to be.”204 Langton’s paradigmatic example of silencing is as follows:
A man views pornography that depicts women as coy and sexually insatiable.
Women in these films say ‘no’ to sexual advances when they mean ‘yes’. In other 
words, they do not mean to refuse sex when they say ‘no’; they mean to tease and 
titillate men. The implication is that this kind of refusal, refusal from a woman in 
a sexual context, does not count as a “real” refusal. Instead, it counts as foreplay.
This pornography-viewing man subsequently finds himself in a sexual context 
with a woman. The woman says ‘no’ to his sexual advances, but he does not take 
her utterance to count as a refusal, and he rapes her.205
Langton argues that pornography is itself a speech act, and it both illocutionarily and 
perlocutionarily silences women’s refusal of sex. In other words, in this example, pornography 
both prevents this woman’s utterance from being taken as a refusal of sex and makes it 
impossible for this woman to perform the act of refusing sex.
Langton’s refusal example is interesting for a number of reasons. First, it is an example of 
politically significant communication failure that has been taken seriously by the philosophical 
community. The number of responses to Langton that are detailed in Chapter Two of this thesis 
are evidence of that fact. The silencing debate continues to be innovative and lively nearly 
twenty years after the publication of Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts. It is therefore safe to 
argue that politically significant communication failure is a topic of considerable philosophical 
interest, and one worth taking seriously. Second, with this example Langton focuses on a 
particular kind of communication failure. She notes that women can be silenced in a number of 
different ways. They can be physically restrained or gagged. They can be threatened. However, 
she is interested in a different kind of silencing. She is interested in the silencing that occurs 
because of a very specific interaction between language and power.
204 Langton (1993), p. 299.
205 This summary o f Langton’s example is taken from Section 1.3 of this thesis.
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If you are powerful, you sometimes have the ability to silence the speech of the 
powerless. One way might be to stop the powerless from speaking at all. Gag 
them, threaten them, condemn them to solitary confinement. But there is another, 
less dramatic but equally effective way. Let them speak. Let them say whatever 
they like to whomever they like, but stop that speech from counting as an action.
More precisely, stop it from counting as the action it was intended to be.206
In other words, with this example Langton draws our attention to the fact that language and 
socio-political forces interact in a complex and interesting way, and that this interaction might be 
the locus of an injustice. It might be the case that a speaker’s audience or social situation has 
more control over what a speaker is able to communicate than the speaker does. Under certain 
circumstances, this lack of control seems troubling. Finally, although Langton does not discuss 
this example in these terms, it seems clear that the silencing case is an example of how 
communicative abilities can be distributed unequally among a population of language users. It is 
this inequality that gives us a sense that there might be a communication-based injustice here, 
and not just a power imbalance or a shocking instance of sexual violence.
In spite of the many interesting features of this case, Langton’s silencing framework is 
subject to a number of difficulties. First and foremost, Langton’s reliance on Austinian speech 
act theory leaves her argument vulnerable to many of the difficulties inherent in that theory. In 
particular, Langton must contend with the issue of uptake, and whether the content of the uptake 
is sufficient to determine the content of the illocution.207 I discuss some objections to the speech 
act theory behind silencing in Chapter Two. Second, Langton’s argument rests on her assertion 
that pomographers have sufficient authority to set felicity conditions for sexual refusal. This 
assertion relies on inconclusive empirical evidence. While this is not necessarily an obstacle to 
her argument, it does serve to lessen its intuitive appeal for some. It certainly makes silencing- 
type phenomena seem plausible only under certain limited, rarefied circumstances. It does not 
seem likely that the silencing framework will easily generalize to cover more instances of 
politically significant communication failure. While it is true that Langton did not set out to 
achieve such broad coverage, this lack of generalizability is still a drawback for those of us 
hoping to understand the phenomenon of politically significant communication failure and locate
206 Langton (1993), p. 299.
207 See Bird (2002), Jacobson (1995).
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it within a broader context of social injustice. Third, both Langton’s example and her framework 
focus on the experience of the silenced woman. However, it seems clear that both people in this 
example were involved in a communication failure. To say this is not to make excuses for a 
rapist; the consequences of communication failure can be considered separately from the 
communication failure itself. To say that pornography silences women only seems to capture 
half of what happens in this example.
If we look at this example through the lens of my Resource-Based Communicative 
Injustice framework, some of these problems seem more tractable. However, before I 
demonstrate how helpful the RCI framework is here, let me first show that we can understand 
Langton’s refusal example as a case of RCI.
Recall the definition of RCI. An attempt to communicate is a RCI if the following three 
conditions apply:
1. There must be a deficit in the communal communicative resource. This 
deficit can take one of two forms. Either
a. a lack of a term, concept, etc. as in the case of ‘sexual harassment’, or
b. a debilitating lack of clarity with respect to a term or concept, as in the 
case o f ‘rape’.
2. A person or group of people must make a communicative attempt. In any 
communicative attempt, the following conditions must be met:
a. A person or group makes an attempt to communicate.
b. That person or group is unable to communicate.
c. A term or concept obscured by or missing because of a resource deficit 
is necessary for successful communication, and
d. The communication failure occurs because of the resource deficit, 
either because the resource is insufficiently clear (as in the case of rape) 
or because the resource lacks a necessary term (as in the case of sexual 
harassment).
3. The person or group must have a vital need to communicate. In other 
words, the communication failure must interfere with the communicator’s 
ability to flourish and pursue her own projects.
In this case, the debilitating lack of clarity with respect to the term ‘no’ signals that there is a 
clear deficit in the communal communicative resource. The woman and man in the example 
make an attempt to communicate. The notion of sexual refusal is necessary for their
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communication. They are arguably unable to communicate because of their lack of clarity or 
consensus about what counts as sexual refusal. He takes her to be consenting when she utters 
‘no’, while she takes herself to be refusing; their communication failure occurs because of the 
deficit. Finally, both people have a vital need to communicate here. The woman needs to be 
able to communicate her refusal in order to maintain her bodily integrity and control over her 
sexuality, among other things. The man needs to be able to understand sexual refusal in order to 
live a good life and avoid becoming a rapist. This example meets all of the conditions for a RCI.
There are several advantages to understanding the silencing example in this way. First, in 
so doing, we avoid all objections connected to speech act theory. We also avoid the need to 
make empirical claims about the authority of pornographers. All that is required to get this 
example off the ground as an instance of RCI is that we understand the exchange involving the 
utterance of ‘no’ as a communication failure. We do not need to construct arguments about the 
cause of the resource deficit, interesting though those claims may be. However, the main 
advantage of the RCI framework does not rely on overcoming the disadvantages of Langton’s 
speech act framework. Instead, it is based on the merits of the RCI framework itself.
Namely, the RCI framework takes in a bigger picture than Langton’s speech act framework 
does. Langton helps us to see that the woman in the refusal case is a victim of an injustice, or at 
least that she is silenced and that this is wrong. However, her framework does not help us to 
understand the role played by the man in this example. Under RCI, both conversationalists 
might be victims of an injustice. While we can easily understand that the silenced woman is a 
victim of an injustice, we may be tempted to conclude that the man in this story is not a victim of 
injustice because he goes on to rape the woman. Just as we separated her harasser’s subsequent 
bad behavior from the communication failure in the Carmita Wood case, we can also separate 
confusion over the use of the word ‘no’ from the subsequent rape here.208 This separation means 
that we can understand that the resource deficit left both conversationalists equally vulnerable to 
communication failure, and that both might be victims of RCI. A broader focus like this may 
prove helpful when trying to understand and improve communication practices at the
208 See Chapter Four for more on this distinction.
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community-wide level. This more comprehensive understanding of the example is a definite 
advantage of the RCI framework.
6.3 La n g to n ’s Protest  Example
I also introduce another example of communication failure in Chapter One. Langton uses a 
second example to illustrate her silencing framework, this time focusing on the notion of 
illocutionary silencing. Recall the following summary:
Linda Marchiano is a woman who has appeared in pornographic films. She wrote 
about her experiences during the filming of one particular piece, describing how 
she was beaten, tortured, drugged, coerced, and raped. Marchiano wrote about 
these experiences in explicit detail in order to protest against the treatment that she 
and other people endure in the making of pornographic films. She intended her 
account to shock and horrify her readers. Instead, Marchiano’s book is sold in 
pornography catalogues alongside material of pornographic content; it is sold as 
pornography. Langton argues that Marchiano’s illocutionary act of protest was 
silenced by the porn industry just as was the woman in the [refusal] example.
Neither one was able to perform the speech act that she intended to perform.209
It is important to note here that it is not the case that no-one could understand Marchiano’s book 
as a protest against the pornography industry. It is only the case that some people did not or 
chose not to understand it in this way. It is not impossible that Marchiano’s book be understood 
as a protest. Instead, Langton’s claim is that Marchiano’s book is sold as pornography, thus 
silencing her speech act of protest. She intended to protest, and some people took her to be 
producing pornography. This case is importantly different from the refusal case, and I will 
explain this distinction in what follows.
First however, I should note the that Langton’s protest example is not an example of 
resource-based communicative injustice. To see why this is so, consider the first criterion of my 
RCI definition:
1. There must be a deficit in the communal communicative resource. This 
deficit can take one of two forms. Either
a. a lack of a term, concept, etc. as in the case of ‘sexual harassment’, or
209 Chapter 1.3.
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b. a debilitating lack of clarity with respect to a term or concept, as in the 
case o f ‘rape’.
In this case, there is no resource deficit. Marchiano did not lack terms or concepts to describe 
her experience in the pornography industry. She did not suffer from a debilitating lack of clarity 
with respect to any of the terms or concepts that she employed to write her book. In this case, 
Marchiano had the communicative resources that she needed, but she was still unable to 
communicate. Although Marchiano’s experience may be an example of a kind of communicative 
injustice, the injustice is not resource-based. This classification may seem strange, since there 
are obvious parallels between the refusal case and the protest case. Both cases involve a person 
struggling to communicate by using words (or performing acts) that fail to convey what they are 
intended to convey. Why, then, is the refusal case an example of RCI while the protest case is 
not?
To see the deeper dissimilarity between these two cases, consider the following 
explanation. In the refusal case, the woman says ‘no’ and means to refuse sex, while the man 
hears ‘no’ and takes her to be consenting to sex. In the protest case, say that Marchiano says 
something like ‘I was bound and gagged,’ and means that she was physically restrained, but a 
potential pom-using reader takes her to be telling a story about her experience of being 
imprisoned. The crucial distinction here is that the pom-user finds Marchiano’s account of her 
experiences to be sexually arousing, while Marchiano intends it to be horrifying, etc. In the 
protest case, Marchiano fails to evoke the response that she intends to evoke. She does not fail to 
tell the story she intends to tell. When she says ‘I was bound and gagged,’ her reader takes her to 
mean that she was bound and gagged. This is not the case in the refusal example. The kind of 
communication failure is subtly different.
Langton is right to point out that there is something troubling and unjust about Marchiano’s 
story. However, the problem seems to occur on the level of the audience’s response to 
Marchiano, and not on the level of any failure to understand what is said. In the refusal case, we 
are to understand that the pornographic convention is so robust that the man could not have 
understood the woman’s utterance as a refusal. In this case, Langton’s argument is that some 
conventions make refusal impossible in some sexual contexts. In the protest case, the 
pornographic convention may influence the pom-user’s response to Marchiano’s words, but it
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does not make it impossible for her to tell her story. Also, it is not clear that the communal 
communicative resource should make it the case that we respond one way or another to a 
person’s utterances. In Davidson’s example about the actor trying to warn his audience about a 
fire in the theatre, both the actor and the audience had access to the part of the communal 
communicative resource that contains the term ‘fire’. The fact the audience failed to take his 
words as a warning is tragic, but this failure does not demonstrate a deficit in our communal 
communicative resources with regard to the term ‘fire’. We also would not want every utterance 
of ‘fire’ to count as a warning, since this would restrict our communication and self-expression 
considerably. The fact that Marchiano’s act of protest served to arouse some people is certainly 
an indication of a communication problem. This problem may be an indication of a 
communicative injustice, but as I have argued here, it is not a resource-based communicative 
injustice.
6 . 4  T h e  ‘s e x u a l  h a r a s s m e n t ’ Ex a m p l e
I have devoted considerable space in this thesis to Miranda Fricker’s example about the 
origins of the term ‘sexual harassment’.210 Recall the example:
Carmita Wood worked for a North American university in the early 1970s, at a 
time when significant numbers of women had not been members of ‘the 
professions’ long enough for us to develop a nuanced understanding of 
professional gender relations. At a time when we had no concept of what sexual 
harassment was, Carmita Wood’s boss made unwanted sexual advances to her in 
their place of work. Carmita did everything she could to avoid or alleviate the 
situation before succumbing to stress and trauma and quitting her job. Her 
subsequent claim for unemployment insurance was denied because she could not 
name or describe to her (or anyone else’s) satisfaction the reason for her 
unemployment. Carmita eventually found a women’s group that fostered 
discussion of women’s experiences in the workplace. She discovered that her 
experience was not uncommon. Members of this group chose to name their 
shared experience ‘sexual harassment’, and they used this name in a successful 
campaign to make sexual harassment illegal. Carmita Wood’s story is also an 
account of the origins of the term ‘sexual harassment’.211
210 See Chapters Three, Four, and Five.
211 Chapter Five p. 5-6.
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Fricker uses this example as a paradigm case of hermeneutical injustice. Carmita is a victim of 
hermeneutical injustice because there is a gap in the collective hermeneutical resource where the 
term ‘sexual harassment’ should be and because women like her were denied the opportunity to 
prevent this gap from arising by participating equally in the generation of the resource. Because 
of these two things, Carmita is unable to understand her experience of sexual harassment and is 
therefore a victim of hermeneutical injustice.
However, Fricker’s account of hermeneutical injustice includes the idea that such injustices 
occur when some significant area of one’s social experience is obscured from collective 
understanding.212 This idea of collective understanding includes not only Carmita’s 
understanding of her experience, but also her harasser’s understanding. As I argue in Chapter 
Four, this notion of collectivity presents a problem for Fricker’s account. Fricker’s account of 
hermeneutical injustice relies on an asymmetry between Carmita and her harasser. Although 
both people suffer from and are harmed by the same lack of knowledge and understanding, only 
Carmita is a victim of hermeneutical injustice because she is wronged by this lack in a way that 
her harasser is not. However, as I have argued, this does not seem to fully capture what is going 
on in this case. Hermeneutical injustice is a form of epistemic injustice, and both parties in this 
case share a similar epistemic position with respect to an understanding of sexual harassment (or 
lack thereof). As I have argued, this makes it seem like the asymmetry between Carmita and her 
harasser rests on pre-existing social inequality and not on epistemic grounds. I argue that 
Fricker’s way of understanding Carmita Wood’s story is unsatisfying for this reason.
However, Carmita’s story is also an example of resource-based communicative injustice. It 
meets each of the three conditions of my definition. First, there is a clear deficit in the 
communal communicative resource. This deficit involves the lack of a term, and was my 
paradigm example of this kind of resource deficit in Chapter Five. The second condition for a 
RCI is the communicative attempt. Recall the condition:
A person or group of people must make a communicative attempt. In any
communicative attempt, the following set of conditions must be met:
a. A person or group makes an attempt to communicate.
212 Fricker (2007), p. 155.
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b. That person or group is unable to communicate.
c. A term or concept obscured by or missing because of a resource deficit 
is necessary for the communication, and
d. The communication failure occurs because of the resource deficit, 
either because the resource is insufficiently clear (as in the case of rape) 
or because the resource lacks a necessary term (as in the case of sexual 
harassment).
Carmita makes a communicative attempt when she attempts to fill in the form at the 
unemployment insurance office. She tries to find a word to explain why she left her job, and she 
cannot do so. This takes care of sub-conditions a) and b). It is clear both that the term ‘sexual 
harassment’ was missing at that point and that this term was necessary during Carmita’s attempt 
to fill in the form, thus satisfying sub-condition c). It is also clear that Carmita’s failure to find a 
term that describes why she was unemployed occurred because of the resource deficit. If ‘sexual 
harassment’ had been a part of the resource, she would have both understood her experience as 
one of sexual harassment and used the term to explain why she left her job. This satisfies the 
final sub-condition. Under my definition, then, Carmita made a communicative attempt. Finally, 
I have argued in Chapter Five that Carmita had a vital need to communicate, thus meeting the 
third and final condition for RCI.213 She needed to be able to communicate about sexual 
harassment in order to understand her experience, protest against further injustices, and generally 
pursue her own projects and flourish as a human person.
If we understand Carmita Wood’s story as an example of RCI, we gain the following 
advantages. First, under the RCI framework, both Carmita and her harasser might be victims of 
injustice. We already understand how Carmita is a victim, but her harasser may also be one, 
depending on how you tell his story. He suffers from the same resource deficit as Carmita, thus 
fulfilling the first condition of the definition. If he were to attempt to make a communicative 
attempt before or after harassing Carmita, he might potentially meet the other two conditions for 
RCI. His communicative attempt would probably fail for the same reasons that Carmita’s did, 
and one might argue that he has an interest in understanding and communicating about sexual 
harassment in order to flourish. For example, he might want to engage only in behavior that 
treats other people as worthy of human dignity, and the resource deficit in this case might mean
213 See section 5.3.
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that he lacks an understanding of his harassing behavior that would allow him to meet this 
goal.214 It is possible that he and Carmita might both be victims of RCI. This is important 
because RCI allows us to understand a broader picture of communication failure. Because the 
definition is rooted in the shared resource, we immediately see the problem in terms of the entire 
conversational context. We do not limit our understanding to one party or another due to their 
role in other simultaneously-occurring kinds of injustice.
Another advantage of the RCI approach is that it focuses our attention on the communal 
communicative resource. This focus on the resource may in turn help us to find practical 
solutions to the problems presented by the injustice. For example, in the Carmita Wood case, it 
is clear that we lacked a term that described the experience of sexual harassment. Fortunately, 
Carmita and her colleagues did not need my account of RCI to see that they needed to come up 
with a term in order to raise awareness about sexual harassment and make it illegal in the 
workplace. However, in future cases, if we are aware that our communicative resources may be 
a source of injustice, we might be inclined to look to those resources to adapt, change, or fix 
problems that lead to injustices. The RCI definition and established success stories like that of 
‘sexual harassment’ might serve as a model for future success stories. They provide us with a 
roadmap for practical solutions that address this kind of injustice.
6.5  T he “r a p e ”-r a p e  Ex a m p l e
In Chapter Five I also considered an example of communication failure involving 
confusion about the term ‘rape’. Recall the example:
Prosecutors from California have been trying to mount a case against Big 
Director, who fled the U.S.A after being convicted of rape charges more than 20 
years ago. Allegedly, Big Director forced an underage model, who may or may 
not have been his employee, to have sex with him. There has been a public outcry 
on both sides of this case. Some people feel that Big Director should be 
extradited from Switzerland (where he is currently being held) and sent to the U.S. 
to face charges. They feel that he should not be shown leniency simply because 
he is famous and makes good movies, or simply because time has passed, or
214 This interpretation is possible, even if this positive characterization seems unlikely in Brownmiller’s original 
description.
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simply because his victim has dropped the charges. On the other side, a large 
number of actors and public figures have come out in support of Big Director.
These people feel that the charges should be dropped for a number of reasons.
One well-publicized line of reasoning in support of Big Director appeals to the 
idea that he did not actually commit “real” rape. As Prominent Actress says, it 
was not “rape”-rape.
What does Prominent Actress mean by this statement? Let us assume that she 
knows the facts of the case. Presumably she intends to imply that Big Director’s 
charges should be dropped because he did not “really” rape his putative victim. 
Presumably she means that he did something else (possibly behaved badly) that 
does not count as rape. ‘Rape’ is a word used to describe a concept that most of 
us are very confused about. Prominent Actress’s assertion that Big Director’s case 
was not a case of “rape”-rape is a testament to this widespread confusion. This 
confusion exists even when a putative instance of rape meets the criteria set out in 
criminal law. For example, Big Director confessed to the crime of rape. He was 
convicted in a court of law. His victim was under the legal age of consent. There 
is a clear, unambiguous, and uncontested description of the event on public record. 
However, as we can see, this record has not been particularly helpful in this 
case.215
This case is an example of resource-based communicative injustice. It meets all three 
conditions of the RCI definition. First, it involves one of my core examples of a resource deficit. 
In this case, the deficit takes the form of
b. a debilitating lack of clarity with respect to a term or concept, as in the 
case o f ‘rape’.
Prominent Actress is so affected by this lack of clarity about rape that she uses the term ‘rape’ in 
a kind of double-barreled neologism (“rape”-rape) in an attempt to distinguish Big Director’s 
rape from some other kind of act that is also rape. When she struggles to get her point across in 
this way, she makes a communicative attempt, thus satisfying the second condition of the RCI 
definition. Recall that a communicative attempt must include the following four things:
1. A person or group makes an attempt to communicate.
2. That person or group is unable to communicate.
3. A term or concept obscured by or missing because of a resource deficit 
is necessary for the communication, and
215 See Chapter 5.1.
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4. The communication failure occurs because of the resource deficit, 
either because the resource is insufficiently clear (as in the case of rape) 
or because the resource lacks a necessary term (as in the case of sexual 
harassment).
Prominent Actress makes an attempt to communicate with you or me (via a journalist) when she 
issues her statement in defense of Big Director about “rape”-rape. When taken together with a 
general lack of awareness and clarity about rape in her audience, the fact that she tried to use the 
same term to distinguish one act from another is an indication of her communication failure. The 
term ‘rape’ is clearly necessary for this communicative attempt, and Prominent Actress’s 
communication failure occurs because of this resource deficit.
This leaves only the vital need condition. In this case, it may seem strange to argue that 
Prominent Actress has a vital need to communicate about rape. Recall my outline of the vital 
need condition from Chapter Five:
For the purposes of my working definition, let us say that a need to communicate 
successfully is a vital need if failure to communicate successfully would interfere 
with a person’s ability to flourish and pursue her own projects.216
Prominent Actress’s need may seem less vital than that of someone like Carmita Wood. After all, 
it may not seem like Prominent Actress needs a resource that includes a better, clearer version of 
our current term ‘rape’ in order to protect her own bodily integrity or come to understand her 
own experiences. However, this understanding of our communal need (or lack thereof) for 
effective communication about rape is limited and problematic. Even if it were the case that rape 
victims were the only people who had a vital need for the term ‘rape’, statistics tell us that victim 
of sexual assault make up a considerable section of society. As many as one in six women and 
one in thirty-three men will be sexually assaulted during the course of their lifetime.217 This 
means that a considerable portion of the population has a vital need for clear, useful 
communication about the term ‘rape’. Chances are that Prominent Actress might be among 
them. However, victims are not the only people who need to communicate about rape. Friends,
216 Chapter 5.3.
217 See http://www.ovw.usdqj.gov/sexual-violence-report-march.pdf for the report produced in 2010 by the United 
States Department o f Justice Office on Violence Against Women, the White House Council on Women and Girls, 
and the White House Advisor on Violence Against Women.
relatives, and other members of victims’ communities have a vital need to understand these 
experiences in order to relate to victims and maintain interpersonal relationships. Everyone has a 
vital need to understand what is and is not rape in order to avoid confusion that may lead to 
sexual assault. If we are all clear about the boundaries of acceptable sexuality under the law, 
then we can all speak, act, and judge one another accordingly. Prominent Actress has a vital 
need to communicate about rape, as does anyone who wishes to live a good life in a just society.
If the “rape”-rape case is classed as an example of resource-based communicative injustice, 
we gain the following advantages. First, and like the other examples discussed thus far, the RCI 
framework allows us to focus on practical solutions to complicated problems. I have already 
demonstrated that the collective communicative resource can grow and adapt to our needs and 
changing circumstances. If there is a consensus that we are failing to communicate about rape 
on a broad scale, then there are steps we can take as a society to address this deficit in our 
resource. For example, legislators can work to clarify the legal definition of rape. Politicians 
and law enforcement personnel can engage in awareness campaigns to publicize this new 
definition. Given an acknowledgement of the scale of the problem and the political will to 
address it, the RCI model can help us to see the importance of effective communication about 
rape. Second, the RCI framework does not focus on victims, perpetrators, social norms, men, or 
women. Instead, it invites us to focus on the community as a whole. Resource deficits affect the 
entire community because they are deficits in the collective communicative resource. This broad 
impact might be more obvious in some cases than others. For example, most of us have been 
unaffected by the addition of the term ‘rotation illness’ to the collective resource, even though 
our communicative abilities have been enriched by that addition. However, in cases involving 
terms like ‘rape’, everyone can understand the need for effective communication and 
understanding. The RCI framework makes this communal involvement clearer. This, in turn, 
gives us a deeper understanding of the importance of communicative justice for a just and 
flourishing society.
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6.6 T he N ew sw eek  Example
This final example is new. It has not appeared in this thesis so far. I am including it here 
because it is a nice illustration of what might be the most common kind of resource-based 
communicative injustice. This example is similar to the ‘rape’ case and Langton’s refusal case in 
that it involves terms that already exist in our communal communicative resource. However, it is 
distinctive in that it involves terms and concepts that remain constant over time, even when 
associated facts and understandings change.
A recent Newsweek magazine article tells the story of the Newsweek “dollies” - bright 
young women who worked for the magazine in the 1960s as the women’s movement was 
gathering strength.218 These women faced harassment, discrimination, and an explicit glass 
ceiling where advancement and promotion were concerned. Their frustrations with the job and 
the public momentum of the women’s movement reached a critical mass around the same time, 
and the “dollies” banded together to sue Newsweek for employment discrimination based on 
gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Newsweek’s women were the first media 
professionals to bring such a suit to the courts.
Susan Brownmiller is a former Newsweek researcher. She details some experiences of the 
“dollies” in her memoir entitled In Our Time. Current Newsweek employees Jessica Bennett, 
Jesse Ellison, and Sarah Ball found copies of In Our Time and began to compare the working 
conditions of the “dollies” with those of current Newsweek employees. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
they found that many things have not changed. It may be the case that some things are 
undeniably better:
Forty years after NEWSWEEK's women rose up, there's no denying our cohort of 
young women is unlike even the half-generation before us. We are post-Title IX 
women, taught that the fight for equality was history; that we could do, or be, 
anything. The three of us were valedictorians and state-champion athletes; we got 
scholarships and were the first to raise our hands in class. As young professionals, 
we cheered the third female Supreme Court justice and, nearly, the first female 
president. We've watched as women became the majority of American workers,
218 This example, along with all statistics in this paper, appears in Bennett, Jessica, Jesse Ellison and Sara Ball. “Are 
We There Yet?” Newsweek March 29, 2010.
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prompting a Maria Shriver-backed survey on gender, released late last year, to 
proclaim that "the battle of the sexes is over."
However, some things are not:
The problem is, for women like us, the victory dance feels premature. Youthful 
impatience? Maybe. But consider this: U.S. Department of Education data shows 
that a year out of school, despite having earned higher college GPAs in every 
subject, young women will take home, on average across all professions, just 
80 percent of what their male colleagues do. Even at the top end, female M.B.A.s 
make $4,600 less per year in their first job out of business school, according to a 
new Catalyst study. Motherhood has long been the explanation for the persistent 
pay gap, yet a decade out of college, full-time working women who haven't had 
children still make 77 cents on the male dollar. As women increasingly become 
the breadwinners in this recession, bringing home 23 percent less bacon hurts 
families more deeply than ever before.
These statistics, and others like them, provide evidence for the claim that women have not come 
as far as we might have hoped in terms of gender equality in the workplace. Today’s Newsweek 
women are not “dollies”, but they have not yet broken down all of the barriers that the dollies 
fought against.
The interesting (and insidious) part of co-authors Bennett, Ellison, and Ball’s reflection is 
yet to come. The authors go on to write,
In countless small ways, each of us has felt frustrated over the years, as if 
something was amiss. But as products of a system in which we learned that the 
fight for equality had been won, we didn't identify those feelings as gender- 
related. It seemed like a cop-out, a weakness, to suggest that the problem was 
anybody's fault but our own. It sounds naive—we know—especially since our 
own boss Ann McDaniel climbed the ranks to become NEWS WEEK'S managing 
director, overseeing all aspects of the company. Compared with the NEWSWEEK 
dollies, what did we have to complain about? "If we judge by what we see in the 
media, it looks like women have it made," says author Susan Douglas. "And if 
women have it made, why would you be so ungrateful to point to something and 
call it sexism?"
In other words, on top of any difficulties with the gender pay gap and workplace sexism, 
Bennett, Ellison, and Ball also face an additional problem. In the face of progress made by the 
“dollies” and a society that has ostensibly embraced and moved past the women’s movement,
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how do they express the fact that all things are still not equal? Nobody in today’s journalism 
industry would say that “women don’t write here”, as the “dollies” were told in the early 1960s. 
However, in 1970, 25% of Newsweek’s editorial staff were female. Today that number is 39%. 
As Bennett, Ellison, and Ball point out, “better” is not equality. It is important to note that 
Newsweek is not unusual in this respect. Female bylines at major magazines are outnumbered 
seven to one. Across the professions, women are less than three percent of Fortune 500 CEOs 
and less than a quarter of law partners and politicians. In 1960, the four most common 
professions for women were secretary, domestic help, teacher, and cashier. Today, registered 
nurse takes the place of domestic help, but otherwise this list, like many aspects of gender 
equality in the workplace, remains unchanged.219 And frustration with these facts can be 
surprisingly difficult to express to co-workers and colleagues.
This slow progress has placed women in what Bennett et al call “a bind”. On the one 
hand, many people think that women’s lib is over. Progress has been made. Women can go to 
college with men, enter professions alongside their male colleagues, and do what they want with 
their lives. On the other hand, they can’t. Not if earning equal pay for equal work and having an 
equal shot at career advancement is what they want. And here is the bind: because limited 
progress has been made, women feel that they cannot protest these inequalities without seeming 
irrational, angry, and a host of other undesirable things. High profile success has masked 
persistent inequality. To quote Bennett et al, “We know what you’re thinking: we’re young and 
entitled, whiny and humorless - to use a single, dirty word, feminists!”
In addition to the other kinds of discrimination levied against them, some women like 
Bennett, Ellison, and Ball are also failing to communicate. They don’t know how to express the 
realities of their work situation so that people will listen and understand them. They don’t have 
the language tools — words like ‘feminism’ and ‘sexism’ are no longer acceptable to use at work 
lest one be branded a troublemaker or complainer, and the situation is no better outside the 
office. And even if they could use these words, the meaning of the word ‘sexism’ has not 
changed at the same pace as our understanding of discrimination and other barriers to women. 
Bennett and her colleagues don’t feel able to use words like ‘sexism’ to describe their situation
219 According to Bennett et al, 43% of today’s employed women work in these “pink collar” jobs.
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because nobody has ever told them that they can’t have the promotion, etc. because they are a 
woman.
Somewhere along the road to equality, young women like us lost their voices. So 
when we marched into the workforce and the fog of subtle gender discrimination, 
it was baffling and alien. Without a movement behind us, we had neither the 
language to describe it nor the confidence to call it what it was.
Not only have these women lost the tools that they need in order to communicate effectively, but 
this loss has been compounded by the further loss of self-confidence and assurance that words 
like ‘sexism’ generated for the “dolly” generation. This means that Bennett et al face a more 
complicated challenge than did their “dolly” predecessors. The “dollies” had to create and 
popularize the words and concepts they needed in order to communicate about and fight for 
workplace equalities. Bennett et al must now find new language and new ideas to replace those 
of previous generations, or find some way to reclaim old tools while at the same time distancing 
themselves from the complacency or negative backlash often experienced by contemporary 
communicators.
• One of the main obstacles to successful communication involving the word ‘feminist’ is the 
current confusion about the meaning of the term. There are (at least) two different meanings for 
the general term ‘feminist’ available in the communicative resource.
‘feminist’ meaning A : man-hater, angry woman, irrational harpy 
‘feminist’ meaning B: person who opposes gender-based inequality 
These two divergent meanings can lead to the following problems. First, a person who believes 
that ‘feminist’ means meaning A is simply incorrect. Most feminists are not man-haters, angry 
women, or irrational harpies. This list of descriptions does not capture the extension of the term. 
A person using meaning A is, at the very least, confused. Second, even if a person were to use 
meaning B, in any attempt to communicate, that person’s audience may take them to be using 
meaning A. This is the problem that Bennett et al describe in their article. This confusion 
between meanings can lead to backlash, or a situation in which a person uses a term in order to 
pursue some communicative end but is unable to communicate successfully because the term is 
closely associated with something undesirable, unpopular, and contrary to the communicator’s
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intended meaning. Finally, this situation, in which two meanings are available for one term, can 
lead to widespread confusion about what the term does, in fact, mean.
A similar explanation is available for Bennett et aVs difficulties with the word ‘sexism’. In 
this case, there are also at least two meanings available:
‘sexism’ meaning A: deliberate discrimination against the clearly oppressed
‘sexism’ meaning B: something that includes meaning A but is more frequently 
manifested as implicit bias, stereotype threat, etc.220
In this case, the following problems occur. First, many people think that ‘sexism’ means A, so
therefore Bennett and her colleagues do not think that there is any sexism at Newsweek
magazine. This scenario captures what Bennett meant when she wrote that
[i]n countless small ways, each of us has felt frustrated over the years, as if 
something was amiss. But as products of a system in which we learned that the 
fight for equality had been won, we didn't identify those feelings as gender- 
related.
She was coming up against the limits of the old understanding of ‘sexism’, or ‘sexism’ A. This 
frustration led to a subsequent problem. Given her frustrations with the limits of ‘sexism’ A, 
Bennett begins to be uncertain about what the term ‘sexism’ really means. She has some sense, 
gathered from statistics and from reading Brownmiller’s book, that Newsweek has not achieved 
gender equality, and she understands that this lack of equality is importantly related to sexism. 
However, she is not certain that ‘sexism’ is a label that applies to her treatment in the office. She 
feels that there is a risk of misunderstanding and communication failure that may come with any 
use of the term ‘sexist’. Because of this risk, she feels that she can’t use the term.
Bennett et al give an account of communication failure about sexism and feminism. They 
have “lost their voices”; they no longer have “the language to describe” their thoughts about 
contemporary gender discrimination in the workplace. This situation is a resource-based 
communicative injustice. It meets the three conditions of my RCI definition. First, the 
confusion over the multiple meanings of ‘sexism’ and ‘feminism’ constitutes a resource deficit. 
Bennett and her colleagues require resources that will help them to communicate the fact that the
220 For more information on bias and stereotype threat see Saul (in progress), Implicit Bias, Stereotype Threat, and 
Women in Philosophy.
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struggle for gender equality in the workplace is not finished. These tools are not present in the 
collective communicative resource, or if they are, the are not accessible to the people who need 
them. For the Newsweek “dollies”, the word ‘sexism’ meant overt gender discrimination and 
harassment. For many members of the public, this is what the word still means. For Bennett et 
al, ‘sexism’ may include this meaning, but it should not stop there. Bennett needs to be able to 
use ‘sexism’ to describe implicit judgements and practical states of affairs that may seem 
unconnected to any kind of explicit bias or prejudice. At the present time, Bennett cannot use 
‘sexism’ to refer to the realities of gender inequality in the workplace because words like 
‘sexism’ are not sufficiently clear or well enough understood. The resource has not evolved at 
the same speed as gender discrimination.
Second, Bennett describes her communicative attempt when she recounts her struggle to 
understand and describe her experiences in the workplace. She notes that she “had neither the 
language to describe [subtle gender discrimination] not the confidence to call it what it was”. 
She was reaching for effective words and concepts to take the places formerly occupied by 
‘sexism’ and ‘feminist’ and other such words, but she was not finding the resources that she 
needed. She makes an attempt to communicate, she fails in that attempt, the terms ‘sexism4 and 
‘feminism4 are necessary for the communication, and her failure occurs because of the resource 
deficit.
Finally, Bennett had a vital need to understand her experiences and be able to communicate 
about them to herself and others. Without this ability, Bennett suffers from two distinct kinds of 
harm. First, she lacks the tools that she needs to communicate. She cannot tell the rest of the 
world that she is a victim of injustice. She cannot make her case to an increasingly skeptical 
public. ’ Her work to remedy gender inequality may therefore be stilted and less effective. And 
second, as a result of this inability to communicate, Bennett and other young women are losing 
cognitive confidence. They are no longer sure that their lack of progress in the workplace is not 
their fault. They are no longer sure that the situation as it stands is unacceptable. In other words, 
they will be consistently undervalued and undermined while being unable to communicate about 
or protest such treatment. Such a situation is inconsistent with the kind of life in which a person
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might flourish. Bennett et al are therefore in vital need of the ability to communicate about these 
things.
Given these three conditions, Bennett, Ellison, and Ball are victims of communicative 
injustice. If we understand this case as an instance of RCI, we gain advantages similar to the 
advantages already discussed in the other examples. Namely, the focus on the resource allows us 
to identify, isolate, and possibly rectify problems with the terms ‘sexism’ and ‘feminism’, and the 
RCI framework helps us to conceptualize and understand the communicative needs of the entire 
community rather than focusing only on Bennett and her colleagues.
6.7 C o nclusio n
In summary, the RCI approach offers the following advantages for understanding 
communication failure. First, it promotes a wider understanding of communication failure. RCI 
includes the entire conversational group rather than focusing only on one person’s struggle to 
communicate. This broad focus helps to avoid misunderstanding, alienation, and other barriers 
to understanding. As long as each person affected by a resource deficit makes a communicative 
attempt and has a vital need, then, under the RCI framework, their struggle is an injustice. 
Second, the RCI framework draws our attention to the ways that communication can be a locus 
of injustice. This is a fruitful way of thinking about communication and the relations that hold 
between language and justice, and as we have seen in this chapter, it can be a fruitful way of 
dealing with a wide range of communication failures. Even when an example does not meet the 
criteria for RCI, like Langton’s protest case, for example, its exclusion from the RCI framework 
tells us that the example is not about a resource deficit. This knowledge may encourage us to 
look elsewhere for a deeper understanding of the problem. Finally, under the RCI framework, 
the focus on the collective communicative resource may make some practical solutions (lawsuits 
for ‘sexual harassment’, awareness campaigns for ‘rape’) more apparent, or more apparently 
necessary. The RCI framework may help us to generate ideas about practical solutions to 
communication problems.
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C o nclusio n
S o m e  F in a l  T h o u g h t s  a n d  t h e  C o n t in u in g  P r o j e c t
In this thesis I have begun an exploration of communicative injustice. I have considered 
the thought that some of our communicative practices are so vital to our flourishing existence as 
human persons that we may suffer an injustice when these practices fail. I have argued that there 
are certain contexts in which we should be able to communicate certain things, and that 
sometimes an inability to communicate constitutes an injustice.
I have worked through several different accounts of politically significant communication 
failures (most notably Langton’s silencing and Fricker’s hermeneutical injustice). My RCI 
model provides an alternate way of dealing with many of the examples raised in these accounts. 
It is my hope that it provides a way of working through these difficult cases that is fruitful and 
productive. These examples of communication failure present us with serious practical, moral, 
and political problems, and in order to address them we must begin to pay more attention to the 
broader context of communication failure. That is, resource-based communication failure is not 
(usually) something that happens only to one person. Often we may discover that both speaker 
and audience are adversely affected by a resource-based communication failure, and even if the 
failure happens because one party is a member of either a marginalized or an unfairly advantaged 
social group, both parties may benefit from attempts to address the resource deficit.
My definition of resource-based communicative injustice is only a working definition. I 
expect that it will change and evolve as I encounter further criticism and discussion. There is 
still work to be done on this project, both in terms of refining the definition of resource-based 
communicative injustice and in terms of expanding a general understanding of communicative 
injustice to include other varieties. I am particularly interested in developing an account of 
communicative injustice that focuses on our access to the collective communicative resource. I 
touch briefly on this issue in Chapter Five with discussion of the rotation illness case. If a vitally 
important term exists in the resource but is so seldom used that it becomes peripheral and 
therefore difficult for many people to access, is this a kind of injustice? This question bears
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further consideration, and the example might work better under a different, non-resource-based 
framework. In addition to issues about access, I am also interested in future work on the idea of 
communicative competence. What counts as communicative competence? Who gets to decide 
this, and how do they make that decision? If a person cannot access the communal 
communicative resource because they do not have (or have not been taught) sufficient 
communicative skills, is this also a kind of injustice? If so, how are we to distinguish 
communicative injustice from communicative disability? These are just some of the questions I 
look forward to addressing in future work.
My goal here has been to provide a working definition of resource-based communicative 
injustice. This definition and its accompanying conceptual framework can help us to gain a 
better understanding of some important kinds of communication failure. An RCI is an injustice, 
and should be recognized as such.
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